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ON THE PROBABILISTIC CONVENTION T

  • HANNES LEITGEB (a1)

Abstract

We introduce an epistemic theory of truth according to which the same rational degree of belief is assigned to Tr(┌α┐) and α. It is shown that if epistemic probability measures are only demanded to be finitely additive (but not necessarily σ-additive), then such a theory is consistent even for object languages that contain their own truth predicate. As the proof of this result indicates, the theory can also be interpreted as deriving from a quantitative version of the Revision Theory of Truth.

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*DEPARTMENTS OF PHILOSOPHY AND MATHEMATICS UNIVERSITY OF BRISTOL 9 WOODLAND ROAD, BRISTOL BS8 1TB, UK E-mail:hannes.leitgeb@bristol.ac.uk

References

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