I have benefited from the comments of Timothy White, Douglas Macdonald, Eric Selbin, and anonymous reviewers.

1. Huntington, Samuel P., The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order. (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996);Google Scholar and “The Clash of Civilizations?” Foreign Affairs 72 (1993): 56–73.Google Scholar On this idea and September 11, see Anonymous, , Through Our Enemies' Eyes: Osama bin Laden, Radical Islam, and the Future of America (Washington, D.C.: Brassey's, 2002).Google Scholar

2. Juergensmeyer, Mark, Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious Violence (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000).Google Scholar On terrorism, also see Hoffman, Bruce, Inside Terrorism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998);Google ScholarLaqueur, Walter, No End to War: Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century (New York: Continuum, 2003).Google Scholar

3. I use the term Islamist to describe those who would like to bring about an Islamic state. Also see Roy, Olivier, The Failure of Political Islam, trans. Volk, Carol (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994).Google Scholar I prefer Islamist to fundamentalist because the latter term does not necessarily connote a political agenda, and because Islamists have attempted to establish novel orders. On this last point see especially Brown, L. Carl, Religion and State: The Muslim Approach to Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000).Google Scholar

4. For a similar view of bin Laden's aims from the perspective of Middle East studies, see Doran, Michael Scott, “Somebody Else's Civil War: Ideology, Rage and the Assault on America,” in How Did This Happen? Terrorism and the New War, ed. Hoge, James Jr., and Rose, Gideon (New York: Public Affairs, 2001), pp. 31–52.Google Scholar

5. The work that probably comes closest to presenting this paradigm is Halliday's, FredRevolution and World Politics: The Rise and Fall of the Sixth Great Power (Durham: Duke University Press, 1999).CrossRefGoogle Scholar Also see Schweller, Randall L., Deadly Imbalances: Tripolarity and Hitler's Strategy of World Conquest (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998);Google ScholarArmstrong, David, Revolution and World Order: The Revolutionary State in International Society (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1993);CrossRefGoogle ScholarCalvert, Peter, Revolution and International Politics (London: Pinter, 1996).Google Scholar

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9. Quoted in Reeve, Simon, The New Jackals: Ramzi Yousef Osama Bin Laden, and the Future of Terrorism (Boston, MA: Northeastern University Press, 1999), p. 262;Google Scholar and Anonymous, Through Our Enemies′ Eyes, p.115.Google Scholar

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21. Quoted in Anonymous, Through Our Enemies′ Eyes, p. 71.Google Scholar As the 1996 “Declaration of War” demonstrates, bin Laden discussed Saudi domestic politics in detail; his principal target audience for his war on America was Saudi citizens.

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46. Ibid, p. 7.

47. Ibid, p. 35.

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49. Ibid, p. 11.

50. Ibid, p. 17.

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64. Cited in “Jihad against Jews and Crusaders.”

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67. The U.S. should take bin Laden's numerous references to punishing it for Hiroshima and Nagasaki quite seriously. Should he use nuclear weapons against the U.S., one would find it difficult to deny there has not been a clash of civilizations even if bin Laden is condemned widely in the Islamic world.

68. See, for example, Friedman, Thomas L., The Lexus and the Olive Tree (New York: Anchor Books, 2000).Google Scholar

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