^{page 27 note 1} See, for example, Tillich, P., The Protestant Era (Chicago, 1948), pp. vi, 12, 6–8, 76.Google Scholar

^{page 28 note 1} Tillich, Paul, ‘On the Boundary’, in The Interpretation of History, Part I trans. Rasetski, N. A., Parts II, III, and IV trans. Talmey, E. L. (New York, 1936), p. 60Google Scholar. The wording has been altered from that employed in the English translation. ‘I nurtured idealism’ is an inadequate translation of the German, ‘Beim deutschen Idealismus bin ich in die Schule gegangen.…’ (Aufder Grenze (Stuttgart, 1964), p. 57.)

^{page 28 note 2} In The Theology of Paul Tillich, eds. Kegley, C. and Bretall, R., Library of Living Theology, vol. I (New York, 1961), p. 10.Google Scholar

^{page 28 note 3} Tillich, Paul, Perspectives on Nineteenth and Twentieth Century Protestant Theology, ed. Bratten, Carl E. (London, 1967), p. 134.Google Scholar

^{page 29 note 1} Lessing, G. E., Lessing's Theological Writings, trans, with introd. Chadwick, H. (London, 1956), p.55.Google Scholar

^{page 29 note 2} Kant, E., Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone, trans, with introd. and notes Greene, J. and Hudson, H. (Chicago, 1934), p. 56.Google Scholar

^{page 29 note 3} Fichte, J. G., The Way Towards the Blessed Life, Or the Doctrine of Religion, trans. 1Smith, W. (London, 1849), P 107Google Scholar; see Brunner, E., The Mediator, trans. Wyon, O. (London, 1934), pp. 24, 29, 36.Google Scholar

^{page 29 note 4} Strauss, D., The Life of Jesus Critically Examined, trans. Elliot, G. from the fourth German edn. (London, 1892), p. 774.Google Scholar

^{page 29 note 5} Tillich, Paul, ‘The Significance of the Historical Jesus for the Christian Faith’, Monday Forum Talks, No. 5 (Feb. 28, 1938), p. 4; an unpublished stenographic record made available by Union Theological Seminary and cited with their permission.Google Scholar

^{page 29 note 6} Hegel, G., Lectures on the Philosophy of History, trans. Sibree, J. from the third German edn. (London, 1888), p. 10.Google Scholar

^{page 30 note 1} Hegel, G., Lectures on the Philosophy of History, trans. Sibree, J. from the third German edn (London, 1888), p. 10.Google Scholar

^{page 30 note 2} Hegel, G., Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion, trans. Speirs, E. and Sanderson, J., from the second German edn. (London, 1895), 3 vols., III, 115Google Scholar. As J. Hyppolite writes of Hegel's early theological writings and particularly of his ‘Life of Jesus’: ‘What a difference already between this life of Jesus and the work of Kant.…. It is an historical account; Jesus is certainly the moral ideal, but presented as living’ (trans, from Introduction h la Philosophic de l' histoire de Hegel (Paris, 1948), p. 37). To cite a much more critical historian: ‘At last … there was no dehistoricizing.hellip; Reason itself, was understood historically’ (Barth, K., From Rousseau to Ritschl, trans. Cozens, B.) (London, 1959), p. 294.Google Scholar

^{page 30 note 3} Detailed discussion of this claim will follow. To cite at this point the incisive comment of Mackintosh, H. R.: ‘The idealistic habit of identifying God with Man in virtue of the creative reason that constitutes the essence of both, is opposed to Christian faith in … that it bars the way to a true conception of “self” and “neighbour” in their relations to each other. If I am merged ultimately in God, I am also merged in the mass of those who to me are “others”’ (Types of Modem Theology (London, 1937), p. 115)Google Scholar. Thus in relation to Jesus Christ only the divine reason in him, i.e. the Christ or Logos, is important for faith. His human particularity as Jesus must be negated and transcended. ‘Because to Hegel the rational was historical and the historical rational,’ states Barth, ‘he completely and finally disposed of the God who had somehow stood in opposition to reason, who was in some way an offence and a foolishness to reason, and who could perhaps be denied through reason’ (From Rousseau to Ritschl, p. 279).

^{page 31 note 1} Tillich, Paul, Systematic Theology, 3 vols. (Chicago, 1951, 1957, and 1963)Google Scholar. For the convenience of readers possessing the British editions (London, 1953, 1957, and 1964), page references to these editions are added in parentheses; III, 353 (377).

^{page 31 note 2} Tillich, , S.T., I, 275 (305)Google Scholar, Interpretation of History, pp. 166–8.

