1 For more complete accounts, see Benn, Stanley I., “Wickedness,” Ethics, vol. 95, no. 4 (07 1985), pp. 795–810; Kekes, John, Facing Evil (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990); and Milo, Ronald D., Immorality (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984).
2 For an account of the difficult concept of autonomy and a bibliography of the large literature on this subject, see Dworkin, Gerald, The Theory and Practice of Autonomy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988); and “Autonomy,” in A Companion to Contemporary Political Philosophy, ed. Goodin, Robert E. and Pettit, Philip (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993), pp. 359–65.
3 See Wolf, Susan, Freedom within Reason (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), p. 43.
4 See Gowans, Christopher, ed., Moral Dilemmas (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), for seminal articles and a bibliography; see also Gowans, Christopher, Innocence Lost (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994); and Rescher, Nicholas, Ethical Idealism (Berkeley. University of California Press, 1987), ch. 2.
5 This is a minority view, but see Brown, James, “Moral Theory and the Ought-Can Principle,” Mind, vol. 89, no. 342 (04 1977), pp. 206–23; Kekes, John, “‘Ought Implies Can’ and Two Kinds of Morality,” Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 34, no. 137 (10 1984), pp. 459–67; Larmore, Charles E., Patterns of Moral Complexity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), pp. 84–90; and White, Morton, “Ought and Can,” in The Idea of Freedom, ed. Ryan, Alan (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979), pp. 211–19.
6 Kant, Immanuel, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Smith, Norman Kemp (London: Macmillan, 1953), A548.
7 Kant, Immanuel, Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone, trans. Greene, Theodore M. and Hudson, Hoyt H. (New York: Harper and Row, 1960), pp. 43, 46, and 55.
8 See, for instance, Sartre, Jean-Paul, Being and Nothingness, trans. Barnes, Hazel E. (New York: Philosophical Library, 1954), esp. Part IV.
9 Falk, W. David, “Morality, Self, and Others,” in his Ought, Reasons, and Morality (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1986), p. 219.
10 See Frankfurt, Harry G., “Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person,” in his The Importance of What We Care About (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), pp. 11–25; Taylor, Charles, “Responsibility for Self,” in The Identities of Persons, ed. Rorty, Amelie (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976), pp. 281–99; and Watson, Gary, “Free Agency,” Journal of Philosophy, vol. 72, no. 8 (04 1975), pp. 205–20.
11 Wolf, Susan, “Sanity and the Metaphysics of Responsibility,” in Responsibility, Character, and the Emotions, ed. Schoeman, Ferdinand (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), pp. 46–62.
12 Greenspan, Patricia, “Unfreedom and Responsibility,” in Schoeman, , ed., Responsibility, Character, and the Emotions, pp. 63–80.
13 Fischer, John Martin, “Responsiveness and Moral Responsibility,” in Schoeman, , ed., Responsibility, Character, and the Emotions, pp. 81–106.
14 Bennett, Jonathan, “Accountability,” in Philosophical Subjects, ed. van Straaten, Zak (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980), pp. 14–47; Scanlon, Thomas M. Jr., “The Significance of Choice,” in The Tanner Lectures on Human Values, ed. McMurrin, Sterling M. (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 1988), pp. 151–216; and Strawson, Peter F., “Freedom and Resentment,” in his Freedom and Resentment, and Other Essays (London: Methuen, 1974), pp. 1–25.
15 Wolf, Susan, “Asymmetrical Freedom,” Journal of Philosophy, vol. 77, no. 3 (03 1980), pp. 151–66.