Published online by Cambridge University Press: 17 February 2009
There has been a significant amount of discussion on the applicability of international humanitarian law (IHL) to United Nations forces (hereafter, UN forces), and the practice of the UN and states on the matter has gradually developed over the years. Now, there is substantial evidence that IHL is applicable to UN forces. However, as alleged misconduct of UN forces has been increasingly reported, including potential violations of IHL, the legal consequences of such violations have come into question. Thus, this article will not only review the recent developments and remaining issues on the applicability of IHL to UN forces but will also discuss the responsibility of the UN and states for violations of IHL by UN troops as well as individual criminal responsibility of UN troops. The article begins by recalling the conditions in which UN forces have been conducting their activities.
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7. See the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations website for statistics on fatalities <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/fatalities/fata12.htm>.
9. See SC Res. 143, 17 July 1960; SC Res. 145, 22 July 1960; SC Res. 161, 21 February 1961; and SC Res. 169, 24 November 1961.
10. For accounts of ONUC air strikes, see the following: UN Doc. S/4940/Add. 17, 9 December 1961, para. 4; Add. 18, 20 December 1961, paras. 8 and 12; UN Doc. S/5053/Add. 14, paras. 76–78. For the reports on the Congo, including accounts of the fighting between ONUC and irregular forces, see UN Doc. S/4940 and Add. 1–9, SCOR (United Nations), Supp. for July-September 1961, pp. 99–121; Add. 10–19, ibid., Supp. for October-December 1961, pp. 1–59; UN Doc. S/5053 and Add. 1–9, ibid., Supp. for January-March 1962, pp. 2–44; Add. 10, ibid., Supp. for April-June 1962, pp. 1–93; Add. 11, ibid., Supp. for July-September 1962, pp. 1–40; Add. 12 and 13, ibid., Supp. for October-December 1962, pp. 1–142; Add. 14 and 15, ibid., Supp. for January-March 1963, pp. 1–85. See also Abi-Saab, G., The United Nations Operation in the Congo 1960–1964 (Oxford, Oxford University Press 1978)Google Scholar.
11. UN Doc. S/5053/Add. 14, 11 January 1963, supra n. 10, p. 18, paras. 76–78.
12. See supra n. 10.
13. UN Doc. S/4940/Add. 15, 30 November 1961, supra n. 10, pp. 29–32, paras. 1–9.
14. UN Doc. S/4940/Add. 12, 2 November 1961, supra n. 10, pp. 11–12, para. 2.
15. UN Doc. S/5053/Add. 14, 11 January 1963, supra n. 10, pp. 44–45, Annex XXVI.
17. See supra n. 7.
18. For an overview of the situation in Somalia and the activities of UNOSOM II in 1993, see United Nations, ‘Somalia’, 47 Yearbook of the United Nations (1993) pp. 288–304Google Scholar.
19. See the full report on the incident on 5 June 1993, Report of the Commission of Inquiry Established Pursuant to SC Res. 885 (1993) to Investigate Armed Attacks on UNOSOM II Personnel Which Led to Casualties among Them, UN Doc. S/1994/653, 1 June 1994, p. 27, para. 137.
22. See supra n. 7.
23. For UNPROFOR combat activities and NATO air strikes, see the UN Secretary-General's reports and letters, UN Docs. S/1994/131, 7 February 1994; S/1994/300, 16 March 1994; S/1994/466, 19 April 1994; S/1994/600, 19 May 1994; S/1994/1067, 17 September 1994; S/1994/1389, 1 December 1994; S/1995/222, 22 March 1995; S/1995/444, 30 May 1995; S/1994/555, 9 May 1994.
24. For UN Secretary-General's concern over the character of UNPROFOR, see UN Docs. S/1994/300, 16 March 1994, para. 34; S/1994/1067, 17 September 1994, para. 43.
25. For UN Secretary-General's concern over the impartiality of UNPROFOR, see UN Docs. S/1994/555, 9 May 1994, para. 10; S/1995/444, paras. 40 and 58. For hostage-taking of UNPROFOR troops, see UN Docs. S/1994/600, 19 May 1994, para. 17; S/1995/444, 30 May 1995, paras. 14 and 57.
