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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 14 July 2022
This paper provides a systemic study of China's policy and legal responses to security-related actions and disputes in the international trade regime. It starts with a brief review of the law and practices relating to the security exceptions under the World Trade Organization to provide an important context for understanding the recent developments of China's approaches to national security. Based on a detailed discussion of China's approaches at international and domestic levels, we argue that China's security strategy has been shifting from being defensive to proactive: internationally by seeking to influence the development of trade rules and practices, and domestically by expanding national security to cover a wide spectrum of economic security interests and developing a comprehensive regulatory framework to protect such interests. The way in which major trading nations are taking the law into their own hands, based on ever-expanding security interests, does not bode well for the future of the multilateral trading system. There is a pressing need for collective action by all governments involved to re-design security-related rules and exceptions to confine the use of security measures to agreed parameters.
1 C.P. Bown (2020) ‘Trump's Steel and Aluminum Tariffs are Cascading out of Control’, PIIE (4 February 2020), www.piie.com/blogs/trade-and-investment-policy-watch/trumps-steel-and-aluminum-tariffs-are-cascading-out-control.
2 Office of the United States Trade Representative [USTR] (undated), ‘China Section 301 – Tariff Actions and Exclusion Process’, undated, https://ustr.gov/issue-areas/enforcement/section-301-investigations/tariff-actions; also see A.B. Schwarzenberg (2022) ‘Section 301: Tariff Exclusions on US Imports from China’, FAS (26 May 2022), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/IF11582.pdf.
3 See e.g., The Industry and Security Bureau (2020) ‘Addition of Huawei Non-US Affiliates to the Entity List, the Removal of Temporary General License, and Amendments to General Prohibition Three (Foreign-Produced Direct Product Rule)’, Federal Register (20 August 2020), www.federalregister.gov/documents/2020/08/20/2020-18213/addition-of-huawei-non-us-affiliates-to-the-entity-list-the-removal-of-temporary-general-license-and.
4 See Office of the Secretary of State (2020) The Policy Planning Staff, ‘The Elements of the China Challenge’, United States Government (November 2020), www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/20-02832-Elements-of-China-Challenge-508.pdf; G. Magnus (2021) ‘Economics, National Security, and the Competition with China’, War on the Rocks (3 March 2021), https://warontherocks.com/2021/03/economics-national-security-and-the-competition-with-china/; M. Schneider-Petsinger et al. (2019) ‘US–China Strategic Competition: The Quest for Global Technological Leadership’, Chatham House (November 2019), www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/publications/research/CHHJ7480-US-China-Competition-RP-WEB.pdf; Roberts, A., Moraes, H. Choer, and Ferguson, V. (2019) ‘Toward a Geoeconomic Order in International Trade and Investment’, Journal of International Economic Law 22(4), 655CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
5 G. Myre (2021) ‘Biden's National Security Team Lists Leading Threats with China at the Top’, NPR (13 April 2021), www.npr.org/2021/04/13/986453250/bidens-national-security-team-lists-leading-threats-with-china-at-the-top.
6 Office of the USTR (2021) ‘2021 Trade Policy Agenda and 2020 Annual Report of the President of the United States on the Trade Agreements Program’ (1 March 2021), at 2 & 4, https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2021/march/biden-administration-releases-2021-presidents-trade-agenda-and-2020-annual-report.
7 European Commission (2021) ‘Trade Policy Review – an Open, Sustainable and Assertive Trade Policy’, COM(2021) 66 Final (18 February 2021) at 8–9, https://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regdoc/rep/1/2021/EN/COM-2021-66-F1-EN-MAIN-PART-1.PDF.
8 Office of the USTR (2018) ‘Joint Statement on Trilateral Meeting of the Trade Ministers of the United States, Japan, and the European Union’ (31 May 2018), https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2018/may/joint-statement-trilateral-meeting; Office of the USTR (2019) ‘Joint Statement of the Trilateral Meeting of the Trade Ministers of the United States, European Union, and Japan’ (23 May 2019), https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2019/may/joint-statement-trilateral-meeting; European Commission (2020) ‘Joint Statement of the Trilateral Meeting of the Trade Ministers of Japan, the United States and the European Union’ (14 January 2020), https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2020/january/tradoc_158567.pdf.
