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¹ CNN, ‘PNG’s Kevin Conrad in Bali: US, Get out of the Way!’, available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=C1fwrWc-g_A; A.C. Revkin, ‘Issuing a Bold Challenge to the U.S. over Climate’, The New York Times, 22 Jan. 2008, available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/22/science/earth/22conv.html?_r=0.

² New York, NY (US), 9 May 1992, in force 21 Mar. 1994, available at: http://unfccc.int.

³ Decision 1/CP.13, ‘Bali Action Plan’, UN Doc. FCCC/CP/2007/6/Add.1, 14 Mar. 2008.

⁴ Kyoto (Japan), 11 Dec. 1997, in force 16 Feb. 2005, available at: http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/kpeng.pdf.

⁵ Bali Action Plan, n. 3 above, para. 1(b)(ii).

⁶ Angelsen, A. & McNeill, D., ‘The Evolution of REDD+’, in A. Angelsen et al. (eds), Analysing REDD+: Challenges and Choices (CIFOR, 2012), pp. 31–50 , at 35.

⁷ McDermott, C.L., Levin, K. & Cashore, B., ‘Building the Forest-Climate Bandwagon: REDD+ and the Logic of Problem Amelioration’ (2011) 11(3) Global Environmental Politics, pp. 85–103 .

⁸ Corbera, E. & Schroeder, H., ‘Governing and Implementing REDD+’ (2011) 14(2) Environmental Science & Policy, pp. 89–99 , at 90–3.

⁹ Cerbu, G.A., Swallow, B.M. & Thompson, D.Y., ‘Locating REDD : A Global Survey and Analysis of REDD Readiness and Demonstration Activities’ (2011) 14(2) Environmental Science & Policy, pp. 168–180 .

¹⁰ Winkler, H. & Rajamani, L., ‘CBDR&RC in a Regime Applicable to All’ (2013) 14(1) Climate Policy, pp. 102–121 ; Brunnée, J. & Streck, C., ‘The UNFCCC as a Negotiation Forum: Towards Common but More Differentiated Responsibilities’ (2013) 13(5) Climate Policy, pp. 589–607 ; Deleuil, T., ‘The Common but Differentiated Responsibilities Principle: Changes in Continuity after the Durban Conference of the Parties’ (2012) 21(3) Review of European, Comparative & International Environmental Law, pp. 271–281 ; Rajamani, L., ‘Ambition and Differentiation in the 2015 Paris Agreement: Interpretive Possibilities and Underlying Politics’ (2016) 65(2) International and Comparative Law Quarterly, pp. 493–514 .

¹¹ Winkler & Rajamani, ibid., p. 104; Brunnée & Streck, ibid., p. 602.

¹² See, e.g., Rajamani, L., ‘The Changing Fortunes of Differential Treatment in the Evolution of International Environmental Law’ (2012) 88(3) International Affairs, pp. 605–623 .

¹³ UNFCCC, n. 2 above, Preamble, Arts 3(1), 4(7).

¹⁴ Winkler & Rajamani, n. 10 above, p. 105; Rajamani, n. 12 above; Deleuil, n. 10 above, pp. 275, 279.

¹⁵ Rajamani, n. 12 above, p. 606; Brunnée & Streck, n. 10 above, p. 594.

¹⁶ Costantini, V., Sforna, G. & Zoli, M., ‘Interpreting Bargaining Strategies of Developing Countries in Climate Negotiations: A Quantitative Approach’ (2016) 121 Ecological Economics, pp. 128–139 ; Michaelowa, A. & Michaelowa, K., ‘Do Rapidly Developing Countries Take up New Responsibilities for Climate Change Mitigation?’ (2015) 133(3) Climatic Change, pp. 499–510 ; Deleuil, n. 10 above; Brunnée & Streck, n. 10 above; Winkler & Rajamani, n. 10 above.

¹⁷ Certain developing countries have continued to emphasize the moral responsibility of developed countries to bear the burden of mitigation based on their historical GHG emissions. On the other hand, developed countries resist, focusing on current and future contributions and the ability to act. Yet developing country positions have become increasingly varied, given their different economic and political power, GHG emissions and vulnerability to the effects of climate change: see, e.g., Brunnée & Streck, n. 10 above, pp. 590–8; Rajamani, n. 12 above, pp. 615–20; Michaelowa & Michaelowa, ibid.; Costantini, Sforna & Zoli, ibid.; Winkler & Rajamani, n. 10 above.

¹⁸ Paris Agreement, Paris (France), 13 Dec. 2015, not yet in force (in UNFCCC Secretariat, Report of the Conference of the Parties on its Twenty-First Session, Addendum, UN Doc. FCCC/CP/2015/10/Add.1, 29 Jan. 2016, Annex).

¹⁹ CBDR has been reformulated in the Paris Agreement as ‘common, but differentiated responsibilities and capabilities, in the light of different national circumstances’. It has been argued that this new phrasing is intended to capture the evolving economic realities of individual developing countries and to move away from a binary distinction between Annex I and non-Annex I parties. The Paris Agreement also applies differentiation in nuanced ways to parties’ obligations across the agreement: ibid., Preamble. For more information, see Rajamani, n. 10 above. On difficulties in the UNFCCC negotiations, see also Costantini, Sforna & Zoli, n. 16 above, p. 129; Deleuil, n. 10 above, pp. 271, 273.

²⁰ CBDR guides the parties’ actions in implementing the UNFCCC under Art. 3(1). However, it also applies separately and in more specified ways to areas of activity including adaptation, technology transfer, finance and capacity building. Additionally, negotiating groups may formulate tailored interpretations of CBDR for specific issues, such as REDD+: Winkler & Rajamani, n. 10 above, p. 105; Rajamani, n. 12; Deleuil, n. 10 above, pp. 275, 279.