26. See supra n. 7.
27. See the following for attacks on United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) and the capture of 461 troops by the rebels: Fourth Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone, UN Doc. S/2000/455, 19 May 2000, paras. 56–71 and Fifth Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone, UN Doc. S/2000/751, 31 July 2000, para. 24. For the UN forces in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, see ‘UN Mission, Congolese National Army launch joint action against rebels’, UN News Centre, 8 November 2004 <http://www.un.org/News>; Third Special Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, UN Doc. S/2004/650, 16 August 2004, paras. 34–46; Walsh, D., ‘Rebel move on Congo City threatens fragile peace’, in The Independent, 1 06 2004, p. 25Google Scholar.
28. Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel of 1994, UN Doc. A/RES/49/59, 17 February 1995, Annex, 34 ILM (1995) p. 484Google Scholar.
29. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 37 ILM (1998) p. 999Google Scholar. Arts. 8(2)(b)(iii) and (e)(iii) provide that the following are war crimes: ‘Intentionally directing attacks against personnel, installations, material, units or vehicles involved in a humanitarian assistance or peacekeeping mission in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, as long as they are entitled to the protection given to civilians or civilian objects under the international law of armed conflict.’ See also Art. 4(b) of the Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone <http://www.sc-sl.org/scsl-statute.html>. See also the indictments of the Special Court which include attacks on UN troops by the rebels: Prosecutor v. Sesay et al., SCSL-2004-15-PT, p. 9, para. 41 and p. 21, para. 83 and count 15; Prosecutor v. Brima et al., SCSL-2004–16-PT, p. 8, para. 38 and pp. 20–21, para. 80 and count 15.
30. See ‘Current operations’ in the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/index.asp>.
31. United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL, SC Res. 1270, 1289, 1389); Mission des Nations Unies en République démocratique du Congo (MONUC, SC Res. 1291, 1493, 1533); United Nations Mission in Support in East Timor (UNMISET, SC Res. 1410); United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI, SC Res. 1528); Opération des Nations Unies au Burundi (ONUB, SC Res. 1545). United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL, SC Res. 1509) and Mission des Nations Unies pour la stabilisation en Haïti (MINUSTAH, SC Res. 1529) were only authorised under Chapter VII.
32. Former Yugoslavia (SC Res. 770, 787, 816, 836, 844, 908, 958); Somalia (SC Res. 794); 1993 Haiti (SC Res. 875, 917); Rwanda (SC Res. 929); 1994 Haiti (SC Res. 940); 1995 Croatia (SC Res. 981); 1996 Croatia (SC Res. 1037, 1120); Bosnia and Herzegovina (SC Res. 1088, 1174, 1247, 1305, 1357, 1423); Central African Republic (SC Res. 1159); Kosovo (SC Res. 1244); Timor-Leste (SC Res. 1264); Democratic Republic of the Congo (SC Res. 1484); Liberia (SC Res. 1497); Côte d'Ivoire (SC Res. 1528); 2004 Haiti (SC Res. 1529).
33. See supra n. 25.
34. See SC Res. 678, 29 November 1990 and supra n. 32.
36. Status of forces agreements between the UN and the state in which UN forces are stationed often provide the following provision: ‘The UN forces and Operations, as subsidiary organs of the United Nations ….’ See status of forces agreements in infra nn. 45–52. The legal bases for the establishment of subsidiary organs by the Security Council and the General Assembly are Arts. 29 and 22 of the Charter of the United Nations, respectively, and Art. 7(2) in general.
41. See para. 44 of the UNEF I Force Regulations, para. 43 of the ONUC Force Regulations, and para. 40 of the UNFICYP Force Regulations, in Siekmann, R., Basic Documents on United Nations and Related Peace-keeping Forces (The Hague, T.M.C. Asser Institute 1985) pp. 37, 89, and 175Google Scholar.
42. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field of August 12, 1949, 75 UNTS p. 31; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea of August 12, 1949, 75 UNTS p. 85; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of August 12, 1949, 75 UNTS p. 135; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of August 12, 1949, 75 UNTS p. 287.
43. See para. 11 of the agreement between the UN and Canada with regard to UNFICYP, in Siekmann, supra n. 41, p. 165; Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, 249 UNTS p. 240.
