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MODAL MODELS FOR BRADWARDINE'S THEORY OF TRUTH

  • GREG RESTALL (a1)

Abstract

Stephen Read (2002, 2006) has recently discussed Bradwardine's theory of truth and defended it as an appropriate way to treat paradoxes such as the liar. In this paper, I discuss Read's formalisation of Bradwardine's theory of truth and provide a class of models for this theory. The models facilitate comparison of Bradwardine's theory with contemporary theories of truth.

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Corresponding author

*PHILOSOPHY DEPARTMENT THE UNIVERSITY OF MELBOURNE MELBOURNE, VICTORIA 3010, AUSTRALIA E-mail:restall@unimelb.edu.au

References

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