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11 Heath, J. Benton (2020) ‘The New National Security Challenge to the Economic Order’, The Yale Law Journal 129, 1020, 1020Google Scholar.
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13 See e.g., G. Vidigal and S.W. Schill (2021) ‘International Economic Law and the Securitization of Policy Objectives: Risks of a Schmittean Exception’, Legal Issues of Economic Integration 48(2), 109; Pinchis-Paulsen, M. (2020) ‘Trade Multilateralism and US National Security: The Making of the GATT Security Exceptions’, Michigan Journal of International Law 41(1), 109Google Scholar; Heath, ‘The New National Security Challenge to the Economic Order’, supra 11; Weiß, W. (2020) ‘Adjudicating Security Exceptions in WTO Law: Methodical and Procedural Preliminaries’, Journal of World Trade 54(6), 829CrossRefGoogle Scholar; S. Lester and H. Zhu (2019) ‘A Proposal for “Rebalancing” to Deal with “National Security” Trade Restrictions’, Fordham International Law Journal 42(5), 1451; Voon, T. (2019) ‘The Security Exception In WTO Law: Entering a New Era’, American Journal of International Law Unbound 113, 45Google Scholar.
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15 For two recent studies on China's position on national security in the field of international economic law in general and international investment law more specifically, see C. Huang (2021) ‘China's Take on National Security and Its Implications for the Evolution of International Economic Law’, Legal Issues of Economic Integration 48(2), 119; L. Knight and T. Voon (2020) ‘The Evolution of National Security at the Interface Between Domestic and International Investment Law and Policy: the Role of China’, The Journal of World Investment & Trade 21(1), 104. These studies do not focus on China's position on national security in the international trade regime.
16 Hanks, P. (1988) ‘National Security – A Political Concept’, Monash University Law Review 14, 114Google Scholar; Cai, ‘Enforcing a New National Security? China's National Security Law and International Law’, supra n. 14; Heath, ‘The New National Security Challenge to the Economic Order’, supra n. 11.
17 See Pinchis-Paulsen, ‘Trade Multilateralism and US National Security’, supra n. 13.
18 WTO, GATT Analytical Index – Article XXI Security Exceptions, at 600, www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/gatt_ai_e/art21_e.pdf.
19 See Pinchis-Paulsen, ‘Trade Multilateralism and US National Security’, supra n. 13, at 117–118.
20 See generally GATT Analytical Index, supra n. 18. Also see Heath, ‘The New National Security Challenge to the Economic Order’, supra n. 11, at 1053–1058.
21 See Heath, J. Benton (2019) ‘National Security and Economic Globalization: Toward Collision or Reconciliation?’, Fordham International Law Journal 42(5), 1431, 1442–1443Google Scholar.
22 GATT, Minutes of Meeting of the Council on 31 October 1975, C/M/109 (10 November 1975) 8–9.
23 GATT, Sweden – Import Restrictions on Certain Footwear, Notification by the Swedish Delegation, L/4250 (17 November 1975) 3.
24 See Minutes of Meeting of the Council on 31 October 1975, supra 22, at 9.
25 GATT, Sweden – Import Restrictions on Certain Footwear – Addendum, L/4250/Add.1 (15 March 1977).
26 WTO, United States – The Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act, Request for the Establishment of a Panel by the European Communities, WT/DS38/2 (8 October 1996).
27 WTO, Dispute Settlement Body Minutes of Meeting Held on 16 October 1996, WT/DSB/M/24 (26 November 1996) at 6–7.
29 European Union – United States: Memorandum of Understanding Concerning the US Helms-Burton Act and the US Iran and Libya Sanctions Act (11 April 1997), 36 I.L.M 529 (1997).
30 Panel Report, Russia – Measures Concerning Traffic in Transit (Russia–Traffic in Transit), WT/DS512/R (adopted 26 April 2019).
36 Panel Report, Saudi Arabia – Measures concerning the Protection of Intellectual Property Rights (Saudi Arabia–IPRs), WT/DS567/R (circulated 16 June 2020), para. 2.46.
49 H. Gao (2007) ‘China's Participation in the WTO: A Lawyer's Perspective’, Singapore Year Book of International Law 11, 1, 2–4.
