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Genesis of U. S.-Soviet Relations in World War II

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 August 2009

George Fischer
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Extract

American wartime policy regarding Russia continues to be disputed heatedly. In these controversies the genesis of Soviet-American relations in World War II, although it obviously played a key role in shaping both the victorious anti-Axis alliance and the uneasy peace that followed, has so far been neglected. To throw light on the initial rapprochement, this paper is presented as a survey of the half-year period in 1941 between the German attack on Russia and the Japanese attack on the United States.

Sumner Welles, Under Secretary of State in 1941, records that “the relations between the United States and the Soviet Union, particularly during the period of the German-Soviet agreement, had been practically non-existent.” The Soviet invasion of Finland, sharply resented by American public opinion, served to exacerbate relations further. Only after the German attack of June 22, 1941, did the two great powers draw together.

Type
Research Article
Information
The Review of Politics , Volume 12 , Issue 3 , July 1950 , pp. 363 - 378
Copyright
Copyright © University of Notre Dame 1950

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References

1 Welles, Sumner, Where Are We Heading? (New York, 1946), p. 6.Google Scholar

2 Hull, Cordell, Memoirs (New York, 1948), Vol. II, p. 967.Google Scholar

3 U. S. Department of State, Bulletin (Washington, 1941), Vol. V, p. 343.Google Scholar

4 House of Representatives Document No. 358, 77th U. S. Congress (Washington, D. C).

5 Bullitt, William C., “How We Won the War and Lost the Peace,” Part I., Life, August 30, 1948, p. 97.Google Scholar

6 Welles, Sumner, op. cit., p. 38.Google Scholar

7 Wartime Correspondence between President Roosevelt and Pope Pius XII, ed. Taylor, Myron C. (New York, 1947), p. 61.Google Scholar

8 U. S. Department of State, op. cit., p. 476.Google Scholar

9 Welles, Sumner, op. cit., pp 29–30, 102–104.Google Scholar

10 Vishney, S., The Military Potential of the United States, Bol'sherik, September, 1941, no. 19, p. 33.Google Scholar

11 Hull, Cordell, op. cit., 976–977.Google Scholar

12 Sherwood, Robert E., Roosevelt and Hopkins, An Intimate History (New York, 1948), p. 417. In general, while Soviet material is still restricted to a few official statements, editorials and diplomatic notes, the Sherwood book remains by far the most complete published account of this period. Therefore all subsequent references in this paper to statements of actions by Roosevelt, Hopkins, Harriman and at the Moscow Conference, unless otherwise cited or a matter of well-known record, are drawn from this book.Google Scholar

13 Cf. New York Times, August 24, 1941, and October 9, 1941.Google Scholar

14 Industrial Mobilization for War, History of the War Production Board and Predecessor Agencies, 1940–, Vol. I (Washington, 1947), pp. 130–131.Google Scholar

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17 Harriman was named only when Hopkins' health was found to disqualify him from another long journey at an early date.

18 On Colonel Faymonville's wartime approach to the USSR, see Deane, John R., The Strange Alliance, the Story of Our Efforts at Wartime Cooperation with Russia (New York, 1947), p. 91.Google ScholarFaymonville himself stated his present stand in The Worker Magazine, Sunday Supplement of the Daily Worker, March 13, 1949, p. 1.Google Scholar

19 The aftermath of this exchange is generally little known. The British, for one, encountered immense difficulties when before long they wished to base RAF escort planes near Murmansk and Archangel to protect northern route convoys. Moreover—although it was an unprecedented Soviet concession—the sole major case of allied troops operating on Russian territory during World War II became unusually handicapped by innumerable Soviet restrictions. This was the U. S. “shuttle-bombing” command in the Ukraine. Cf. Kerr, Walter, The Russian Army, Its Men, Its Leaders, and Its Battles (New York, 1944), p. 230Google Scholar and Deane, John R., op. cit., ch. VII.Google Scholar

20 Deane, John R., op. cit., pp. 88–89.Google Scholar

21 Beaverbrook, Lord William Maxwell, Parliamentary Debates, House of Lords, Fifth Series, Vol. 120 (London, 1942), p. 399.Google Scholar

22 Soviet Foreign Policy During the Patriotic War, Documents and Materials, 22 Junt 1941– December 1943, (Moscow, 1944), p. 155 (in Russian).Google Scholar

23 Cf. the lengthiest and most prominently displayed soviet comment on the Moscow Conference, in the front-page editorial in Pravda, October 3, 1941.Google Scholar

24 Together with the Washington (1942), London (1943) and Ottawa (1944) Soviet supply agreements, it was first made public by the U. S. Government soon after the war. Cf. Soviet Supply Protocols, U. S. Department of State, European Series no. 22 (Washington, 1948), pp. 3–12.Google Scholar

25 Deane, John R., op. cit., p. 59.Google Scholar

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27 Pravda, November 7, 1941.Google Scholar

28 Truman, Harry S., Twenty-First Report to Congress on Lend-Lease Operations, For Period Ending September 30, 1945 (Washington, 1946), p. 28.Google Scholar

29 JrStettinius, Edward R., Lend-Lease, Weapon for Victory (New York, 1944), pp. 205, 207–208.Google Scholar

30 For an example of the vast but little studied Soviet military defections in the first eight months of the German attack, cf. Fischer, George, “General Vlasov's Official Diary,” Russian Review, October, 1949.Google Scholar

31 Hull, Cordell, op. cit., II, pp. 1165–1166.Google Scholar

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34 Langer, William L., “Political Problems of a Coalition,” Foreign Affairs, October, 1947, p. 83.Google Scholar

35 Cf. Stettinius, Edward R. Jr., op. cit., p. 211;Google ScholarIndustrial Mobilization for War, op. cit., p. 133;Google ScholarNew York Times, September 27, 1941;Google ScholarKerr, Walter, op. cit., pp. 231–234;Google ScholarDeane, John R., op. cit., pp. 72–73.Google Scholar

36 For examples of Soviet statements, cf. Ponamarev, B., The People's United Anti-Hitler Front is Growing Stronger, Bol'shevik, no. 17, p. 13, and Pravda throughout second half of 1941.Google Scholar

37 Langer, William L., op. cit., p, 89.Google Scholar It should be noted that Langer does not cany this view to explicit chronological extremes, as others have done. For an example of this, cf. JrStettinius, Edward R.., Roosevelt and the Russians, The Yalta Conference, p. 295: “The real difficulties with the Soviet Union came after Yalta when the agreements were not respected.” (Mr. Stettinius' italics.)Google Scholar

38 This early development, notably the Moscow talks of Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden and Molotov's first visit to Washington, is described in Hull's Memoirs and Sherwood's Roosevelt and Hopkins.