^{page 31 note 3} Tillich, S.T., III, 374 (199); see also S.T., I, 82 (91).

^{page 31 note 4} Tillich, S.T., III, 51 (58), S.T., II, 72 (83), S.T., III, 255 (271); Merold Westphal thus refers to ‘a deep-seated congruity between his [Tillich's] thought and Hegel's which is usually obscured by the fact that his overt references to Hegel are regularly negative’ (‘Hegel, Tillich, and the Secular’, Journal of Religion, LII, No. 1, 1972, 234).Google Scholar

^{page 32 note 1} Tillich, , trans, from Aufder Grenze, p. 37.Google Scholar

^{page 32 note 2} Tillich, S.T., II, 97ff. (112ff.). This position is outlined briefly in S.T., I, 111 (123–4), 126 (140). and 136 (152).

^{page 32 note 3} Tillich, , S.T., II, 98–99 (113–14).Google Scholar

^{page 32 note 4} ibid., p. 114 (132); parenthetical addition mine.

^{page 33 note 1} Tillich, , Monday Forum Talks, p. 4.Google Scholar

^{page 33 note 2} Tillich, , S.T., II, 114 (131), 107 (123).Google Scholar

^{page 33 note 3} Hegel, , Philosophy of Religion, III, 115.Google Scholar

^{page 33 note 4} Hegel, , The Phenomenology of Mind, trans. Baillie, J. B., second revised edn. (London, 1931), p. 781.Google Scholar

^{page 33 note 5} Hegel, , Philosophy of History, p. 334.Google Scholar

^{page 33 note 6} Hegel, , Philosophy of Religion, III, 111–114; italics mine.Google Scholar

^{page 34 note 1} Tillich, Paul, Church Quarterly Review, CXLVII (Jan.-March, 1949), 141–145: italics mineGoogle Scholar. Tillich also employs such synonyms as ‘essential manhood’, ‘essential being’, or simply ‘essence’. In his later writings he tends to substitute the term ‘eternal’ for ‘essential’ when modifying ‘Godmanhood’.

^{page 34 note 2} Tillich, , S.T., II, 148 (170)Google Scholar; Tillich often abbreviates, but he gives no indication that the term ‘picture’ is not always inferred.

^{page 34 note 3} Tillich, , Church Quarterly Review, CXLVII (Jan.-March, 1949), 142.Google Scholar

^{page 34 note 4} ibid., p. 144: Just as Tillich is able to refer to ‘the picture of Jesus as the Christ, the picture of essential Godmanhood’ as synonyms, he similarly equates ‘ideas’ and ‘an ideal picture’ (Monday Forum Talks, p. 4; cited above, p. 3). The synonymous character of these concrete and universal concepts is indicated further by reference to ‘the idea of the Incarnation’ (Church Quarterly Review, p. 133) and ‘the idea of essential Godmanhood’ (ibid., p. 144).

^{page 34 note 5} Tillich, , Church Quarterly Review, CXLVII (Jan.-March, 1949) 133.Google Scholar

^{page 34 note 6} Tillich, , S.T. II, 148 (170)Google Scholar; parenthetical additions mine.

^{page 34 note 7} Tillich, , S.T. I, 218 (242).Google Scholar

^{page 35 note 1} Hegel, G., Philosophy of Mind, trans. Wallace, W., from The Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences (Oxford, 1894), p. 176Google Scholar, and Hegel, , Phenomenology of Mind, pp. 763–764; italics in text.Google Scholar

^{page 35 note 2} Hegel, , Philosophy of Religion, III, p. 73.Google Scholar

^{page 36 note 1} Hegel, , Philosophy of Religion III, p. 89Google Scholar; parenthetical addition and italics mine.

^{page 36 note 2} ibid., p. 99; parenthetical addition and italics mine. Hegel's ‘left-wing’ follower, Strauss, is even more explicit: ‘This is the key to the whole of Christology’, he writes, ‘that, as a subject to the predicate which the church assigns to Christ, we place, instead of an individual, an idea; but an idea which has an existence in reality, not in the mind only, like that of Kant. In an individual, a God-man, the properties and functions which the church ascribes to Christ contradict themselves, in the idea of the race they perfectly agree’ (Strauss, Life of Jesus, p. 780). ‘Right-wing’ Hegelians, such as Marheineke, Daub, and Goschel, emphasised the positivistic side of Hegel's ambiguous language and thus made the objective historical Jesus much more central than he is in Hegel himself. As Albert Schweitzer states of Strauss: ‘He admits that Hegel’s philosophy is ambiguous in this matter, since it is not clear “whether the evangelical fact as such, not indeed in its isolation, but together with the whole series of manifestations of the idea [of God-manhood] in the history of the world, is the truth; or whether the embodiment of the idea in that single fact is only a formula of which consciousness makes use in forming its concepts” ‘ (The Quest of the Historical Jesus, trans. W. Montgomery (London, 1910), p. 114). That the latter is Hegel's basic position, and that Strauss is right in claiming to be the ‘logical representative of Hegel's essential view’ (ibid., p. 115) has been suggested above and will be further amplified throughout the remainder of this article.