50 See e.g., Wu, ‘The Chinese Security Concept and Its Historical Evolution’, supra n. 14; Wang, Z. (2004) ‘Conceptualizing Economic Security and Governance: China Confronts Globalization’, The Pacific Review 17(4), 523Google Scholar.
51 See e.g., Huang, ‘China's Take on National Security and Its Implications for the Evolution of International Economic Law’, supra n. 15.
52 See e.g., European Commission (2018) ‘WTO Modernisation: Introduction to Future EU Proposals’ (18 September 2018), https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2018/september/tradoc_157331.pdf; WTO, General Council, ‘Strengthening and Modernizing the WTO: Discussion Paper – Communication from Canada’, JOB/GC/201, 24 September 2018; WTO, General Council, ‘Communication from the European Union, China, Canada, India, Norway, New Zealand, Switzerland, Australia, Republic of Korea, Iceland, Singapore, Mexico, Costa Rica and Montenegro’, WT/GC/W/752/Rev.2, 11 December 2018; WTO, General Council, ‘An Undifferentiated WTO: Self-Declared Development Status Risks Institutional Irrelevance – Communication from the United States’, WT/GC/W/757/REV.1, 14 February 2019.
53 See generally W. Zhou and H. Gao (2020) ‘US – China Trade War: A Way Out?’, World Trade Review 19(4), 605.
54 See Gao, H. (2021) ‘WTO Reform and China: Defining or Defiling the Multilateral Trading System?’, Harvard International Law Journal 65, 1Google Scholar.
55 See Executive Office of the President (2018) ‘Adjusting Imports of Steel Into the United States’, Federal Register (15 March 2018), www.federalregister.gov/documents/2018/03/15/2018-05478/adjusting-imports-of-steel-into-the-united-states; Executive Office of the President (2018) ‘Adjusting Imports of Aluminum Into the United States’, Federal Register (15 March 2018), www.federalregister.gov/documents/2018/03/15/2018-05477/adjusting-imports-of-aluminum-into-the-united-states.
56 See Office of the USTR (2018) ‘Findings of the Investigation Into China's Acts, Policies, and Practices Related to Technology Transfer, Intellectual Property, and Innovation Under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974’, USTR (22 March 2018), https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/Section%20301%20FINAL.PDF; Office of the USTR, ‘China Section 301-Tariff Actions and Exclusion Process’, supra n. 2.
58 See H. McGeachy (2019) ‘US–China Technology Competition: Impacting a Rules-Based Order’, United States Studies Centre (1 May 2019), www.ussc.edu.au/analysis/us-china-technology-competition-impacting-a-rules-based-order; R. Hass et al. (2021) ‘US–China Technology Competition: A Brookings Global China Interview’, Brookings (23 December 2021), www.brookings.edu/essay/u-s-china-technology-competition/.
59 Office of the USTR (2018) ‘Joint Statement on Trilateral Meeting of the Trade Ministers of the United States, Japan, and the European Union’, supra n. 8.
60 See generally the State Council of China (2018), ‘《中国与世界贸易组织》白皮书 [The China and the WTO White Paper]’ (28 June 2018), www.scio.gov.cn/zfbps/ndhf/37884/Document/1632379/1632379.htm [in Chinese]; WTO, General Council, ‘China's Proposal on WTO Reform – Communication from China’, WT/GC/W/773, 13 May 2019, at 3–4.
61 See ‘China's Proposal on WTO Reform – Communication from China’, supra n. 60, at 4.
62 We thank one of the anonymous reviewers for this observation.
63 See C.P. Bown and M. Kolb (2022) ‘Trump's Trade War Timeline: An Up-to-Date Guide’, PIIE (8 February 2022), www.piie.com/sites/default/files/documents/trump-trade-war-timeline.pdf.
64 See Office of the USTR (2020) ‘Economic and Trade Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the People's Republic of China’ (15 January 2020), https://ustr.gov/countries-regions/china-mongolia-taiwan/peoples-republic-china/phase-one-trade-agreement/text. For an overview of the deal, see W. Zhou and H. Gao (2020) ‘US–China Phase One Deal: A Brief Account’, Regulating for Globalization Blog, Wolters Kluwer (22 January 2020), http://regulatingforglobalization.com/2020/01/22/us-china-phase-one-deal-a-brief-account/.