44. Status of forces agreements are concluded between the UN and the state to which the concerned UN forces will be deployed.
45. Agreement on the United Nations Forces and Operations in Croatia, 1864 UNTS p. 287, para. 7(a).
48. Exchange of Letters Constituting an Agreement on the Status of the United Nations Protection Force in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, 1788 UNTS p. 257, para. 7(a).
49. Agreement on the Status of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda, 1748 UNTS p. 17, para. 7(a).
50. Agreement on the Status of the United Nations Peace-keeping Operation in Angola, 1864 UNTS p. 193, para. 6(a).
51. Agreement on the Status of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon, 1901 UNTS p. 397, para. 7(a).
52. Agreement Concerning the Status of the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic, 2015 UNTS p. 727, para. 6(a).
53. Supra nn. 45–52, with slight variations for each UN forces. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relative to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 1125 UNTS p. 3; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relative to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), 1125 UNTS p. 609.
54. Model Agreement between the United Nations and Member States Contributing Personnel and Equipment to United Nations Peace-keeping Operations, A/46/185, 23 May 1991, in Fleck, D., ed., The Handbook of the Law of Visiting Forces (Oxford, Oxford University Press 2001) pp. 615–620Google Scholar, para. 28. Apart from SOFAs, the UN normally concludes agreements with states which contribute troops to the concerned UN forces. The UN Model Agreement is a standard form for such agreements.
55. Secretary-General's Bulletin, ‘Observance by United Nations forces of international humanitarian law’, UN Doc. ST/SGB/1999/13, 6 August 1999, sec. 3.
56. See, in particular, Art. 2(2) Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel 1994; UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, ‘The comprehensive report on lessons learned from the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM)’ (1995) para. 58 <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/lessons/>; report of the Secretary-General on ‘Financing of the United Nations Protection Force, the United Nations Confidence Restoration Operation in Croatia, the United Nations Preventive Deployment Force and the United Nations Peace Forces headquarters’, UN Doc. A/51/389, 20 September 1996, para. 16; ‘Report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council on the protection of civilians in armed conflict’, UN Doc. S/1999/957, 8 September 1999, para. 61; UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, supra n. 37, p. 58.
57. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties between States and International Organizations or between International Organizations, 25 ILM (1986) p. 543Google Scholar.
58. See infra 3.3.
59. See preamble of the 1977 Additional Protocol I which reads as follows: ‘… the provisions of the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and of this Protocol must be fully applied in all circumstances to all persons who are protected by those instruments, without any adverse distinction based on the nature or origin of the armed conflict or on the causes espoused by or attributed to the Parties to the conflicts …’ See also In re List and Others, United States Military Tribunal at Nürnberg, 19 February 1948, 8 Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals (1949) pp. 34 at 59–60Google Scholar. An overwhelming majority of writers concur: see Brownlie, I., International Law and the Use of Force by States (Oxford, Clarendon Press 1963) p. 406, n. 3CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Kelsen, H., Principles of International Law, 2nd edn. (New York, Holt Rinehart and Winston 1966) pp. 87–91Google Scholar; McDougal, M. and Feliciano, F., The International Law of War (New Haven, New Haven Press 1994) pp. 530–542Google Scholar; Sass⋯li, M. and Bouvier, A., eds., How Does Law Protect in War? (Geneva, ICRC 1999) pp. 83–88Google Scholar; Green, L., The Contemporary Law of Armed Conflict, 2nd edn. (Manchester, Manchester University Press 2000) pp. 18–19Google Scholar; Greenwood, C., ‘International humanitarian law (laws of war)’, in Kalshoven, F., ed., The Centennial of the First International Peace Conference: Reports and Conclusions (The Hague, Kluwer Law International 2000) pp. 161 at 176–186Google Scholar; Roberts, A. and Guelff, R., eds., Documents on the Laws of War, 3rd edn. (Oxford, Oxford University Press 2000) pp. 1–2Google Scholar; Dinstein, Y., War, Aggression and Self-Defence, 3rd edn. (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 2001) pp. 140–7CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Bugnion, F., ‘Guerre juste, guerre d'agression et droit international humanitaire’, 84 IRRC (2002) pp. 523 at 544–545Google Scholar.