^{page 36 note 3} Hegel, , Philosophy of Religion, II, 327.Google Scholar

^{page 36 note 4} Hegel, , Philosophy of Mind, p. 176; italics in text.Google Scholar

^{page 37 note 1} Tillich, , Interpretation of History, p. 166.Google Scholar

^{page 37 note 2} ibid., p. 165.

^{page 37 note 3} Kähler and Kierkegaard have been especially influential here.

^{page 37 note 4} Tillich, , S.T., I, 133–134 (148–50).Google Scholar

^{page 38 note 1} Tillich, Paul, The New Being (New York, 1955), p. 91Google Scholar; see also S.T., II, 97 (112–13), 121–5 (139–44), and S.T., I, 136 (151–2), 152 (168–9). For a description of the ontological power of love, see Tillich's, Paul book, Love, Power and Justice (New York, 1960).Google Scholar

^{page 38 note 2} See especially Tillich, S.T., II, 92 (107), 97 (112); S.T., III, 329 (350).

^{page 38 note 3} Hegel, , Philosophy of Religion,. III, 130–131.Google Scholar

^{page 39 note 1} Hegel, , ‘The Spirit of Christianity’, in Early Theological Writings, trans. Knox, J. M. (Chicago, 1948), pp. 271–272.Google Scholar

^{page 39 note 2} Hegel, , Philosophy of History, p. 340Google Scholar; see also especially Hegel, , Philosophy of Religion, III, 132Google Scholar. As McTaggart writes of Hegel's position: ‘According to Hegel's exposition, the Father and the Son are the Thesis and Antithesis of a triad of which the Holy Ghost is the Synthesis’ (McTaggart, J. M. E., Studies in Hegelian Cosmology (Cambridge, 1918), p. 204).Google Scholar

^{page 39 note 3} Hegel, , Philosophy of Religion, III, 25, 73.Google Scholar

^{page 40 note 1} Tillich, , S. T., II, 88 (102).Google Scholar

^{page 40 note 2} See above, pp. 4–5 and Tillich, , Church Quarterly Review, CXLVII (Jan.-March, 1949). 137–138.Google Scholar

^{page 40 note 3} Tillich, , S.T., I, 17 (20)Google Scholar. Tillich's full comment, contained in a footnote, states: ‘The Logos doctrine is misunderstood if the tension between universal and concrete is interpreted as a tension between abstract and particular. Abstraction negates parts of that from which it abstracts. Universality includes every part because it includes concreteness. Particularity excludes every particular from every other one. Concreteness represents every other concrete because it includes universality. Christian theology moves between the poles of the universal and the concrete and not between those of the abstract and the particular.’ As Hamilton comments in his brilliant critique of Tillich, ‘It would be a grievous error to suppose that the concrete universal manifesting the universal Logos (‘the concretelogos’ as Tillich calls it) can ever, in any circumstances, be itself a particular or individually existing actuality’ ( Hamilton, K., The System and the Gospel: A Critique of Paul Tillich (London, 1963), p. 170)Google Scholar. McCollough, would agree: ‘Jesus can lose his being while possessing it because the being which he possesses is the ground of being, being itself’ (‘The Ontology of Tillich and Biblical Personalism’, Scottish Journal of Theology, XV (1962), 275).Google Scholar

^{page 40 note 4} Tillich, , S.T., I, 17 (20), 28 (32), 135 (150–1).Google Scholar

^{page 41 note 1} Hegel, , Philosophy of Religion, III, 106, 24Google Scholar; see also especially ibid., p. 111.

^{page 41 note 2} Tillich, , S.T., II, 97 (112).Google Scholar

^{page 41 note 3} Tillich, , Church Quarterly Review, CXLVII, 144 (Jan.-March, 1949)Google Scholar; italics mine.