65 See ‘China's Proposal on WTO Reform – Communication from China’, supra n. 60, at 7–8.
66 See Panel Report, Russia–Traffic in Transit, Annex D-4 Executive Summary of the Arguments of China, supra n. 30, at 81–82; Panel Report, Saudi Arabia–IPRs, Annex C-5 Integrated Executive Summary of the Arguments of China, supra n. 36, at 60–61.
67 WTO, United States – Tariff Measures on Certain Goods from China, Request for Consultations by China’, WT/DS543/1, G/L/1219, 5 April 2018; WTO, United States – Certain Measures on Steel and Aluminum Products, Request for Consultations by China, WT/DS544/1, G/L/1222, G/SG/D50/1, 9 April 2018; WTO, ‘United States – Tariff Measures on Certain Goods from China II, Request for Consultations by China’, WT/DS565/1, G/L/1260, 27 August 2018; WTO, ‘United States – Tariff Measures on Certain Goods from China III, Request for Consultations by China’, WT/DS587/1, G/L/1322, 4 September 2019.
68 WTO Panel Report, United States – Tariff Measures on Certain Goods from China, WT/DS543/R, circulated 15 September 2020.
74 There is a significant body of literature on the necessity test, see e.g., M. Du (2016) ‘The Necessity Test in World Trade Law: What Now?’, Chinese Journal of International Law 15(4), 817; G. Kapterian (2010) ‘A Critique of WTO Jurisprudence on “Necessity’’’, International & Comparative Law Quarterly 59(1), 89.
75 See R.G. Sutter et al. (2013) ‘Balancing Acts: The US Rebalance and Asia-Pacific Stability’, The George Washington University (August 2013), www2.gwu.edu/~sigur/assets/docs/BalancingActs_Compiled1.pdf; K.G. Lieberthal (2011) ‘The American Pivot to Asia’, Brookings (21 December 2011), www.brookings.edu/articles/the-american-pivot-to-asia/.
76 See ‘The Trans-Pacific Partnership: What You Need to Know about President Obama's Trade Agreement’, undated, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/issues/economy/trade; Sutter et al., ‘Balancing Acts: The US Rebalance and Asia-Pacific Stability’, supra n. 75, at 2.
77 See C. Huang (2011) ‘Beijing Suspicious Over US Regional Trade Bloc’, South China Morning Post (14 November 2011), www.scmp.com/article/984758/beijing-suspicious-over-us-regional-trade-bloc; D. Hewitt (2015) ‘China Responds Cautiously to TPP Deal, Which Analysts Say Will Bring Pressure For Faster Reforms’, International Business Times (6 October 2015), www.ibtimes.com/china-responds-cautiously-tpp-deal-which-analysts-say-will-bring-pressure-faster-2128302.
78 See M. Du (2015) ‘Explaining China's Tripartite Strategy Toward the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement’, Journal of International Economic Law 18(2), 407, 424–425.
79 See UNCTAD (2021) ‘A New Centre of Gravity: The Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership and Its Trade Effects’ (15 December 2021), https://unctad.org/system/files/official-document/ditcinf2021d5_en_0.pdf.
80 See O. Wang (2021) ‘RCEP: China Says World's Largest Trade Pact Gives It “Powerful Leverage” to Cope with 2022 Challenges’, US–China Relations (31 December 2021), www.scmp.com/economy/china-economy/article/3161601/rcep-china-says-worlds-largest-trade-pact-gives-it-powerful.
81 See P.A. Petri and M. Plummer (2020) ‘RCEP: A New Trade Agreement That Will Shape Global Economics and Politics’, Brookings (16 November 2020), www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2020/11/16/rcep-a-new-trade-agreement-that-will-shape-global-economics-and-politics/.
82 See Editorial Board (2022) ‘Opinion: In Asia, China Fills an Economic Void the United States Left’, The Washington Post (4 January 2022), www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2022/01/04/rcep-trade-agreement-china/.
83 See generally G. Shaffer and H. Gao (2020) ‘A New Chinese Economic Order?’, Journal of International Economic Law 23(3), 607, 609–614.