²¹ Erlanger, H. et al., ‘Is It Time for a New Legal Realism?’ (2005) 2 Wisconsin Law Review, pp. 335–363 ; Merry, S.E., ‘New Legal Realism and the Ethnography of Transnational Law’ (2006) 31(4) Law & Social Inquiry, pp. 975–995 .

²² Koh, H.H., ‘Transnational Legal Process’ (1996) 75(1) Nebraska Law Review, pp. 181–206 , at 183–4; Shaffer, G., ‘Transnational Legal Process and State Change’ (2012) 37(2) Law & Social Inquiry, pp. 229–264 , at 233.

²³ Shaffer, ibid., p. 236; Koh, ibid., pp. 183–4.

²⁴ Snidal, D., ‘Rational Choice and International Relations’, in W. Carlsnaes, T. Risse & B.A. Simmons (eds), Handbook of International Relations (Sage, 2013), pp. 85–111 .

²⁵ Finnemore, M. & Sikkink, K., ‘International Norm Dynamics and Political Change’ (1998) 52(4) International Organization, pp. 887–917 , at 891.

²⁶ Decision 1/CP.16, ‘The Cancun Agreements: Outcome of the Work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-Term Cooperative Action under the Convention’, UN Doc. FCCC/CP/2010/7/Add.1, 15 Mar. 2011, paras 68–79.

²⁷ For more on rationalist-constructivist frameworks, see Checkel, J.T., ‘International Norms and Domestic Politics: Bridging the Rationalist-Constructivist Divide’ (1997) 3(4) European Journal of International Relations, pp. 473–495 ; March, J.G. & Olsen, J.P., ‘The Institutional Dynamics of International Political Orders’ (1998) 52(4) International Organization, pp. 943–969 ; Hall, P., ‘Historical Institutionalism in Rationalist and Sociological Perspective’, in J. Mahoney & K. Thelen (eds), Explaining Institutional Change: Ambiguity, Agency, and Power (Cambridge University Press, 2009), pp. 204–224 .

²⁸ Gulbrandsen, L.H., Transnational Environmental Governance: The Emergence and Effects of the Certification of Forests and Fisheries (Edward Elgar, 2010), pp. 18–20 . See, generally, Simmons, B.A., ‘International Law and State Behavior: Commitment and Compliance in International Monetary Affairs’ (2000) 94(4) American Political Science Review, pp. 819–835 .

²⁹ Finnemore & Sikkink, n. 25 above, pp. 896–9; Payne, R., ‘Persuasion, Frames and Norm Construction’ (2001) 7(1) European Journal of International Relations, pp. 37–61 , at 38–9. See, generally, Risse, T., ‘“Let’s Argue !”: Communicative Action in World Politics’ (2000) 54(1) International Organization, pp. 1–39 .

³⁰ Simmons, B.A., ‘Compliance with International Agreements’ (1998) 1(1) Annual Review of Political Science, pp. 75–93 .

³¹ On the role of capacity building and material assistance in transnational processes, see Bernstein, S. & Cashore, B., ‘Complex Global Governance and Domestic Policies: Four Pathways of Influence’ (2012) 88(3) International Affairs, pp. 585–604 , at 593; and Chayes, A. & Chayes, A., The New Sovereignty: Compliance with International Regulatory Agreements (Harvard University Press, 1995), pp. 193–195 .

³² Checkel, J.T., ‘International Institutions and Socialization in Europe: Introduction and Framework’ (2005) 59(4) International Organization, pp. 801–826 . See also Risse, T. & Sikkink, K., ‘The Socialization of International Human Rights Norms into Domestic Politics: Introduction’, in T. Risse, S.C. Ropp & K. Sikkink (eds), The Power of Human Rights. International Norms and Domestic Change (Cambridge University Press, 1999), pp. 1–38 .

³³ Finnemore & Sikkink, n. 25 above, pp. 904–5.

³⁴ Goodman, R. & Jinks, D., Socializing States: Promoting Human Rights through International Law (Oxford University Press, 2013) pp. 27–28 .

³⁵ On the importance of combining rationalist and constructivist perspectives, see Checkel, n. 27 above; March & Olsen, n. 27 above; and Hall, n. 27 above.

³⁶ Halliday, T.C. & Carruthers, B.G., Bankrupt: Global Lawmaking and Systematic Financial Crisis (Stanford University Press, 2009), p. 406 .

³⁷ Deflem, M., Sociology of Law: Visions of a Scholarly Tradition (Cambridge University Press, 2008), pp. 100–101 .

³⁸ Risse, T. & Ropp, S.C., ‘Introduction and Overview’, in T. Risse, S.C. Ropp & K. Sikkink (eds), The Persistent Power of Human Rights: From Commitment to Compliance (Cambridge University Press, 2013), pp. 3–25 , at 13; Goodman & Jinks, n. 34 above, pp. 180–2.

³⁹ Beach, D. & Pedersen, R.B., Process-Tracing Methods: Foundations and Guidelines (University of Michigan Press, 2013), pp. 18–21 .

⁴⁰ Goertz, G. & Mahoney, J., A Tale of Two Cultures: Qualitative and Quantitative Research in the Social Sciences (Princeton University Press, 2012), pp. 100–115 .

⁴¹ Sil, R. & Katzenstein, P.J., Beyond Paradigms: Analytical Eclecticism in the Study of World Politics (Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), p. 419 .