60. This view is supported by most experts. See Faite and Grenier, supra n. 3, pp. 1–2.
61. For ongoing UN forces authorised under Chapter VII, see supra n. 31.
62. The term ‘self-defence’ here is used in the context of the defence of each soldier as well as his or her fellow troops. It is distinguished from the right of self-defence within the meaning of Art. 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, which is to defend a state itself and can only be invoked by the highest government officials. In any case, neither the Security Council nor UN forces are entitled to invoke Art. 51.
63. UN Secretary-General's Bulletin, supra n. 55, sec. 1.1.
64. Supra nn. 45–52.
65. UN Secretary-General's Bulletin, supra n. 55, sec. 3.
66. See Art. 5 of Geneva Convention III of 1949 and common Art. 2 of the Geneva Conventions of 1949.
67. de Preux, J. et al. , Commentary on the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, Vol. III (Geneva, ICRC 1960) p. 23Google Scholar. Slight variations in J. Pictet et al., ibid., Vol. I (1952) p. 32; J. Pictet et al., ibid., Vol. II (1960) p. 28; O. Uhler et al., ibid., Vol. IV (1958) pp. 20–21. See also Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94–1, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, Appeals Chamber, 5 October 1995, para. 70 (hereafter, Tadić Decision on Jurisdiction). The Chamber defined ‘armed conflict’ as follows: ‘… an armed conflict exists whenever there is a resort to armed force between States or protracted armed violence between governmental authorities and organized armed groups or between such groups within a State. International humanitarian law applies from the initiation of such armed conflicts and extends beyond the cessation of hostilities until a general conclusion of peace is reached; or, in the case of internal conflicts, a peaceful settlement is achieved. Until that moment, international humanitarian law continues to apply in the whole territory of the warring States or, in the case of internal conflicts, the whole territory under the control of a party, whether or not actual combat takes place there.’
68. See, for example, the fighting between the Bosnian Serb forces and UNPROFOR over Vrbanja bridge in Sarajevo, UN Doc. A/54/549, 15 November 1999, p. 46, para. 192.
69. Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94–1, Judgement, Appeals Chamber, 15 July 1999, p. 72, para. 162 (hereafter, Tadić Judgement).
70. For ratification status of the former Yugoslavia, see Roberts and Guelff, supra n. 59 pp. 361, 404, 498, and 551. Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects and Protocols I–III, 1342 UNTS p. 137.
72. Tadić Judgement, supra n. 69, p. 72, para. 162.
73. Canadian Forces Peace Support Training Centre, Peace Support Operations Field Handbook (2002), sec. 1.1 <http://armyapp.dnd.ca/pstc-cfsp/main.asp>; US Department of the Army, FM 100–23 Peace Operations (1994) pp. 48–49Google Scholar <http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/service_pubs/fm100_23.pdf>.
74. UN Secretary-General's Bulletin, supra n. 55, sec. 1.1.
75. Supra nn. 45–52.
76. SCOR (United Nations), Supp. for October-December 1961, p. 191, UN Doc. S/5025, 15 December 1961.
78. Sielcman, supra n. 41.
79. Simpson, J., Law Applicable to Canadian Forces in Somalia 1992/93: A Study Prepared for the Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia (Ottawa, Government of Canada 1997) p. 26Google Scholar.
80. UN Doc. S/26351, 24 August 1993, p. 3, para. 9.
82. See infra 4.2.1.
83. US Department of the Army, supra n. 73, p. 49.
84. See R. Kolb, ‘Applicability of international humanitarian law to forces under the command of an international organization’ in Faite and Grenier, supra n. 3, pp. 66–67.
86. Prosecutor v. Tadić, Decision, Trial Chamber, 10 August 1995, paras. 66–74; Tadić Decision on Jurisdiction, supra n. 67, para. 102; Prosecutor v. Tadić, Judgement, Trial Chamber, 7 May 1997, p. 217, para. 607.
87. See Tadić Decision on Jurisdiction, supra n. 67, para. 102.
88. Uhler et al., supra n. 67, p. 36.
89. See ch. VI of the Convention.
90. Tadić Decision on Jurisdiction, supra n. 67, para. 127. See, however, the cautious approach of the ICTY in transferring rules of the law of international armed conflict to the law of non-international armed conflict in ibid., para. 126.