84 Ibid., 632–635; OECD (2018) ‘The Belt and Road Initiative in the Global Trade, Investment and Finance Landscape’, OECD Business and Finance Outlook 2018 (3 September 2018), www.oecd-ilibrary.org/finance-and-investment/oecd-business-and-finance-outlook-2018/the-belt-and-road-initiative-in-the-global-trade-investment-and-finance-landscape_bus_fin_out-2018-6-en; J. Wang (2019) ‘China's Governance Approach to the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI): Relation, Partnership, and Law’, Global Trade and Customs Journal 14(5), 222.
85 EU – China Comprehensive Agreement on Investment (CAI), Agreement in Principle, concluded on 30 December 2020, https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=2237.
86 See H. Gao (2021) ‘The EU–China Comprehensive Agreement on Investment: Strategic Opportunity Meets Strategic Autonomy’, Singapore Management University School of Law Research Paper (1 May 2021), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3843434.
87 See B. Mercurio (2021) ‘Putting the Comprehensive Agreement on Investment (CAI) into Perspective: Five Key Points’, Institute for International Trade Policy Brief (2 February 2021), https://iit.adelaide.edu.au/news/list/2021/02/02/putting-the-comprehensive-agreement-on-investment-cai-into-perspective-five.
88 See Ministry of Commerce of China, ‘China officially applies to join the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP)’ (18 September 2021), http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/article/newsrelease/significantnews/202109/20210903201113.shtml.
89 See e.g. A. Remeikis (2020) ‘China Accuses Australia of Discriminating Against Huawei’, The Guardian (17 February 2020), www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2020/feb/17/china-accuses-australia-of-discriminating-against-huawei; J. Kehoe et al. (2021) ‘Treasurer Blacklists China Investments’, Australian Financial Review (12 January 2021), www.afr.com/politics/federal/treasurer-imposes-informal-ban-on-china-investments-20210112-p56thm; D. Hurst and V. Ni (2021) ‘China Accuses Australia of ‘Violent’ Interference in Five Eyes Response to Hong Kong Election’, The Guardian (22 December 2021), www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2021/dec/21/china-accuses-australia-of-violent-interference-in-five-eyes-response-to-hong-kong-election.
90 See Zhou and Laurenceson, ‘Demystifying Australia – China Trade Tensions’, supra n. 9.
91 See M. Reynolds and M. Goodman (2022) ‘China's Economic Coercion: Lessons from Lithuania’, Center for Strategic & International Studies (6 May 2022), www.csis.org/analysis/chinas-economic-coercion-lessons-lithuania.
92 WTO, China – Measures Concerning Trade in Goods and Services, Request for Consultations by the European Union, WT/DS610/1 (31 January 2022).
93 See Wang, ‘Conceptualizing Economic Security and Governance: China Confronts Globalization’, supra n. 50, at 524; Huang, ‘China's Take on National Security and Its Implications for the Evolution of International Economic Law’, supra n. 15, at 121; Sørensen, ‘That Is Not Intervention; That Is Interference with Chinese Characteristics: New Concepts, Distinctions and Approaches Developing in the Chinese Debate and Foreign and Security Policy Practice’, supra n. 14.
94 《中华人民共和国国家安全法》 [State Security Law of the People's Republic of China] (Expired), Order No. 6 of the President, issued on 22 February 1993, effective on the same date. This law has been replaced by the Counter-espionage Law of the People's Republic of China on 1 November 2014.
95 See the State Council Information Office of China (2011) ‘“China's Peaceful Development” White Paper’, September 2011, www.scio.gov.cn/zxbd/nd/2011/Document/1006416/1006416.htm.
96 See ‘习近平：坚持总体国家安全观 走中国特色国家安全道路 [Xi Jinping: Adhere to the Overall National Security Concept and Take the Road of National Security with Chinese Characteristics]’, Xinhua Net (14 April 2014), www.xinhuanet.com/politics/2014-04/15/c_1110253910.htm [in Chinese]. For a detailed discussion of the National Security Commission, see Ji, ‘China's National Security Commission: Theory, Evolution and Operations’, supra n. 14.
97 《中华人民共和国国家安全法》 [National Security Law of the People's Republic of China], Order No. 29 of the President, issued on 1 July 2015, effective on the same date.