^{page 41 note 4} Thus Johnson is misinterpreting Tillich when he writes: ‘The only Biblical event that Tillich utilizes theologically for other than occasional illustrative purposes is the Caesarea Philippi confession, the classic “Believing interpretation”. As the Biblical symbol of the response or reception of the revelation, this is the single historical rock upon which the system is built’ (Authority in Protestant Theology (Philadelphia, 1959), p. 138)Google Scholar. Tavard's criticism that ‘It is not enough to state that the original fact is the Apostles' interpretation of Jesus’ (Tavard, G. H., Paul Tillich and the Christian Message (New York, 1962), p. 109)Google Scholar is open to the same criticism.

^{page 42 note 1} Limitations of space do not allow a thorough discussion of this key concept here. Of its importance Tillich writes: ‘The center of my theological doctrine of knowledge is the concept of symbol’ (‘Reply to Interpretation and Criticism’ in The Theology of Paul Tillich, eds. Kegley, and Bretall, , p. 333)Google Scholar. Much has already been written, since the transcendence of particularity arising from Tillich's attempt to hold together universal ontology and concrete faith is perhaps most clearly evident in his discussion of the symbolical character of saving history. Tillich himself states that the considerable criticism to which his position has been subjected ‘is natural’ (The Theology of Paul Tillich, pp. 333–4). See, e.g., Religious Experience and Truth, ed. Hook; McDonald, H., ‘The Symbolic Theology of Paul Tillich’, Scottish Journal of Theology, XVII (Dec. 1964), 414–430CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Charbonnier, E., ‘The Theology of the Word of God’, Journal of Religion (Jan. 1953), 16–30Google Scholar; Rosenthal, K., ‘Myth and Symbol’, Scottish Journal of Theology, XVII (Dec. 1965), 411–434CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Ferré, N., ‘The Fabric of Paul Tillich's Theology’, Scottish Journal of Theology, XXI (June 1968), 163–169Google Scholar; and Morrison, R, ‘Tillich and the Space-Time Conflicts’,Scottish Journal of Theology, XXVI (Sept. 1973), 312–326CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Weigel's, G. article, ‘Myth, Symbol, and Analogy’ in Religion and Culture: Essays in Honour of Paul Tillich, ed. Leibrecht, W. (London, 1959), pp. 120–130Google Scholar, in which he attacks the ‘dehistoricizing of history’ through its transformation into symbolic meta-history, remains one of the most significant analyses of the problem. For Tillich's definition of the symbol see Tillich, Paul, Dynamics of Faith (New York, 1957), pp. 41–53Google Scholar and Tillich, , in Religious Experience …, pp. 4–6.Google Scholar

^{page 42 note 2} Tillich, , S.T., II, 239 (265).Google Scholar

^{page 42 note 3} Tillich, , ‘The Religious Symbol’ in Religious Experience and Truth, ed. Hook, (Edinburgh, 1962), p. 317.Google Scholar

^{page 42 note 4} See especially Tillich, , S.T., I, 239 (265–266).Google Scholar

^{page 42 note 5} Tillich, , in Religious Experience …, p. 316Google Scholar; see also S.T., I 120 (133–4).

^{page 42 note 6} Tillich, , in Religious Experience …, p. 317.Google Scholar

^{page 43 note 1} ‘For many people’, Tillich writes, ‘the very term “symbolic” carries the connotation of nonreal’ which ‘is partially due to the identification of reality with … the entire realm of objective things and events’ (S.T., I, 241 [267]). Without suggesting that reality is limited to the realm of objective events one may nevertheless ask if Tillich is not limiting reality to an ontological realm which excludes the realm of objective-historical events.

^{page 43 note 2} Tillich, , S.T., I, 136–137 (152)Google Scholar; parenthetical additions mine.

^{page 43 note 3} Tillich, , in Religious Experience …, p. 317Google Scholar. In The Interpretation of History, Tillich does employ the expression ‘philosophy of history’, p. 243.

^{page 43 note 4} Hegel, , Philosophy of Religion, III, 95Google Scholar; italics mine.

^{page 43 note 5} ibid., p. 114.

^{page 44 note 1} Hegel, , ‘The Positivity of the Christian Religion’, three parts, in Early Theological Writings, p. 79.Google Scholar

^{page 44 note 2} ibid., p. 171; italics in text.

^{page 44 note 3} ibid.; see also Hegel, , Philosophy of Religion, III, 120.Google Scholar

^{page 44 note 4} Hegel, , Philosophy of Religion, III, 120.Google Scholar

^{page 44 note 5} Hegel, , Philosophy of History, III, 3Google Scholar; italics mine.