91. See Greenwood, C., ‘Protection of peacekeepers: the legal regime’, 7 Duke JC & IL (1996–1997) p. 203Google Scholar. See also Bloom, E., ‘Protecting peacekeepers: the Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel’, 89 AJIL (1995) p. 621CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Bourloyannis-Vrailas, C., ‘The Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel’, 44 ICLQ (1995) p. 560CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Bouvier, A., ‘Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel: presentation and analysis’, 35 IRRC (1995) p. 638CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
92. See supra 3.2.
93. See Lauterpacht, H., ‘The limits of the operation of the law of war’, 30 BYIL (1953) pp. 206 at 212Google Scholar.
94. See supra 2.
95. See supra 3.3.
96. UN Secretary-General's Bulletin, supra n. 55, sec. 1; ICRC, International Humanitarian Law: Answers to Your Questions (2002) p. 38Google Scholar.
97. UN Secretary-General's Bulletin, supra n. 55, sec. I.
98. See supra n. 29.
99. See Arts. 48 and 50 of 1977 Additional Protocol I.
100. For the latest ratification status, see the website of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Scope of Legal Protection under the Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel <http://www.un.org/law/UNsafetyconvention/index/html>.
101. Note, however, that recent Security Council resolutions establishing UN peacekeeping operations frequently refer to the 1994 Safety Convention, either in the preamble or in the operative paragraphs. Those Security Council resolutions were all adopted after the Safety Convention entered into force on 15 January 1999. See SC Res. 1291 (MONUC), 1410 (UNMISET), 1528 (UNOCI), and 1545 (ONUB).
102. For the list of troop contributing states for UNFICYP, see <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/unficyp/facts/html>.
103. See supra 3.3.
104. Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, in Roberts and Guelff, supra n. 59, p. 69.
105. See generally M. Sass⋯li, ‘Outline of de jure and de facto applicability of the law of occupation to United Nations-Mandated Forces’, in A. Faite and J. Grenier, supra n. 3, p. 33; B. Oswald, ‘The law of occupation and United Nations peace operations: an effective mechanism to fulfil command and responsibility?’, in ibid., p. 35; A. Faite, ‘Applicability of the law of occupation to United Nations-Mandated Forces’, in ibid., p. 71.
106. Art. 42 of the 1907 Hague Regulations provides that ‘[t]erritory is considered occupied when it is actually placed under the authority of the hostile army.’ UN forces will not be considered as a ‘hostile army’ when there is a consent from the state where the UN forces will be deployed.
107. This view is supported by many experts. See Faite and Grenier, supra n. 3, p. 2.
108. SCOR (United Nations), Supp. for January-March 1963, p. 60, paras. 23–37, UN Doc. S/5053/Add. 15, 30 January 1963.
109. Report of the Commission of Inquiry, supra n. 19, p. 10, paras. 19–22.
110. US Department of the Army, supra n. 73.
111. UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations 1995, supra n. 56, para. 58.
112. For ONUC, see SC Res. 161, 21 February 1961, para. 1. For UNOSOM II, see SC Res. 814, 26 March 1993, para. 5 and the UN Secretary-General's report to which the Security Council refers, UN Doc. S/25354, 3 March 1993, paras. 56–88; SC Res. 837, 6 June 1993, para. 5.
113. For the original mandate, see SC Res. 751, 24 April 1992, paras. 2 and 7.
114. UN Secretary-General's Bulletin, supra n. 55, sec. 5, 7, and 9.
116. See, for example, the following for cooperation between ONUC and the ICRC, UN Doc. S/4940/Add. 18, 20 December 1961, paras. 10, 16, 24 and 28. See also UN Secretary-General's Bulletin, supra n. 55, sec. 8(a).
117. See UN Doc. S/1995/444, 30 May 1995, para. 63.
118. UN Secretary-General's Bulletin, supra n. 55, sec. 8.
119. ICRC Press Release 95/20, ‘Bosnia-Herzegovina: Sarajevo: ICRC visits Serb combatants held by UNPROFOR’, 29 May 1995 <http://www.icrc.org/eng>.