98 For a detailed discussion of the law, see Cai, ‘Enforcing a New National Security? China's National Security Law and International Law’, supra n. 14.
100 See US Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security, ‘Entity List’, undated, www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/policy-guidance/lists-of-parties-of-concern/entity-list.
101 See Industry and Security Bureau (2019) ‘Addition of Certain Entities to the Entity List and Revision of Entries on the Entity List’, Federal Register (21 August 2019), www.federalregister.gov/documents/2019/08/21/2019-17921/addition-of-certain-entities-to-the-entity-list-and-revision-of-entries-on-the-entity-list; US–China Economic and Security Review Commission (2019) ‘2019 Report to Congress’, November 2019, at 48, www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/2019-11/2019%20Annual%20Report%20to%20Congress.pdf.
102 For a discussion of the extraterritorial reach of the US export control law, see J. Voetelink (2021) ‘Limits on the Extraterritoriality of United States Export Control and Sanctions Legislation’, in Robert Beeres et al. (eds.), NL ARMS Netherlands Annual Review of Military Studies 2021. The Hague: T.M.C. Asser Press, https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-94-6265-471-6_11.
103 See US – China Economic and Security Review Commission (2021) ‘2021 Report to Congress’, November 2021, at 44, www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/2021-11/2021_Annual_Report_to_Congress.pdf.
104 See BIS (2021) ‘Addition of Certain Entities to the Entity List and Revision of an Entry on the Entity List’, Federal Register (17 December 2021), www.federalregister.gov/documents/2021/12/17/2021-27406/addition-of-certain-entities-to-the-entity-list-and-revision-of-an-entry-on-the-entity-list.
105 See Executive Office of the President (2020) ‘Addressing the Threat Posed by TikTok, and Taking Additional Steps to Address the National Emergency with Respect to the Information and Communications Technology and Services Supply Chain’, Federal Register (11 August 2020), www.federalregister.gov/documents/2020/08/11/2020-17699/addressing-the-threat-posed-by-tiktok-and-taking-additional-steps-to-address-the-national-emergency; Executive Office of the President (2020) ‘Addressing the Threat Posed by WeChat, and Taking Additional Steps to Address the National Emergency with Respect to the Information and Communications Technology and Services Supply Chain’, Federal Register (11 August 2020), www.federalregister.gov/documents/2020/08/11/2020-17700/addressing-the-threat-posed-by-wechat-and-taking-additional-steps-to-address-the-national-emergency. The Biden administration removed these restrictions. See ‘Executive Order on Protecting Americans’ Sensitive Data from Foreign Adversaries’, The White House (9 June 2021), www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/2021/06/09/executive-order-on-protecting-americans-sensitive-data-from-foreign-adversaries/.
106 《不可靠实体清单规定》 [Provisions on the Unreliable Entities List], Order No. 4  of the Ministry of Commerce of the People's Republic of China, issued on 19 September 2020, effective on the same date. For a detailed discussion of the entity lists introduced by the US and China, see Bu, Q. (2020) ‘China's Blocking Mechanism: the Unreliable Entity List’, Journal of International Trade Law and Policy 19(3), 159CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
107 《商务部就<不可靠实体清单规定>答问》 [The Ministry of Commerce Answers Questions on the Provisions on the Unreliable Entities List] (2020), The State Council Information Office of the People's Republic of China (20 September 2020), www.scio.gov.cn/xwfbh/gbwxwfbh/xwfbh/swb/Document/1688083/1688083.htm [in Chinese].
108 《关于调整发布<中国禁止出口限制出口技术目录>的公告》 [Announcement on the Amendment of Catalogue of Technologies Prohibited and Restricted from Export], Announcement No. 38  of the Ministry of Commerce and Ministry of Science and Technology of the People's Republic of China, issued on 28 August 2020, effective on the same date.
109 《中华人民共和国出口管制法》 [Export Control Law of the People's Republic of China], Order No. 58 of the President of the People's Republic of China, issued on 17 October 2020, effective on 1 December 2020.
110 《中华人民共和国对外贸易法》 [Foreign Trade Law of the People's Republic of China], Order No. 22 of the President of the People's Republic of China, issued on 12 May 1994, effective on 1 July 1994, revised by Order No. 15 of the President of the People's Republic of China on 6 April 2004 and Order No. 57 of the President of the People's Republic of China on 7 November 2016.
