With World War II and the explosion of the atomic bomb, the critical importance of organized research and development (R & D) to weapons development and to international relations became obvious to everyone. It created new problems in national policy, deriving essentially from the mobilization and the close involvement of university science and industrial technology with strategic and quasistrategic aims. And it changed the rules of the game in international relations by increasing, by many orders of magnitude, the costs of waging all-out war.

IN the early 1960's a great deal of “scare” literature was produced concerning Latin America. The titles and subtitles of many of the books and articles written during the period help bear this contention out: “The Eleventh Hour,” “Reform or Revolution,” “Evolution or Chaos.” The concern of scholars and public officials, stemming principally from the Cuban revolution, was that Latin America was about to explode in violent upheaval, that unless democratic reforms were quick in forthcoming, the Latin American nations would soon be the victims of Castro-Communist takeovers. The “one-minute-to-midnight” mentality shaped not only a great deal of official thinking and policy with regard to Latin America during the 1960's, but also permeated, in varying degrees of sophistication, the large body of development literature dealing with the area.

Integration theorists are increasingly turning their attention away from an examination of the relationship of gains to the integration process and towards the elaboration of complex models in which the salience of the former is obscured. As this variable appears to influence the durability of integrative systems among third-world countries and, by entering into actor calculations of alternatives, effects changes within the integrative system, an analysis is warranted which places the relationship of gains to the integration process in bolder relief.

Bureaucrats perceive politics bureaucratically. They would wish it to be an orderly process. Therefore, when officers of “new” or “developing” nations take power, they seek to legitimize the administrative state. Their model is bureaucracy, but government and administration are found to be very different from the model. Organization does not meet all problems; neither does the issuance of “the right orders.” The goals of administration cannot be achieved without the active compliance of much of the population. What is more, compliance must be active: passive acceptance alone is not enough.

Theorists in the field of political integration have already established that first-rank states usually assume leadership of the process of what I term external political integration. (The concept itself is neutral: Several autonomous political units merge into a larger one, which may take the form of a loosely-knit confederation, a full federation, or a unitary state.) To use Karl Deutsch's terminology, die leading states usually operate as “core areas.” This phenomenon shows that a first-rank state usually regards its relationship with the process of integration as arising out of the theoretical demands of its prestige.

We are especially indebted to the author of this book because of the extraordinary paucity of biographies of the great man who is its subject. As the British military historian, Michael Howard, says in the foreword: “Clausewitz as a man remains almost completely unknown.” And again: “As yet mere has appeared no serious biography in English and for this reason alone Roger Parkinson's book breaks important new ground.”

After a decade of play, the score in the match pitting men in uniform against politicians is nearly even. About half of the new states of Black Africa have remained uninterruptedly under civilian rule while in the other half each has experienced at least one coup in which armed forces—military and police—have played a prominent role. Most of the coups were followed by the establishment of some form of military government. Sometimes the original coup leaders were overthrown by others; sometimes they returned to their barracks, hovering about the seats of power; sometimes they or others abruptly interrupted “civilianization.”