120. Not all persons entitled to prisoners of war status are combatants. See Art. 50(1) of Additional Protocol I of 1977 which excludes persons in Art. 4(A)(4) and (5) of Geneva Convention III of 1949. Combatants are invariably entitled to prisoner of war status but persons entitled to prisoner of war status are not invariably combatants. The question of who is a combatant and who is entitled to prisoners of war status are distinct.
121. SCOR (United Nations), Supp. for January-March 1963, p. 84, para. 2, UN Doc. S/5053/Add. 15, Annex IX, 30 January 1963.
122. ICTY, ‘Final report to the Prosecutor by the Committee Established to Review the NATO Bombing Campaign Against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia’, 39 ILM (2000) p. 1257Google Scholar.
123. International Law Commission, Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, GAOR (United Nations), Supp. No. 10, UN Doc. A/56/10 (2001) pp. 43–59.
124. Reparation for Injuries Suffered in Service of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Rep. (1949) pp. 14 at 179Google Scholar.
125. Art. 57 of the ILC Articles on State Responsibility provides that ‘[t]hese articles are without prejudice to any question of the responsibility under international law of an international organization, or of any State for the conduct of an international organization.’ See the two reports of the International Law Commission on the question of the responsibility of international organisations: International Law Commission, Report on the work of its fifty-fourth session, GAOR (United Nations), Supp. No. 10, UN Doc. A/57/10 (2002) p. 228 and Report on the work of its fifty-fifth session, GAOR (United Nations), Supp. No. 10, UN Doc. A/58/10 (2003) p. 29.
126. International Law Association, ‘Accountability of International Organisations’, 2nd, 3rd and 4th reports (2000, 2002, 2004, respectively) <http://www.ila-hq.org/html/layout_committee.htm>.
127. ICJ Rep. (1949) p. 179Google Scholar and ICJ Rep. (1980) pp. 88–89, para. 37Google Scholar. See also Amrallah, B., ‘The international responsibility of the United Nations for activities carried out by U.N. peace-keeping forces’, 32 Revue Egyptienne de Droit International (1976) pp. 57 at 61Google Scholar.
129. See ILC Report 2003, supra n. 125, p. 45.
130. Agreement, supra n. 45.
131. Agreements, supra nn. 48–52.
133. See the following for claims operations with regard to ONUC and the UN forces in the former Yugoslavia: SCOR (United Nations), Supp. for July-September 1965, UN Doc. S/6597, 6 August 1965; Shraga, supra n. 132; Report of the Secretary-General 1996, supra n. 56; Fleck, supra n. 54, pp. 170–173. See the following for the growing number of claims brought against the United Nations, UN Doc. A/57/494, 7 October 2002.
134. UN Doc. S/6597, supra n. 133, p. 157.
135. Report of the Secretary-General 1996, supra n. 56, p. 6, para. 16.
136. UN Doc. S/6597, supra n. 133, p. 157.
137. Report of the Secretary-General 1996, supra n. 56, p. 6, para. 16.
138. ILC Report 2003, supra n. 125, p. 36.
139. See, for example, the claims operations for the UN forces in the former Yugoslavia: Report of the Secretary-General 1996, supra n. 56, p. 12, paras. 49–53.
140. United Nations, ‘The United Nations and Somalia 1992–1996’ (1996) p. 44, para. 128.
142. UN Doc. S/1994/131, 7 February 1994, p. 2.
143. See UN Doc. S/1994/131, 7 February 1994; S/1994/466, 19 April 1994.
144. UN Docs., supra n. 25.
145. Report of the Secretary-General 1996, supra n. 56, p. 6, para. 17.
148. Art. 7 of the Charter of the International Military Tribunal at Nürnberg, 82 UNTS p. 279; Art. 6 of the Charter of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, in Van den Wyngaert, C., ed., International Criminal Law: A Collection of International and European Instruments, 2nd rev. edn. (The Hague, Kluwer Law International 2000) p. 63Google Scholar; Art. 7 of the ICTY Statute, SC Res. 827, 25 May 1993 (last amended by SC Res. 1481, 19 May 1998); Art. 6 of the ICTR Statute, SC Res. 955, 8 November 1994 (last amended by SC Res. 1503, 28 August 2003); Arts. 25 and 27 of the ICC Statute, supra n. 29.
