¹ U.S. Agency for International Development (AID), Economic Data Book: Latin America, 1968 (Washington, D.C. 1968), 8.Google Scholar

² All growth data come from Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA), Economic Survey of Latin America, 1969, Part One, mimeo version (Santiago 1970), 7.Google Scholar

³ ECLA, Economie Survey of Latin America, 1969, Part Two, mimeo version (Santiago 1970), 11–204, 11–201.Google Scholar

⁴ Comité Interamericano de Desarrollo Agrícola (CIDA), Chile: tenencia de la tierray desarrollo socio-económico del sector agricola (Santiago 1966), 204.Google Scholar Although figures for 1966–70 are hard to come by, it is our estimate that the index was still below 100 as late as 1969.

⁵ Ibid., 23.

⁶ Embassy of Chile, Statistical Profile of Chile (Washington, D.C. 1967), 11.Google Scholar

⁷ The 1967 figure is taken from ECLA, Estudio económico de América Latina (New York 1968), 163.Google Scholar The 1968 figure is taken from Hacienda, Ministerio de, Exposición sobre el estado de la hacienda pública (Santiago 1969), 129.Google Scholar The 1969 figure is taken from ECLA (fn. 3), 11–191.

⁸ Data cited in Boron, Atilio A., “Political Mobilization and Political Crisis in Chile, 1920–1970” (Santiago, undated mimeo), 28.Google Scholar

⁹ Cruz, Aníbal Pinto Santa, Chile: un caso de desarrollo frustrado (Santiago 1958), 189–98.Google Scholar

¹⁰ The 1967 data are from the Pan American Union, Statistical Compendium of the Americas (Washington, D.C. 1969), 10.Google Scholar The figure for 1962–63 is from Mattelart, Armand, Integración nacional y marginalidad (Santiago 1965), 112.Google Scholar

¹¹ Ibid., 154.

¹² Ibid., 39.

¹³ Ibid., 115.

¹⁴ Ibid., 154.

¹⁵ Ibid., 150 (urban areas), 139 (rural areas).

¹⁶ Such urban-rural differences have been interpreted by means of a coherent political ideology. Herein may reside the principal difference between Chile and many other Latin American countries, where urban-rural differences along the dimensions we have presented are of course also notorious.

¹⁷ It is important to note that the Chileans have responded more to the absolute as opposed to the comparative or relative nature of their economic and social condition. What appears increasingly salient is Chilean awareness of the untenable nature of the country's economic and social development in absolute terms, regardless, for example, of the fact that Chile might rate higher man Bolivia, Ecuador, Paraguay, or Peru on almost all measures of such development.

¹⁸ It is manifestly impossible to summarize here all the salient relationships in Chilean “structuralist” theorizing or to cite all the important references. For a discussion of structuralism as it has been applied to the effort to resolve the problem of inflation in Chile, see Hirschman, Albert O., Journeys Toward Progress (New York 1963), 212ff.Google Scholar Also see the papers by Campos, Roberto Oliveira, Felix, David, and Grunwald, Joseph in Hirschman, ed., Latin American Issues (New York 1961).Google Scholar Prominently associated with the structuralist viewpoint are the Chilean economists Aníbal Pinto and Osvaldo Sunkel. See Pinto (fn. 9), 125ff., and Sunkel, , “La inflación chilena; un enfoque heterodoxo,” El Trimestre Económico, XXV (October-December 1958), 570–99.Google Scholar

¹⁹ Hirschman, , Journeys Toward Progress (fn. 18), 214.Google Scholar

²⁰ Seers, Dudley, “A Theory of Inflation and Growth in Under-developed Economies Based on the Experience of Latin America,” Oxford Economic Papers, XIV (June 1962), 179.Google Scholar

²¹ Data cited in Pinto (fn. 9), 164.

²² IV Censo Nacional Agropecuario (Santiago 1965), 10.

²³ Data on the Frei achievements are taken from Corporación de la Reforma Agraria (CORA), Reforma Agraria Chilena, 1965–1970 (Santiago 1970), 35–39.Google Scholar

²⁴ CIDA (fn. 4), 206.

²⁵ Ibid., 19.

²⁶ Ibid., 181.

²⁷ The data in this paragraph are cited in Victor Brodersohn, “Consideraciones sobre el carácter dependiente de la burguesía industrial chilena” (Santiago, Universidad de Chile, Centro de Estudios Socio-Económicos 1970), 11. The data were in turn taken from Escobar, Ricardo Lagos, La industria en Chile: antecedentes estructurales (Santiago 1966).Google Scholar Although originally published in 1966, the data refer to 1957. We have attempted in vain to locate more recent data on industrial concentration. It is our distinct impression, derived from such work as that of Caputo and Pizarro, that, if anything, such concentration has actually increased in the intervening years. They argue, for example, that there has been increasing concentration in the automotive, petrochemical, textile, and food industries. Orlando Caputo and Pizarro, Roberto, “Dependencia e inversión extranjera en Chile,” (Santiago, Universidad de Chile, Centro de Estudios Socio-Económicos 1970).Google Scholar

²⁸ Escobar, Ricardo Lagos, La concentración del poder económico (Santiago 1961), 101.Google Scholar

²⁹ Data from CORFO are contained in the “Plan Chonchol,” a Christian Democratic party document published in Política, Economía, Cultura (PEC), No. 239 (July 28, 1967), xvii.