⁴² As part of a broader research project on the transnational legal process for REDD+, Sébastien Jodoin completed 94 semi-structured elite interviews with individuals affiliated with international organizations, developing and developed country governments, corporations, and NGOs actively working on REDD+ around the world. A complete list of these interviews and further information on how they were conducted and analyzed is available at: http://www.sjodoin.ca/s/On-Line-Appendix-on-REDD-Fieldwork.pdf.

⁴³ Checkel, J.T., ‘Process Tracing’, in A. Klotz & D. Prakash (eds), Qualitative Methods in International Relations: A Pluralist Guide (Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), pp. 114–127 , at 119.

⁴⁴ Beach & Pedersen, n. 39 above, pp. 120–43.

⁴⁵ Boyd, W., ‘Ways of Seeing in Environmental Law: How Deforestation Became an Object of Climate Governance’ (2010) 37(3) Ecology Law Quarterly, pp. 843–916 , at 866–69.

⁴⁶ UNFCCC, n. 2 above, Art. 4(1)(d).

⁴⁷ Ibid., Art. 12(1)(a).

⁴⁸ Buizer, M., Humphreys, D. & de Jong, W., ‘Climate Change and Deforestation: The Evolution of an Intersecting Policy Domain’ (2013) 35 Environmental Science & Policy, pp. 1–11 .

⁴⁹ Decision 17/CP.7, ‘Modalities and Procedures for a Clean Development Mechanism as Defined in Article 12 of the Kyoto Protocol’, UN Doc. FCCC/CP/2001/13/Add.1, 21 Jan. 2002.

⁵⁰ Schlamadinger, B. et al., ‘A Synopsis of Land Use, Land-Use Change and Forestry (LULUCF) under the Kyoto Protocol and Marrakech Accords’ (2007) 10(4) Environmental Science & Policy, pp. 271–282 , at 278–9.

⁵¹ Boyd, n. 45 above, pp. 869–70.

⁵² Schlamadinger, B. et al., ‘Should We Include Avoidance of Deforestation in the International Response to Climate Change?’, in P. Moutinho & S. Schwartzman (eds), Tropical Deforestation and Climate Change (Amazon Institute for Environmental Research, 2005), pp. 53–62 .

⁵³ Streck, C. et al., ‘Climate Change and Forestry: An Introduction’, in C. Streck et al. (eds), Climate Change and Forests: Emerging Policy and Market Opportunities (Chatham House, 2008), pp. 3–10 , at 5–6.

⁵⁴ This proposal was later published in two papers: Santilli, M. et al., ‘Tropical Deforestation and the Kyoto-Protocol: An Editorial Essay’ (2005) 71(3) Climate Change, pp. 267–276 ; Moutinho, P. et al., ‘Why Ignore Tropical Deforestation? A Proposal for Including Forest Conservation in the Kyoto Protocol’ (2005) 56(222) Unasylva, pp. 27–30 .

⁵⁵ Santilli et al., ibid., pp. 271–2.

⁵⁶ J.E. Stiglitz, ‘Conservation: Analysis. This is a Bold Initiative that Could Unite the Whole World’, The Independent, 28 Nov. 2005, p. 2, available at: http://www8.gsb.columbia.edu/faculty/jstiglitz/sites/jstiglitz/files/2003_Independent_Conservation.pdf; Statement by Sir Michael T. Somare, Prime Minister of Papua New Guinea, Columbia University, New York, NY (US), 12 May 2005, available at: http://www.rainforestcoalition.org/documents/SirMichaelSomareGROCCSpeech-FINAL.pdf.

⁵⁷ K. Conrad & G. Heal, ‘A Solution to Climate Change in the World’s Rainforests’, The Financial Times, 30 Nov. 2005, available at: http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/3d0dc21e-6147-11da-9b07-0000779e2340.html#axzz32MehdORw.

⁵⁸ Submission by the Governments of Papua New Guinea & Costa Rica, ‘Reducing Emissions from Deforestation in Developing Countries: Approaches to Stimulate Action’, 11^th Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC, Agenda Item 6, 11 Nov. 2005, available at : http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2005/cop11/eng/misc01.pdf.

⁵⁹ Ibid., p. 8.

⁶⁰ Interview 33, pp. 1–2; Interview 70, p. 1.

⁶¹ Stephan, B., ‘Bringing Discourse to the Market: The Commodification of Avoided Deforestation’ (2012) 21(4) Environmental Politics, pp. 621–639 , at 628.

⁶² UNFCCC COP, Agenda Item 6, ‘Reducing Emissions from Deforestation in Developing Countries: Approaches to Stimulate Action’, UN Doc. FCCC/CP/2005/5, 30 Mar. 2006, paras 76–84.

⁶³ UNFCCC SBSTA, ‘Report on a Workshop on Reducing Emissions from Deforestation in Developing Countries’, UN Doc. FCCC/SBSTA/2006/10, 11 Oct. 2006; UNFCCC SBSTA, ‘Report on the Second Workshop on Reducing Emissions from Deforestation in Developing Countries’, UN Doc. FCCC/SBSTA/2007/3, 17 Apr. 2007.

⁶⁴ Stern, N., Stern Review on the Economics of Climate Change (Cambridge University Press, 2006), p. 537 . The Stern Review was a report commissioned by the UK government that was released to a great fanfare. On its influence, see Hulme, M., Why We Disagree about Climate Change (Cambridge University Press, 2009), pp. 125–126 .