111 《中华人民共和国技术进出口管理条例》[Regulations of the People's Republic of China on Administration of Import and Export of Technologies], Order No. 331 of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, issued on 10 December 2001, effective on 1 January 2002, revised by Order No. 588 of the State Council of the People's Republic of China on 8 January 2011, Order No. 709 of the State Council of the People's Republic of China on 2 March 2019, and Order No. 732 of the State Council of the People's Republic of China on 29 November 2020.
112 For discussions of the revision, see J. Yunfen et al. (2020) ‘Revision of the Catalogue of Technologies Prohibited or Restricted from Export of the PRC’, China Law Insight (Blog Post, 15 October 2020), www.chinalawinsight.com/2020/10/articles/customs-business/revision-of-the-catalogue-of-technologies-prohibited-or-restricted-from-export-of-the-prc/; J. Cowley, A. Tsang and D. Wu (2020) ‘China Amends Catalogue of Technologies Prohibited or Restricted from Export’, Baker McKenzie (Blog Post, 1 September 2020), https://sanctionsnews.bakermckenzie.com/china-amends-catalogue-of-technologies-prohibited-or-restricted-from-export/.
113 《商务部就调整发布的<中国禁止出口限制出口技术目录>答问》 [The Ministry of Commerce Answers Questions on the Amendment of the Catalogue of Technologies Prohibited and Restricted from Export] (2020), The State Council Information Office of the People's Republic of China (28 August 2020), www.scio.gov.cn/xwfbh/gbwxwfbh/xwfbh/swb/Document/1686252/1686252.htm [in Chinese].
114 See S. Yu and D. Sevastopulo, ‘China Targets Rare Earth Export Curbs to Hobble US Defence Industry’, Financial Times (16 February 2021), www.ft.com/content/d3ed83f4-19bc-4d16-b510-415749c032c1; J. Liu, A. Lee and J. Deaux, ‘China May Ban Rare Earth Tech Exports on Security Concerns’, Bloomberg (19 February 2021), www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-02-19/china-may-ban-rare-earth-technology-exports-on-security-concerns.
115 D. Köstner and M. Nonn (2021) ‘The 2020 Chinese Export Control Law: A New Compliance Nightmare on the Foreign Trade Law Horizon?’, China–EU Law Journal 1.
116 《阻断外国法律与措施不当域外适用办法》[Rules on Counteracting Unjustified Extra-territorial Application of Foreign Legislation and Other Measures], Order No. 1  of the Ministry of Commerce of the People's Republic of China, issued on 9 January 2021, effective on the same date.
117 《中华人民共和国反外国制裁法》[Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law of the People's Republic of China], Order No. 90 of the President of the People's Republic of China, issued on 10 June 2021, effective on the same date.
118 《商务部就<阻断外国法律与措施不当域外适用办法>答问》 [The Ministry of Commerce Answers Questions on the Rules on Counteracting Unjustified Extra-territorial Application of Foreign Legislation and Other Measures] (2021), The State Council Information Office of the People's Republic of China (10 January 2021), www.scio.gov.cn/xwfbh/gbwxwfbh/xwfbh/swb/Document/1696695/1696695.htm [in Chinese].
119 《全国人大常委会法工委负责人就反外国制裁法答记者问》[Head of the Legal Work Committee of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress Answers Reports’ Questions on the Anti-foreign Sanctions Law] (2021), State Council (11 June 2021), www.gov.cn/zhengce/2021-06/11/content_5616932.htm [in Chinese].
120 See European Commission (2021) ‘Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Protection of the Union and Its Member States from Economic Coercion by Third Countries’, COM(2021) 775 Final (8 December 2021), https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2021/december/tradoc_159958.pdf.
121 For a brief discussion of the ACI, see W. Zhou and Q Kong (2022) ‘ACI is a Sign of European Departure from the Multilateral Trading System’, CGTN (26 May 2022), https://news.cgtn.com/news/2022-05-26/ACI-is-sign-of-European-departure-from-the-multilateral-trading-system-1alQWJqNdbG/index.html.
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