³⁰ Lagos, (fn. 28), 115–16.Google Scholar

³¹ Flores, Gilberto, “Bureaucracy and Political Stability: The Chilean Case” (unpubl. M.A. thesis, University of California, Berkeley 1968), 24, 26.Google Scholar

³² This argument may be found in a host of recent publications. See, for example, Frank, Andre Gunder, Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America (New York 1967)Google Scholar; Bodenheimer, Susanne, “Dependency and Imperialism: The Roots of Latin American Underdevelopment,” NACLA Newsletter, IV (May-June 1970), 18–27CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Santos, Theotonio Dos, “Dependencia económica y alternativas de cambio en América Latina” (Santiago, Universidad de Chile, Centro de Estudios Socio-Económicos 1970).Google Scholar

³³ See, for example, Rosenau, James N., ed., Linkage Politics (New York 1969).Google Scholar

³⁴ Jeffrey Hart (unpubl., University of California, Berkeley 1971).

³⁵ Although not stated there precisely in “dependency” terms or in the form of testable hypotheses, many of these suggestions stem from Douglas A. Chalmers, “Developing on the Periphery: External Factors in Latin American Politics,” in Rosenau (fn. 33), 67–93.

³⁶ Bodenheimer, (fn. 32), 20.Google Scholar

³⁷ Brodersohn, (fn. 27), 1.Google Scholar

³⁸ Morse, Richard, “Latin American Cities,” Comparative Studies in Society and History, IV (July 1962), 473–93.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

³⁹ As it has been formulated in recent years, the dependency theory appears to suffer from a number of problems. Definitions of dependency are neither precise nor readily operational. The theory has placed an over-reliance on a monocausal explanation of Latin American reality. There is usually a lack of specification of the policy implications of the theory. Finally, there is the absence of empirical material in many discussions of dependency.

⁴⁰ Caputo, and Pizarro, (fn. 27), 3.Google Scholar

⁴¹ Ibid., 7.

⁴² Ibid., 9, 11.

⁴³ This is the view of Caputo and Pizarro, ibid., 10.

⁴⁴ On both the automobile and banking industries, see ibid., 20, 9.

⁴⁵ Brodersohn, (fn. 27), 17, 19, 20.Google Scholar

⁴⁶ These percentages have been computed from the absolute total of imports and exports (in value). The absolute totals were obtained in AID (fn. 1), 20–21.

⁴⁷ Hart (fn. 34).

⁴⁸ The phrase “power contenders” is taken from Anderson, Charles W., “Toward a Theory of Latin American Politics,” in Snow, Peter G., ed., Government and Politics in Latin America (New York 1967), 230–46.Google Scholar

⁴⁹ Note that the peasantry is excluded from this assessment of the major power contenders.

⁵⁰ Again we exclude the peasantry from this generalization.

⁵¹ Concerning this pattern of direct access, see Menges, Constantine, “Public Policy and Organized Business in Chile: A Preliminary Analysis,” Journal of International Affairs, XX, No. 2 (1966), 343–65.Google Scholar

⁵² Among Chilean observers, see Pinto (fn. 9), 134–35, and Clodomiro Almeyda, quoted in Halperin, Ernst, Nationalism and Communism in Chile (Cambridge, Mass. 1965), 162.Google Scholar (Almeyda is now the Foreign Minister in the Allende government.) Among North American observers, see Kenworthy, Eldon, “Coalitions in the Political Development of Latin America,” in Groennings, Sven and others, eds., The Study of Coalition Behavior (New York 1970), 103–40Google Scholar; and Zeitlin, Maurice, “The Social Determinants of Political Democracy in Chile,” in Petras, James and Zeitlin, Maurice, eds., Latin America: Reform or Revolution? (Greenwich, Conn. 1968), 220–34.Google Scholar

⁵³ Kenworthy, (fn. 52), 120ff.Google Scholar

⁵⁴ Kaufman, Robert, The Chilean Right and Agrarian Reform: Resistance and Moderation (Washington, D.C. 1967), 28.Google Scholar

⁵⁵ Kenworthy, (fn. 52), 121.Google Scholar

⁵⁶ The Frei administration was responsible for considerable peasant organization. From 1964 through June, 1970, the number of agricultural unions increased from 24 to 488. The number of members increased from 1,658 to 127,688. But the latter figures represented only about 10 per cent of the total campesino population. CORA (fn. 23), 26.

⁵⁷ A very small stratum of workers has fared relatively well and constitutes what Chileans call the “labor aristocracy.” Its predominant element consists of the organized miners.

⁵⁸ Kenworthy, (fn. 52), 124.Google Scholar

⁵⁹ Pinto, (fn. 9), 124.Google Scholar

⁶⁰ Anderson, (fn. 48), 237.Google Scholar

⁶¹ Kenworthy, (fn. 52), 134.Google Scholar

⁶² Jowitt, Kenneth, Revolutionary Breakthroughs and National Development (Berkeley 1971), 7.Google Scholar

⁶³ Kirchheimer, Otto, “Confining Conditions and Revolutionary Breakthroughs,” American Political Science Review, LIX (December 1965), 964–74.Google Scholar

⁶⁴ See, for example, Wiles, P. J. D., The Political Economy of Communism (Cambridge, Mass. 1962).Google Scholar

⁶⁵ Programa Básico de Gobierno de la Unidad Popular (Santiago 1970), 4.