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Particular Thoughts & Singular Thought

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  12 April 2010

M. G. F. Martin
Affiliation:
University College, London

Extract

A long-standing theme in discussion of perception and thought has been that our primary cognitive contact with individual objects and events in the world derives from our perceptual contact with them. When I look at a duck in front of me, I am not merely presented with the fact that there is at least one duck in the area, rather I seem to be presented with this thing (as one might put it from my perspective) in front of me, which looks to me to be a duck. Furthermore, such a perception would seem to put me in a position not merely to make the existential judgment that there is some duck or other present, but rather to make a singular, demonstrative judgment, that that is a duck. My grounds for an existential judgment in this case derives from my apprehension of the demonstrative thought and not vice versa.

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Papers
Copyright
Copyright © The Royal Institute of Philosophy and the contributors 2002

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