⁶⁵ H.-H. Rogner et al., ‘Introduction’, in B. Metz et al. (eds), Climate Change 2007: Mitigation – Contribution of Working Group III to the Fourth Assessment Report of the IPCC, pp. 99–116, at 105–6, available at: http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/wg3/ar4-wg3-chapter1.pdf. The exact share of carbon emissions attributable to forest-based sources in developing countries remains a source of scientific controversy. Some scholars suggest that forests amount to a quarter of the world’s carbon emissions (e.g., Pan, Y. et al., ‘A Large and Persistent Carbon Sink in the World’s Forests’ (2011) 333(6045) Science, pp. 988–993 ); others suggest that emissions from tropical deforestation may be significantly lower than previous estimates (e.g., Zarin, D.J., ‘Carbon from Tropical Deforestation’ (2012) 336(6088) Science, pp. 1518–1519 ).

⁶⁶ Interview 7, p. 8; Interview 9, p. 4; Interview 35, p. 1.

⁶⁷ Joint Statement of Tropical Rainforest Countries’ Leaders, New York, NY (US), 24 Sept. 2007, p. 2, available at: http://www.rainforestcoalition.org/documents/F-11JointStatementbyLeadersofTropicalRainforestCountries24September2007.pdf.

⁶⁸ Bali Action Plan, n. 3 above.

⁶⁹ Ibid., para. 1(b)(ii).

⁷⁰ The expansion of RED into REDD+ was not formally consecrated until a 2008 report of the SBSTA, in which the semi-colon between the first two activities of REDD+ and its last three activities was transformed into a comma, thus giving equal priority to all five activities: UNFCCC SBSTA, ‘Report on the Workshop on Methodological Issues relating to Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation in Developing Countries’, UN Doc. FCCC/SBSTA/2008/11, 8 Sept. 2008. This wording was later adopted by the UNFCCC Secretariat in a decision adopted in 2009 in Copenhagen (Denmark), in Decision 4/CP.15, ‘Methodological Guidance for Activities relating to Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation and the Role of Conservation, Sustainable Management of Forests and Enhancement of Forest Carbon Stocks in Developing Countries’, UN Doc. FCCC/CP/2009/11/Add.1, 30 Mar. 2010.

⁷¹ Pistorius, T., ‘From RED to REDD+: The Evolution of a Forest-Based Mitigation Approach for Developing Countries’ (2012) 4(6) Current Opinion in Environmental Sustainability, pp. 638–645 , at 640; Besten, J.W. den, Arts, B. & Verkooijen, P., ‘The Evolution of REDD+: An Analysis of Discursive-Institutional Dynamics’ (2014) 35 Environmental Science & Policy, pp. 40–48 , at 42–3.

⁷² Decision 2/CP.13, ‘Reducing Emissions from Deforestation in Developing Countries: Approaches to Stimulate Action’, UN Doc. FCCC/CP/2007/6/Add.1, 14 Mar. 2008.

⁷³ Ibid., Preamble.

⁷⁴ Ibid., paras 1 and 3.

⁷⁵ Ibid., paras 2, 5 and 9.

⁷⁶ Doelle, M., ‘The Legacy of the Climate Talks in Copenhagen: Hopenhagen or Brokenhagen?’ (2010) 4(1) Carbon and Climate Law Review, pp. 86–100 .

⁷⁷ Decision 2/CP.15, ‘Copenhagen Accord’, UN Doc. FCCC/CP/2009/11/Add.1, 30 Mar. 2010, paras 6 and 8.

⁷⁸ Interview 41, p. 1.

⁷⁹ See in this regard the reflections of the head of the delegation of the Philippines to the UNFCCC in Copenhagen and the facilitator of the REDD+ negotiations: A. La Vina, ‘Ways Forward after Copenhagen: Reflections on the Climate Change Negotiating Processes by the REDD-plus Facilitator’, 2 Feb. 2010, available at: http://www.ccyd.cl/cambio_climatico_hoy/reed+/01-docredd+/La_Vina_Copenhagen_reflections.pdf.

⁸⁰ Decision 1/CP.16, ‘The Cancun Agreements’, UN Doc. FCCC/CP/2010/7/Add.1, 15 Mar. 2011, paras 68–79.

⁸¹ Ibid., paras 71, 74 and 76.

⁸² Decision 2/CP.17, UN Doc. FCCC/CP/2011/9/Add.1, 15 Mar. 2012, paras 63–73; Decisions 9/CP.19, 10/CP.19, 11/CP.19, 12/CP.19, 13/CP.19, 14/CP.19 and 15/CP.19, UN Doc. FCCC/CP/2013/10/Add.1, 31 Jan, 2014; Draft Decision –/CP.21, ‘Adoption of the Paris Agreement’, UN Doc. FCCC/CP/2015/L.9/Rev.1, 12 Dec. 2015, para. 55, and Paris Agreement, n. 18 above, Art. 5.

⁸³ Interview 42, p. 1.

⁸⁴ Boyd, E., Corbera, E. & Estrada, M., ‘UNFCCC Negotiations (Pre-Kyoto to COP-9): What the Process Says about the Politics of CDM-Sinks’ (2008) 8(2) International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics, pp. 95–112 , at 99; Stephan, n. 61 above, p. 628; J. Ebeling, ‘Risks and Criticisms of Forestry-Based Climate Change Mitigation and Carbon Trading’, in Streck et al., n. 53 above, pp. 43–58, at 44–5.

⁸⁵ E. Trines, ‘History and Context of LULUCF in the Climate Regime’, in Streck et al., n. 53 above, pp. 33–42, at 38. These concerns were largely carried over from ongoing intergovernmental processes focusing on forest governance, in which developing countries sought to obtain compensation for the ‘opportunity costs’ of forest conservation and resisted any instruments that might legally oblige them to conserve their forests or avoid deforestation: see Humphreys, D., ‘The Politics of “Avoided Deforestation”: Historical Context and Contemporary Issues’ (2008) 10(3) International Forestry Review, pp. 433–442 , at 436–40.

⁸⁶ Schlamadinger et al., n. 52 above.

