Are the politics of welfare policy for the “deserving” and “undeserving” poor the same? We use pooled cross-sectional time-series analyses of state government discretionary welfare spending on general assistance (GA) and Supplemental Security Income supplements (SSI-S) to address this question. We find that efforts to assist the GA population decline as electoral competition increases while efforts to assist the SSI-S population increase, providing evidence that only the deserving poor are favored by heightened political competition. We also find that SSI-S benefits rise with ideological liberalism, electoral competition, and the percentage of African Americans in a state. When considered in light of the negative effect of larger African American populations on states' SSI-S efforts, this suggests targeting of particular groups. Finally, we find that SSI-S enrollments are reduced, but the per-recipient payments are increased under state administration, suggesting that state administrators are more likely to provide more services to existing clientele than to expand their client base.

What is the impact of direct democracy on citizens' political participation and knowledge? Progressive Era reformers and normative theorists have argued that institutional procedures allowing citizens a more direct role in government decision-making will increase civic engagement, broadly defined. Using American National Election Studies data for 1996, 1998, and 2000, we test this hypothesis. Our multivariate analysis suggests that exposure to ballot initiatives increases the probability of voting, stimulates campaign contributions to interest groups, and enhances political knowledge. However, we find that the impact of the initiative process on political participation and knowledge varies with electoral context.

Why do state legislators enact policies that conflict with their immediate self-interest? I address this question by assessing the impact of traditional and non-traditional policy determinants on ethics policy adoption. Specifically, I use event history analysis to identify the factors that explain the authorization of independent state legislative ethics commissions from 1973 to 1996. I find that the determinants of ethics policy are substantially, but not completely, different from those of other policies, with ethics policy fitting into an agenda-setting model better than many other policies. Scandals and the actions of other states played a prominent role in setting the agenda and facilitating the authorization of ethics commissions. The agenda-setting process transforms the immediate self-interest of legislators on this issue from one of concern about their own economic well being to one of concern about re-election. In addition, political culture, institutional power arrangements, legislative compensation, and party competition had small but discernible effects on the likelihood of a state establishing a legislative ethics commission.

State-level research affords scholars a unique opportunity to study legislative behavior because state legislators are accessible in ways that members of congress are not. State legislators' willingness to respond to interviews and questionnaires has provided scholars with a rich array of data about their behavior and perceptions. This survey research has contributed greatly to our theoretical and practical knowledge of legislative behavior and institutions. We examine 73 articles published in top academic journals from 1975 to 2000 to identify common techniques of surveying state legislators and suggest ways in which scholars can enhance the prospects for collecting high quality data. We also consider what type of collective efforts could be undertaken to enhance this underutilized resource for studying legislative politics.