149. Agreements, supra n. 45, para. 47(b) and supra nn. 48–52. See also Agreement on the Status of the United Nations Operation in Mozambique, 1722 UNTS p. 39; Agreement on the Status of the United Nations Protection Force in Bosnia Herzegovina, 1722 UNTS p. 77.
150. Fleck, supra n. 54, para. 25.
151. UN Secretary-General's Bulletin, supra n. 55, sec. 4.
152. Report of the Secretary-General 1996, supra n. 56, p. 11, para. 44.
153. Young and Molina, supra n. 6, p. 365.
154. Dubois, supra n. 6.
157. Lupi, supra n. 6.
159. Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia, ‘Dishonoured legacy: executive summary’ (1997) pp. 37–38 <http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/reports/somalia/index_e.asp>.
160. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide of 1948, 78 UNTS p. 277.
161. Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft of 1970, 860 UNTS p. 105.
162. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment of 1984, 1465 UNTS p. 85.
163. Arts. 49, 50 of Geneva Convention I; Arts. 50, 51 of Convention II; Arts. 129, 130 of Convention III; Arts. 146, 147 of Convention IV. See also Art. 85 of Additional Protocol I. ‘Grave breaches’ of IHL are considered as war crimes in Art. 2 of the ICTY Statute and Art. 8(2)(a) of the ICC Statute. For an excellent summary of universal jurisdiction, see separate opinion of Judge Guillaume in the Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 <http://www.icj-cij.org>.
164. Judge Guillaume, supra n. 163.
165. Pictet et al. 1952, supra n. 67, pp. 365–366.
166. Joint separate opinion of Judges Higgins, Kooijmans, and Buergenthal, supra n. 163, para. 31; dissenting opinion of Judge Van den Wyngaert, supra n. 163, p. 32, para. 62.
167. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1155 UNTS p. 331. Art. 31(1) provides that ‘[a] treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.’
169. Loi relative à la répression des infractions graves aux Conventions de Genève de 1949 et aux Protocoles I et II de 1977 additionnels à ces Conventions [Law of 16 June 1993 on the repression of grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions], in Moniteur belge, 5 August 1993, as amended by Loi du 10 février relative à la répression des violations graves du droit international humanitaire [Law of 10 February 1999 relating to the repression of serious violations of international humanitarian law], in Moniteur belge, 23 March 1999. Both laws are reprinted in 2 YIHL (1999) at pp. 539 et seqGoogle Scholar. For a discussion, see Ratner, S., ‘Belgium's war crimes statute: a postmortem’, 97 AJIL (2003) p. 888CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Walleyn, L., ‘Universal jurisdiction: lessons from the Belgian experience’, 5 YIHL (2002) pp. 394–406CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
170. Loi relative aux violations graves du droit international humanitaire [Law of 5 August 2003 on grave breaches of international humanitarian law], in Moniteur belge, 8 August 2003. The law entered in force on the day of its publication.
171. Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000, ICJ Rep. (2002) p. 121.
172. For concerns on withdrawal of troops from UN forces, see, for example, ‘U.N. says its workers abuse women in Congo’, in The Washington Post, 27 11 2004Google Scholar.
173. Compare Art. 1 of the ICTY Statute and Arts. 1, 11–13 of the ICC Statute, and Arts. 2, 3 of the ICTY Statute and Art. 8(2) of the ICC Statute.
174. See generally Sarooshi, D., ‘The Statute of the International Criminal Court’, 48 ICLQ (1999) p. 387CrossRefGoogle Scholar; La Haye, E., ‘The jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court: controversies over the preconditions for exercising its jurisdiction’, 46 NILR (1999) p. 1CrossRefGoogle Scholar. For the relationship between UN forces and the ICC, see Zwanenburg, M., ‘The statute for an international criminal court and the United States: peacekeepers under fire?’, 10 EJIL (1999) p. 124CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