⁸⁷ Angelsen & McNeill, n. 6 above, p. 35.

⁸⁸ Interview 53, pp. 1–3; Interview 70, p. 2.

⁸⁹ Interview 70, p. 1. In the words of one interviewee, REDD+ tends to be perceived positively by governments as ‘something that we can all contribute to’ and that ‘doesn’t deal with a lot of things that a lot of countries care about’: Interview 53, p. 2.

⁹⁰ Allan, J.I. & Dauvergne, P., ‘The Global South in Environmental Negotiations: The Politics of Coalitions in Redd+’ (2013) 34(8) Third World Quarterly, pp. 1307–1322 , at 1314; Gupta, J. et al., ‘The Future of Forests’, in J. Gupta, N. van der Grijp & O. Kuik (eds), Climate Change, Forests and REDD: Lessons for Institutional Design (Routledge, 2013), pp. 229–253 , at 250–2.

⁹¹ Santilli et al., n. 54 above, pp. 271–2.

⁹² Den Besten, Arts & Verkooijen, n. 71 above, p. 46.

⁹³ Checkel, J.T., ‘Why Comply? Social Learning and European Identity Change’ (2001) 55(3) International Organization, pp. 553–588 , at 562; Halliday & Carruthers, n. 36 above, pp. 35–6.

⁹⁴ Shaffer, n. 22 above, p. 256. See also Price, R., ‘Reversing the Gun Sights: Transnational Civil Society Targets Land Mines’ (1998) 52(3) International Organization, pp. 613–644 , at 622–30.

⁹⁵ Risse, n. 29 above, pp. 10–11; Checkel, n. 93 above, p. 563; Shaffer, n. 22 above, p. 249.

⁹⁶ See, e.g., Conrad & Heal, n. 57 above.

⁹⁷ See, e.g., UNFCCC SBSTA, ‘Report on the Second Workshop on Reducing Emissions from Deforestation in Developing Countries’, n. 63 above, paras 43–4; Decision 2/CP.13, n. 72 above, paras 1–3, 5 and 9; Decision 1/CP.16, n. 80 above, paras 71, 74 and 76. See McDermott, C.L., ‘REDDuced: From Sustainability to Legality to Units of Carbon – The Search for Common Interests in International Forest Governance’ (2014) 35 Environmental Science & Policy, pp. 12–19 , at 15–6.

⁹⁸ Interview 33, pp. 1–2; Interview 70, p. 1; Observations Gathered during Participation at COP-16 in Cancun (Mexico), Dec. 2010: Jodoin, n. 42 above. On the legitimacy of different developing countries and coalitions of such countries in the negotiations over REDD+, see also Allan & Dauvergne, n. 90 above.

⁹⁹ See, generally, Brunnée, J., ‘COPing with Consent: Law-Making under Multilateral Environmental Agreements’ (2002) 15(1) Leiden Journal of International Law, pp. 1–52 .

¹⁰⁰ Reinecke, S., Pistorius, T. & Pregernig, M., ‘UNFCCC and the REDD+ Partnership from a Networked Governance Perspective’ (2014) 35 Environmental Science & Policy, pp. 30–39 ; Corbera & Schroeder, n. 8 above.

¹⁰¹ Cerbu, Swallow & Thompson, n. 9 above.

¹⁰² Interview 9, p. 3.

¹⁰³ Streck, C., ‘Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation: National Implementation of REDD Schemes – An Editorial Comment’ (2010) 100(3–4) Climatic Change, pp. 389–394 .

¹⁰⁴ Interview 19, p. 1; Interview 21, p. 1; Interview 85, p. 3. See, generally, McDermott, C. et al., ‘Operationalizing Social Safeguards in REDD+: Actors, Interests and Ideas’ (2012) 21 Environmental Science & Policy, pp. 63–72 , at 64.

¹⁰⁵ Corbera & Schroeder, n. 8 above.

¹⁰⁶ Interview 9, p. 3; Interview 46, p. 3; Interview 54, p. 5. See also Seymour, F. & Angelsen, A., ‘Summary and Conclusions: REDD Wine in Old Wineskins?’, in A. Angelsen (ed.), Realising REDD+: National Strategy and Policy Options (CIFOR, 2009), pp. 293–304 , at 297 (many REDD+ projects ‘are simply old wine in new REDD+ wineskins: existing projects or approaches that have been rebranded as “REDD+” to attract new finance’).

¹⁰⁷ Interview 15, p. 8; Interview 21, p. 1; Interview 53, pp. 1–2.

¹⁰⁸ Interview 21, p. 1; Interview 68, pp. 2–3; Interview 83, p. 1.

¹⁰⁹ See, e.g., Intervention by H.E. Dr Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, President of the Republic of Indonesia on Climate Change at the G-20 Leaders Summit, in Pittsburgh, PA (US), 25 Sept. 2009, p. 2, available at: http://forestclimatecenter.org/files/2009-09-25%20Intervention%20by%20President%20SBY%20on%20Climate%20Change%20at%20the%20G-20%20Leaders%20Summit.pdf: ‘We have to move forward based on the principle of “common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities”. Both developed and developing nations must do more and do away with a “business as usual” mentality. Developed nations must take the lead, but developing nations must also seriously do their part. My last point is on what Indonesia has done and what we will do because we also want to be part of the solution. Indonesia, of course, faces problems and challenges in our national development: growth, unemployment, poverty, infrastructure building, education and health care. But we have decided and established a National Climate Change Action Plan with the targets of 2020 and 2050’.

