Between 1987 and 1990, simultaneous with "glasnost' and perestroika" and the rehabilitation of the victims of Stalin's crimes, execution sites were discovered, particularly in the European regions of the former USSR. One such discovery at Kuropaty (formerly Brod) about twelve kilometers north of Minsk, elicited widespread publicity, and was a serious embarrassment to the communist authorities.

In a recent article in this journal Brym and Degtyarev made a number of claims about the dangers of anti-Semitism in Moscow. On the basis of a telephone survey conducted in 1992, they concluded their analysis with these ominous admonishments: "The evidence thus suggests that some large categories of Moscow's population hold attitudes that are authoritarian, xenophobic, illiberal on social issues and, of course, anti-Semitic. Given the prevalence of anti-Semitic attitudes in the city, Moscow's 150,000 Jews and the 300,000 in the rest of Russia have reason to be anxious." These are serious and important findings, suffused with both theoretical and policy implications. It is therefore important to have a careful look at their data, analysis and substantive conclusions.

In a recent article in the Slavic Review, George G. Weickhardt undertook to demonstrate that Russia "gradually developed a concept of private property for land which more or less approached that of the English 'fee simple' and that the only significant limitations on individual property in [pre-Petrine] Russia were in favor of the clan rather than the state" (665). This thesis runs counter to virtually the entire historical literature in Russian as well as foreign languages.

Brym and Degtyarev argue that in the "volatile" post-Soviet context, the potential for anti-Semitism is high. On the basis of responses drawn from 988 interviews conducted in Moscow in 1992 they conclude that the number of anti-Semites in Moscow is much higher than in the United States or Canada, and they also conclude that anti-Semitic orientations are part of a broader authoritarian, xenophobic and illiberal set of attitudes.

My dispute with Gibson and Hesli et al. rests on fundamental methodological differences. They do not fully appreciate the historical and political context from which Russian survey data derive. As a result, they engage in a series of statistical misapplications which undermine the soundness of their critique of my article with Degtyarev and of their views concerning the nature and consequences of anti-Semitism in Russia.

Richard Pipes's contribution to our understanding of Russian history has been substantial and my own interest in Russian history dates from taking his course on imperial Russia in college some thirty years ago. It is thus only with great reluctance that I would disagree with him. Nevertheless, I respectfully submit that his response to my article suffers not only from insufficient evidence but also from serious conceptual flaws.