175. See Arts. 125(2) and 12(1) of the ICC Statute.
177. Art. 17 of the ICC Statute specifies situations where a case would be inadmissible.
178. Art. 12(2) of the ICC Statute.
179. See generally Elias and Quast, infra n. 181.
181. SC Res. 1422, 12 July 2002. See the following for a summary of events leading to the adoption of Res. 1422: Murphy, S., ed., ‘U.S. notification of intent not to become a party to the Rome Statute’ and ‘Efforts to obtain immunity from ICC for U.S. peacekeepers’, 96 AJIL (2002) pp. 724 et seqGoogle Scholar. On the specific legal issues surrounding Res. 1422, see Weller, M., ‘Undoing the global constitution: UN Security Council action on the International Criminal Court’, 78 International Affairs (2002) p. 693CrossRefGoogle Scholar; MacPherson, B., ‘Authority of the Security Council to exempt peacekeepers from International Criminal Court proceedings’, in ASIL Insights, 07 2002Google Scholar <http://www.asil.org/insights/insigh89.htm>; Stahn, C., ‘The ambiguities of Security Council resolution 1422 (2002)’, 14 EJIL (2003) p. 85CrossRefGoogle Scholar. See also Elias, O. and Quast, A., ‘The relationship between the Security Council and the International Criminal Court in the light of resolution 1422’, 3 Non-State Actors and International Law (2003) p. 165CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
182. SC Res. 1487, 12 June 2003.
183. See Akande, supra n. 180. Indeed, part of the reason the US did not sign the ICC Statute until later was because of Art. 12(2). See also the surrounding events which lead to the adoption of SC Res. 1422 in Weller, supra n. 181.
184. See Stahn, supra n. 181; MacPherson, supra n. 181; Amnesty International, ‘International Criminal Court: Security Council must refuse to renew unlawful resolution 1422’, AI Index: IOR 40/008/2003, 1 May 2003 <http://web.amnesty.org/pages/icc-US_threats-eng>; statements of Canada and New Zealand in the Security Council on the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 10 July 2002 <http://www.nzmissionny.org/frmnzatun.htm> and <http://www.nzmissionny.org/frmnzatun.htm>.
185. For the text of the bilateral agreement, see Murphy, S., ed., ‘U.S. bilateral agreements relating to ICC’, 97 AJIL (2003) pp. 200–203Google Scholar.
186. For the latest information, see Coalition for the International Criminal Court (hereafter, CICC) website <http://www.iccnow.org/documents/USandICC/BIAs.html>.
187. Council of the European Union, 2450th Council Meeting: External Relations, 30 September 2002, p. 10 <http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/gac/date/300902.htm>.
188. Amnesty International, ‘International Criminal Court: US efforts to obtain impunity for genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes’, AI Index: IOR 40/025/2002, 2 September 2002 <http://web.amnesty.org/pages/icc-US_threats-eng>; Human Rights Watch, ‘United States efforts to undermine the International Criminal Court: legal analysis of impunity agreements’, September 2002 <http://www.iccnow.org>; CICC, ‘Memorandum on US impunity agreements’, 23 August 2002 <http://www.iccnow.org>.
189. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra n. 167.
190. Amnesty International, supra n. 188, p. 28; CICC, supra n. 188, pp. 1–2. See also Weller, supra n. 181, p. 709.
191. Prost, K. and Schlunck, A., ‘Article 98: cooperation with respect to waiver of immunity and consent to surrender’, in Triffterer, O., ed., Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (Baden-Baden, Nomos 1999) p. 1131Google Scholar.
193. Supra nn. 149–152. See also Fleck, D., ‘Are foreign military personnel exempt from international criminal jurisdiction under status of forces agreements?’, 1 JICJ (2003) p. 651Google Scholar.
194. Letter from the UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, to the US Secretary of State, Colin Powell of 3 July 2002, in Murphy, S., ed., ‘Efforts to obtain immunity from ICC for U.S. peacekeepers’, 96 AJIL (2002) pp. 725 at 727Google Scholar.
195. Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to General Assembly Resolution 53/35: The Fall of Srebrenica, UN Doc. A/54/549, 15 November 1999.
196. Report of the Commission of Inquiry, supra n. 19.
197. Report of the Independent Inquiry into the Actions of the United Nations during the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda, UN Doc. S/1999/1257, 16 December 1999.
198. UN Doc. S/2004/650, supra n. 27, p. 8, paras. 32–33; Holt, supra n. 5; UN Doc. A/57/494, 7 October 2002, p. 3, para. 2.
199. ‘Report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council on the protection of civilians in armed conflict’, UN Doc. S/1999/957, 8 September 1999.
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