¹¹⁰ Interview 85, p. 1; Interview 89, p. 2. See also Norwegian Agency for Development Corporation (NORAD), ‘Real-Time Evaluation of Norway’s International Climate and Forest Initiative Contributions to National REDD+ Processes 2007–2010. Country Report: Indonesia’, Mar. 2011, pp. 18–9, available at: http://www.norad.no/en/tools-and-publications/publications/publication/_attachment/333468?_download=true&_ts=12f9be6f113; Luttrell, C. et al., ‘The Political Context of REDD+ in Indonesia: Constituencies for Change’ (2014) 35 Environmental Science & Policy, pp. 67–75 , at 69.

¹¹¹ Interview 7, p. 8. See McDermott, Levin & Cashore, n. 7 above, pp. 92–3; Angelsen & McNeill, n. 6 above, pp. 34–41.

¹¹² Interview 21, p. 1.

¹¹³ Halliday & Carruthers, n. 36 above, p. 406.

¹¹⁴ Fisher, R., Hargita, Y. & Günter, S., ‘Insights from the Ground Level? A Content Analysis Review of Multi-National REDD+ Studies since 2010’ (2016) 66 Forest Policy and Economics, pp. 47–58 ; McGregor, A. et al., ‘Practical Critique: Bridging the Gap between Critical and Practice-Oriented REDD+ Research Communities’ (2014) 55(3) Asia Pacific Viewpoint, pp. 277–291 , at 279.

¹¹⁵ Halliday & Carruthers, n. 36 above, p. 18.

¹¹⁶ Streck, C., ‘The Financial Aspects of REDD+: Assessing Costs, Mobilising and Disbursing Funds’, in R. Lyster, C. MacKenzie & C. McDermott (eds), Law, Tropical Forests and Carbon (Cambridge University Press, 2013), pp. 105–127 .

¹¹⁷ See, e.g., Decision 1/CP.16, n. 80 above, para. 71, Appendix I; Decision 1/CP.18, ‘Agreed Outcome Pursuant to the Bali Action Plan’, UN Doc. FCCC/CP/2012/8/Add.1, 28 Feb. 2013, para. 3; Decision 9/CP.19, n. 82 above, para. 2.

¹¹⁸ Decision 9/CP.19, n. 82 above, paras 3 and 5.

¹¹⁹ Angelsen & McNeill n. 6 above, p. 46; Streck, n. 116 above, p. 105.

¹²⁰ Voigt, C. & Ferreira, F., ‘The Warsaw Framework for REDD+: Implications for National Implementation and Access to Results-Based Finance’ (2015) 9(2) Carbon & Climate Law Review, pp. 113–129 , at 123; Recio, M.E., ‘The Warsaw Framework and the Future of REDD+’ (2014) 24(1) Yearbook of International Environmental Law, pp. 37–69 , at 49–50.

¹²¹ M. Norman & S. Nakhooda, The State of REDD+ Finance, Center for Global Development, Working Paper No. 378, Sept. 2014, updated May 2015, p. 2, available at: http://www.cgdev.org/publication/state-redd-finance-working-paper-378.

¹²² Voigt & Ferreira, n. 120 above, p. 123.

¹²³ Decision 2/CP.17, ‘Outcome of the Word of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-Term Cooperative Action’, UN Doc. FCCC/CP/2011/9/Add.1, 15 Mar. 2012, para. 66. See also Recio, n. 120 above, p. 49; UNFCCC Secretariat, ‘Financing Options for the Full Implementation of Results-Based Actions relating to Activities referred to in Decision 1/CP.16, para 70, including Related Modalities and Procedures’, UN Doc. FCCC/TP/2012/3, 26 July 2012, pp. 6–7.

¹²⁴ See ‘Intended Nationally Determined Contribution from the Plurinational State of Bolivia’, submitted to the UNFCCC, 12 Oct. 2015, p. 6; Recio, n. 120 above, p. 50; Boucher, D.H., ‘The REDD/Carbon Market Offsets Debate: Big Argument, Small Potatoes’ (2015) 34(6–7) Journal of Sustainable Forestry, pp. 547–558 , at 548.

¹²⁵ For more discussion, see M.E. Porrúra, E. Corbera & K. Brown, ‘Reducing Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Deforestation in Developing Countries: Revisiting the Assumptions’, Tyndall Centre for Climate Change Research Working Paper 115, Dec. 2007, pp. 22–6, available at: http://www.tyndall.ac.uk/sites/default/files/wp115.pdf. See also Recio, n. 120 above, pp. 49–50; Joint Statement Issued at the Conclusion of the 16^th BASIC Ministerial Meeting on Climate Change, 15–16 Sept. 2013; and Angelsen & McNeill, n. 6 above, p. 46.

¹²⁶ A. Angelsen, ‘REDD+ as Performance-Based Aid’, United Nations University World Institute for Development Economics Research, Working Paper No. 2013/135, Dec. 2013, available at: https://www.wider.unu.edu/publication/redd-performance-based-aid.

¹²⁷ Ibid.

¹²⁸ See, e.g., Fischer, Hargita & Günter, n. 114 above, p. 56; Norman & Nakhooda, n. 121 above, pp. 25–6; K. Canby et al., ‘Tracking REDD+ Finance: 2009–2012 Finance Flows in Seven REDD+ Countries’, Forest Trends, Nov. 2014, pp. 27–8, available at: http://www.forest-trends.org/documents/files/reddx_report_2014.pdf.

¹²⁹ Norman & Nakhooda, n. 121 above, pp. 2 and 23.

¹³⁰ Ibid., p. 2.

¹³¹ Ibid.

¹³² On approaches to and challenges with estimating REDD+ costs, see Streck, n. 116 above; C. Streck & C. Parker, ‘Financing REDD+’, in Angelsen et al., n. 6 above, pp. 111–28.

