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The Concorde SST and Change in the British Polity
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 13 June 2011
Abstract
Britain's experience with the Concorde Project was characterized by changes in the objectives of governmental policy for which the Concorde was to be an instrument. Early in the project, the British state used the Concorde to rationalize Britain's aircraft industry and to enter the E.E.C. Later, the international objective became less salient; the domestic objective, instead of encouragement of efficiency, became maintenance of the industry's employment levels in order to promote political stability. The shift in the purposes of policy can be linked to changes in the power relations beween Britain's society and state. The changes in power relations raise issues about recent characterizations of the British polity and other advanced industrialized societies.
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References
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