^{page 44 note 6} Hegel, Philosophy of Religion, III, 102. As J. N. Findlay writes: ‘It is this immediate universality which is the true content of a belief in the Incarnation’ (Hegel: A Re-examination (London, 1958), p. 140Google Scholar; italics in text). Thulstrup agrees: ‘Hegel's thought’, he writes, ‘is only a variation of Idealism and of the position of its founder, Plato, that men possess the truth and only need to become conscious of it. Plato held that this evocation of the truth takes place by recollection; Hegel held that it takes place with the help of the dialectical method’ ( ‘Commentator's Introduction’, trans. Hong, H. V., in Kierkegaard, Philosophical Fragments (Princeton, 1962), p. lvi.Google Scholar

^{page 45 note 1} Tillich, Monday Forum Talks, pp. 3–4; see also Dynamics of Faith, p. 37 and S. T., II, 105 (121).

^{page 45 note 2} Tillich, S.T., II, 105 (121); see also ibid., pp. 104 (119–20), 108 (125). Tillich's suggestion that the factual personal life behind and analogous to the biblical picture of Christ which belongs to the foundation of faith was photographable (Monday Forum Talks, p. 1; see also Mollegen's similar claim in The Theology of Paul Tillich, p. 234, which Tillich endorses, p. 348) cannot be taken seriously in view of his complete separation of saving and scientific history. If this personal life was photographable, he is at least theoretically subject to scientific history, which Tillich denies. He must therefore be an ontological reality, as was suggested above (p. 7).

^{page 45 note 3} Tillich, , Dynamics of Faith, p. 37.Google Scholar

^{page 46 note 1} Hegel, , Philosophy of Religion, III, 116–118Google Scholar; italics in text. See also ibid., pp. 119–120 and Phenomenology of Mind, p. 764.

^{page 46 note 2} Hegel, , Philosophy of Religion, III, 121–122Google Scholar; see also ibid., pp. 110–15. As Croce writes of Hegel's philosophy of history: ‘Before Hegel seeks the data of facts, he knows what they must be; he knows them in anticipation, as we know philosophic truths, which spirit finds in its own universal being and does not deduce from contingent facts’ ( Croce, B., What is Living and What is Dead of the Philosophy of Hegel,.trans. Ainslie, D. from the third edn. (London, 1915), pp. 140–141).Google Scholar

^{page 46 note 3} Hegel, , Philosophy of History, p. 343.Google Scholar

^{page 46 note 4} Hegel, , Philosophy of Religion, III, 119–120.Google Scholar

^{page 46 note 5} ibid., p. 118; italics mine.

^{page 47 note 1} See, for example, his ‘Autobiographical Reflections’ where, in discussing the influence of Schelling's so-called ‘Positive Philosophy’, he refers to his ‘philosophically decisive break with Hegel, and the beginning of that movement which today is called Existentialism’ (The Theology of Paul Tillich, p. 11). See also Hopper, D., Tillich: A Theological Portrait (Philadelphia, 1968)Google Scholar, who sees clearly the remarkable consistency of Tillich's thought from his very earliest to his latest writings.

^{page 47 note 2} Despite some inconsistencies in his exposition (see my article, ‘The Historical Problem in Paul Tillich's Christology’, Scottish Journal of Theology (Sept. 1965), 257–252)Google Scholar, Donald Baillie described Tillich's basic position accurately over twenty-five years ago when he wrote: ‘He appears to be held fast by the old Hegelian Christology which accepted all dogmas but only by dissolving them into symbolic truths (because the Absolute cannot pour its fullness into any one historical moment)’ (God Was in Christ (London, 1948), p. 79).

^{page 47 note 3} Fackenheim, E., The Religious Dimension in Hegel's Thought (Bloomington, 1967), p. 225.Google Scholar

^{page 47 note 4} Fitzer, J., ‘Hegel and the Incarnation: A response to Hans Küng’, Journal of Religion, vol. 52 (1972), 261.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

^{page 47 note 5} Tillich, , Perspectives.…, p. 136.Google Scholar

^{page 47 note 6} ibid., p. 134.

^{page 48 note 1} See, for example, Tillich, , Perspectives …., p. 125.Google Scholar

^{page 48 note 2} See, for example, The Protestant Era, pp. 166–7.

^{page 48 note 3} May, R., Paulus (New York, 1973), p. 45Google Scholar. See also Tillich's, Hannah remarkable autobiography, From Time To Time (New York, 1973).Google Scholar

^{page 48 note 4} Philippians 3.14.