¹³³ Ibid.

¹³⁴ Sunderlain, W.D. et al., ‘REDD+ at a Critical Juncture: Assessing the Limits of Polycentric Governance for Achieving Climate Change Mitigation’ (2015) 17(4) International Forestry Review, pp. 400–413 , at 410; Norman & Nakhooda, n. 121 above, pp. 19–21.

¹³⁵ Canby et al., n. 128 above, p. 30; Governors’ Climate & Forests Task Force, ‘Rio Branco Declaration: Building Partnerships & Securing Support for Forests, Climate & Livelihoods’, Rio Branco (Brazil), 11 Aug. 2014, available at: http://www.gcftaskforce.org/resource_library/documents.

¹³⁶ Norman & Nakhooda, n. 121 above, p. 9; Streck and Parker, n. 132 above, pp. 117–8.

¹³⁷ Joint Statement by Germany, Norway and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, ‘Unlocking the Potential of Forests and Land Use’, 30 Nov. 2015, available at: http://www.bmub.bund.de/N52621-1. See also The World Bank, ‘Outcomes from COP21: Forests as a Key Climate and Development Solution’, 18 Dec. 2015, available at: http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2015/12/18/outcomes-from-cop21-forests-as-a-key-climate-and-development-solution.

¹³⁸ The UNFCCC COP outcome in Lima (Peru) in 2013 makes scant reference to REDD+: Decision 1/CP.20, ‘Lima Call for Climate Action’, UN Doc. FCCC/CP/2014/10/Add.1, 2 Feb. 2015. The Paris Agreement (n. 18 above, Art. 5(2)) encourages parties to implement and support existing frameworks already agreed upon by the COP.

¹³⁹ Yet, governments typically do not cede control entirely to private enterprises. Private enterprises often act under legal authority and with state support: Rudel, T.K., ‘Changing Agents of Deforestation: From State-Initiated to Enterprise Driven Processes, 1970–2000’ (2007) 24(1) Land Use Policy, pp. 35–41 .

¹⁴⁰ Ibid., p. 35.

¹⁴¹ Angelsen & McNeill, n. 6 above, p. 48.

¹⁴² See, e.g., The Commonwealth, ‘Commonwealth Leaders’ Statement on Climate Action’, 28 Nov. 2015, available at: http://thecommonwealth.org/media/press-release/commonwealth-leaders-statement-climate-action.

¹⁴³ Dixon, R. & Challies, E., ‘Making REDD+ Pay: Shifting Rationales and Tactics of Private Finance and the Governance of Avoided Deforestation in Indonesia’ (2015) 56(1) Asia Pacific Viewpoint, pp. 6–20 , at 7.

¹⁴⁴ Decision 2/CP.17, n. 123 above, para. 65.

¹⁴⁵ Decision 10/CP.19, ‘Coordination of Support for the Implementation of Activities in relation to Mitigation Actions in the Forest Sector by Developing Countries, including Institutional Arrangements’, UN Doc. FCCC/CP/2013/10/Add.1, 31 Jan. 2014, paras 3(e), 4–8.

¹⁴⁶ F. Bernard, S. McFatridge & P.A. Minang, ‘The Private Sector in the REDD+ Supply Chain: Trends, Challenges and Opportunities’, International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD) Report, Aug. 2012, p. 1, available at: http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2012/redd_private_sector_report.pdf; Goldstein, A. & Gonzalez, G., Turning Over a New Leaf: State of the Forest Carbon Markets 2014 (Ecosystem Marketplace, 2014), pp. 40–43 . Companies in developed regions account for 98% of forestry offset purchases: see Norman & Nakhooda, n. 121 above, p. 38.

¹⁴⁷ See, e.g., Goldstein & Gonzalez, ibid.; Barron, D.P. & McDermott, C.L., ‘Private Funders Perspectives on Local Social and Environmental Impacts in Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation+’ (2015) 17(2) Journal of Environmental Policy & Planning, pp. 277–293 , at 279.

¹⁴⁸ Weaver, S., ‘Practitioner Perspective on REDD: Commercial Challenges in Project-Based Rainforest Protection Financing in the Asia Pacific Region’ (2015) 56(1) Asia Pacific Viewpoint, pp. 140–152 , at 148–9; Norman & Nakhooda, n. 121 above, pp. 36–7. Note that California (US) has moved to integrate REDD+ offsets into its cap-and-trade programme.

¹⁴⁹ Goldstein & Gonzalez, n. 146 above, p. xii.

¹⁵⁰ See, e.g., Dixon & Challies, n. 143 above, pp. 15–6.

¹⁵¹ See, e.g., I. Henderson et al., ‘The Role of the Private Sector in REDD+: The Case for Engagement and Options for Intervention’, UN-REDD Programme Policy Brief Issue #04, 2013; Bernard, McFatridge & Minang, n. 146 above; R. O’Sullivan et al., ‘Engaging the Private Sector in the Potential Generation of Carbon Credits from REDD+: An Analysis of Issues’, Report to the UK Department for International Development, June 2010.

¹⁵² Bernard, McFatridge & Minang, n. 146 above, p. 1.

¹⁵³ The UN-REDD Programme emphasizes the wide spectrum of private actors influencing REDD+, including smallholders in developing countries associated with the drivers of deforestation, and it situates private sector engagement within a broader shift to a green economy: see, e.g., Henderson et al., n. 151 above; see also UN Environment Programme, Building Natural Capital: How REDD+ Can Support a Green Economy, Report of the International Resource Panel (UNEP, 2014).

¹⁵⁴ Sikor, T. et al., ‘Global Land Governance: From Territory to Flow?’ (2013) 5(5) Current Opinion in Environmental Sustainability, pp. 522–527 , at 524.

