Is the idea that fear builds cooperative relationships novel?

No. Grossmann suggests that psychologists predominantly view heightened experience and expression of fear and anxiety to be dysfunctional. However, large, long-standing, literatures on social referencing and social support show that feeling and expressing fear is often supportive of human cooperation.

Included in this literature are studies by developmentalists showing that very young children interpret their caretakers' and even a familiar experimenters' expressions of fear as signals that they ought not cross a visual cliff (Klinnert et al., Reference Klinnert, Emde, Butterfield and Campos1986; Sorce, Emde, Campos, & Klinnert, Reference Sorce, Emde, Campos and Klinnert1985). Moreover, both classic (Schachter, Reference Schachter1959) and recent (Scarantino, Hareli, & Hess, Reference Scarantino, Hareli and Hess2021) research shows another's fear serves social referencing functions for adults. Extant work also shows expressing fear signals a desire for support (Scarantino et al., Reference Scarantino, Hareli and Hess2021), that humans selectively express fear (and other emotions) to potentially trusted-caring others (Clark & Finkel, Reference Clark and Finkel2005; Von Culin, Hirsch, & Clark, Reference Von Culin, Hirsch and Clark2017) and that doing so often elicits support (Graham et al., Reference Graham, Huang, Clark and Helgeson2008; Simpson et al., Reference Simpson, Rholes and Nelligan1992). Simpson et al. (Reference Simpson, Rholes and Nelligan1992), for instance, brought dating couples into a laboratory. The female member was subjected to a fear induction and then the couple was left alone. Results showed that the more anxiety/fear securely attached women displayed, the more they sought support and the more care that securely attached male partners provided. To give another example, in study 1 of a paper published by Graham et al. (Reference Graham, Huang, Clark and Helgeson2008), participants read vignettes about a person who needed help. In the condition where this person was described as expressing fear/anxiety, participants said they would provide the person with more help. In study 2 of the same paper, when a confederate in a laboratory study looked fearful and verbally expressed fear that confederate received more help than the same confederate who did not behave in these ways. In a fourth and final study, self-reports of willingness to express negative emotions (including fear/anxiety) prior to college arrival predicted forming more relationships, achieving greater intimacy in the closest of those relationships, and receiving more support from roommates across their first semester of college.

Psychologists do not view fear as “mostly” dysfunctional

As just noted, many psychologists recognize adaptive functions of fear. They also know that fear can be dysfunctional when it is disproportionate to the fearful person's needs (Lemay & Dudley, Reference Lemay and Dudley2011), prevents engagement in normal activities (National Institute of Mental Health, 2022), is expressed to insecure partners (Simpson et al., Reference Simpson, Rholes and Nelligan1992), or is expressed in non-communal relationships wherein it may invite exploitation. There is no paradox. There simply exist social bounds within which feeling and expressing fear is and is not adaptive and it is also the case that some people do persistently experience clinically debilitating levels of fear.

Have humans evolved to feel and to express fear per se at birth?

Is fear “the” emotion that has evolved to be expressed and to promote human cooperation? We think not. Rather we and many others (e.g., Barrett & Campos, Reference Barrett, Campos and Osofsky1987; Stroufe, Reference Stroufe1996) believe human infants are prepared to feel and express distress at birth (which is negatively valenced and associated with arousal) when they have a variety of needs. Parents appear to be prepared to respond with care. When this adaptive pairing occurs again and again it builds trust and cooperative bonds (Leerkes, Blankson, & O’Brien, Reference Leerkes, Blankson and O’Brien2009). Later, as social and conceptual learning and language develop, children differentiate distress into more granular conceptual categories such as fear, sadness, anger, embarrassment, and disgust (Hoemann, Xu, & Barrett, Reference Hoemann, Xu and Barrett2019; Holodynski & Seeger, Reference Holodynski and Seeger2019). The expression of these negative emotions (and positive emotions too) conveys valuable information about the welfare of the expresser. Their expression, when appropriate to the relational context, supports human cooperation in nuanced ways that have been documented (e.g., Algoe, Fredrickson, & Gable, Reference Algoe, Fredrickson and Gable2013; Clark, Ouellette, Powell, & Milberg, Reference Clark, Ouellette, Powell and Milberg1987; Donato, Pagani, Parise, Bertoni, & IaFrate, Reference Donato, Pagani, Parise, Bertoni and IaFrate2014; Feinberg, Willer, & Keltner, Reference Feinberg, Willer and Keltner2011; Gable & Reis, Reference Gable and Reis2010; Semin & Manstead, Reference Semin and Manstead1982). There certainly exists broad theoretical disagreement on the nature of emotion among psychologists, but currently insufficient evidence that feeling and expressing heightened fear per se (rather than general distress) is evolutionarily determined and present at birth.

More than one type of cooperative relationship exists

Human cooperation takes many forms (Bugental, Reference Bugental2000; Clark, Earp, & Crockett, Reference Clark, Earp and Crockett2020). Cooperation in parent/infant relationships, friendships and romantic relationships, business relationships, and in leader–follower relationships differs in form and function (Earp, McLoughlan, Monrad, Clark, & Crockett, Reference Earp, McLoughlan, Monrad, Clark and Crockett2021). Grossmann appears to write about just one type of cooperative relationship, which aligns with what Clark and Mills (Reference Clark and Mills1979, Reference Clark, Mills, Van Lange, Kruglanski and Higgins2012) would call an asymmetrical communal relationship and which Bugental (Reference Bugental2000) would call an attachment relationship. In such a relationship a child expresses needs to which caretakers typically respond with non-contingent given care. Yet, cooperation (and caring about treating partners well) takes a very different form in, for example, exchange/transactional relationships. In these relationships, benefits are provided with the expectation of receiving comparable benefits in exchange or in repayment of these provisions (Clark, Reference Clark1984; Clark & Mills, Reference Clark and Mills1979, Reference Clark, Mills, Van Lange, Kruglanski and Higgins2012). Expressions of emotion are less likely to occur within these relationships (Von Culin et al., Reference Von Culin, Hirsch and Clark2017). Indeed, doing so can make a person appear especially dependent (Clark & Taraban, Reference Clark and Taraban1991), making them vulnerable to exploitation. In exchange relationships partners can be unresponsive to expressions of emotions (Clark et al., Reference Clark, Ouellette, Powell and Milberg1987). To understand how fear and other emotions and their expression subserve cooperation, we must specify the type of cooperative or non-cooperative relationship about which we are talking.

Summary

Emotions and their expression, fear included, subserve cooperative relationships. Yet to understand how, when, and why this develops (and sometimes goes awry) more attention to and integration with extant work on the nature of emotion, the social function of emotions, and the cooperative (or lack thereof) nature of social relationships is needed.