IN recent years a good deal of attention has been focused on the Vlasov movement as an outstanding example of “Soviet opposition to Stalin” and as a wartime opportunity (largely missed by Germany) to utilize defectors and prisoners for military as well as political propaganda purposes. One important facet of the Vlasov problem has eluded systematic investigation: the reaction of the Soviet authorities to the movement. The themes employed in their campaign to reduce the political force of the Vlasov challenge provide some insight into their political behavior under the stress of indigenous opposition.

WE attempt in this article to identify some politically significant characteristics of Soviet policy in the field of “cultural relations. These are discussed in the context of international affairs since the death of Stalin. The significance of this topic for governments was reemphasized by its prominence at the two Geneva East-West meetings of 1955. It impinged noticeably upon world attention once the ”Geneva spirit” had rekindled hope for a lessening of tension.

HOW new is the Soviet “new course”? It is just as difficult to answer this question as it applies to the internal Soviet economy as in its application to internal politics or to foreign affairs. Nor is this surprising, for it is probable that there is a close interrelationship between the various facets of Soviet policy.

ON March 7, 1936, German troops entered the demilitarized zone of the Rhineland. Germany thus violated Articles 42 and 43 of the Treaty of Versailles and Articles 1 and 2 of the Treaty of Locarno of 1925. Remilitarization moved forward for about one hundred miles the areas of concentration for any German armed attack in the west and advanced the defensive line that could be held by the German army. It severely weakened France and, in consequence, all the other powers concerned to maintain the Paris peace settlements and to preserve the peace of Europe.

IHE problem of war and national security, at one time conceived of as the province of almost anyone but the peace-minded international relationist, has come increasingly to occupy scholars and researchers. Arnold J. Toynbee, whose major concern is the philosophy of history, preserves a lively interest in international politics and particularly in the problem of war, the principles of foreign policy, and the quest for an applicable body of theory concerning international society. With the publication of the last four volumes of his famed A Study of History, it may be appropriate to call attention to the other side of his work, especially as he brings to the discussion a clarity, simplicity, and concreteness refreshing by contrast with the pompous tautologies of much of modern scholarship. This article reviews Mr. Toynbee's contribution to knowledge on the first of the problems mentioned, namely, war and national security. It seeks to present his conception of the crisis in modern war, social factors underlying the transformation of warfare, and prevailing theories on the nature and inevitability of war.

INDIA'S experiment with democratic institutions is still only an experiment. Although India adopted a parliamentary system when she achieved independence in 1947 and has thus far been able to maintain her democratic institutions with much more success than some other newly independent Asian nations, no observer can have complete confidence in their stability. Indians have had to adjust from the role of natives in a country occupied by an imperialist power to that of citizens in a democracy, and the adjustment has not been easy. Traditional attitudes have a way of persisting and are not always readily accommodated to a parliamentary system of government.