¹⁵⁵ Hosonuma, N. et al., ‘An Assessment of Deforestation and Forest Degradation Drivers in Developing Countries’ (2012) 7(4) Environmental Research Letters, pp. 1–12 , at 8.

¹⁵⁶ Ibid.; Kissinger, G., Herold, M. & de Sy, V., Drivers of Deforestation and Forest Degradation: A Synthesis Report for REDD+ Policymakers (Lexeme Consulting, 2012), p. 5 .

¹⁵⁷ Ibid.; Pacheco, et al., ‘REDD+ and the Global Economy: Competing Forces and Policy Options’, in Angelsen et al. (eds), n. 6 above, pp. 51–68 , at 52–4; Weatherly-Singh, J. & Gupta, A., ‘Drivers of Deforestation and REDD+ Benefit-Sharing: A Meta-Analysis of the (Missing) Link’ (2015) 54 Environmental Science & Policy, pp. 97–105 , at 98.

¹⁵⁸ Decision 1/CP.16, n. 80 above, para. 72, Appendix II(a).

¹⁵⁹ UNFCCC SBSTA, ‘Views on Issues Identified in Decision 1/CP.16, Para. 72 and Appendix II. Submissions from Parties’, UN Doc. FCCC/SBSTA/2012/MISC.1, 23 Mar. 2012; Recio, n. 120 above, p. 56.

¹⁶⁰ Weatherly-Singh & Gupta, n. 157 above, p. 103; see also Recio, n. 120 above, p. 58.

¹⁶¹ Kissinger, Herold & de Sy, n. 156 above, pp. 19–20; Weatherly-Singh & Gupta, n. 157 above, pp. 98–9, 103.

¹⁶² See, e.g., Boucher, n. 124 above; Kissinger, Herold & de Sy, n. 156 above, pp. 21–2.

¹⁶³ Pacheco et al., ‘REDD+ and the Global Economy: Competing Forces and Policy Options’, in Angelsen et al. (eds), n. 6 above, pp. 51–68, at 59. Much of the literature focuses on general estimates of supply chain values in a given year without direct comparison with REDD+ incentives: see, e.g., M. Peters-Stanley et al., ‘Supply Change: Corporations, Commodities and Commitments that Count’, Forest Trends, Mar. 2015, p. 7, available at: http://forest-trends.org/releases/uploads/Supply%20Change_Report.pdf; Boucher, n. 124 above.

¹⁶⁴ See, e.g., Newton, P., Agrawal, A. & Wollenberg, L., ‘Enhancing the Sustainability of Commodity Supply Chains in Tropical Forest and Agricultural Landscapes’ (2013) 23(6) Global Environmental Change, pp. 1761–1772 .

¹⁶⁵ See, e.g., Auld, G. & Cashore, B., ‘The Forest Stewardship Council’, in P. Utting, D. Reed & A.M. Reed (eds), Business Regulation and Non-State Actors: Whose Standards? Whose Development (Routledge, 2012), pp. 134–147 .

¹⁶⁶ Peters-Stanley et al., n. 163 above; Meyer, C. & Miller, D., ‘Zero Deforestation Zones: The Case for Linking Deforestation-Free Supply Chain Initiatives and Jurisdictional REDD+’ (2015) 34(6–7) Journal of Sustainable Forestry, pp. 559–580 .

¹⁶⁷ There is no standardized definition of ‘zero-deforestation’; it may denote ceasing deforestation altogether or offsetting deforestation through restoration: see Peters-Stanley et al., n. 163 above, p. 14; Meyer & Miller, n. 166 above, pp. 568–9.

¹⁶⁸ UN Climate Summit 2014, ‘Forests Action Statements and Action Plans’, available at: http://www.un.org/climatechange/summit/action-areas.

¹⁶⁹ Nepstad, D. et al., ‘More Food, More Forests, Fewer Emissions, Better Livelihoods: Linking REDD+, Sustainable Supply Chains and Domestic Policy in Brazil, Indonesia and Colombia’ (2013) 4(6) Carbon Management, pp. 639–658 , at 642.

¹⁷⁰ See, e.g., Rajamani, L., ‘The Durban Platform for Enhanced Action and the Future of the Climate Regime’ (2012) 61(2) International and Comparative Law Quarterly, pp. 501–518 .

¹⁷¹ Draft Decision –/CP.21, n. 82 above, Art. 4(4).

¹⁷² Ibid., Art. 4(3)–(5). Interestingly in Art. 9 of the Paris Agreement (n. 18 above) on the subject of finance, the COP requires developed countries to provide finance to developing countries, but it also encourages other parties to provide support voluntarily.

¹⁷³ See, e.g., Harris, P.G. & Symons, J., ‘Norm Conflict in Climate Governance: Greenhouse Gas Accounting and the Problem of Consumption’ (2013) 13(1) Global Environmental Politics, pp. 9–29 ; Steininger, K., et al., ‘Justice and Cost-Effectiveness of Consumption-Based versus Production-Based Approaches in the Case of Unilateral Climate Policies’ (2014) 24 Global Environmental Change, pp. 75–87 ; Frumhoff, P.C., Heede, R. & Oreskes, N., ‘The Climate Responsibilities of Industrial Carbon Producers’ (2015) 132(2) Climatic Change, pp. 157–171 .

The authors thank three anonymous peer reviewers for their constructive and helpful feedback on earlier drafts of this article. This research was funded by the following organizations: the Pierre Elliot Trudeau Foundation, the Ford Foundation, and the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada. IRB exemption granted by the Yale Human Subjects Committee (IRB Protocol #1303011657; 15 Mar. 2013).