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Economic diplomacy at the Atlantic Conference*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  26 October 2009

Alan P. Dobson
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Extract

Of the family of war conferences the Atlantic meeting between Roosevelt and Churchill in August 1941, has been a neglected relation. It has been covered in general histories but only one substantial account of the conference has appeared to date. This state of affairs is regrettable given the intrinsic importance of some of the issues which were raised at Argentia and the fact that T. A. Wilson's account, The First Summit, was written before some of the official records were released. However, though there is a need for an overall review of the conference, this paper has the modest goal of reconsidering the economic questions which resulted in point four of the Atlantic Charter. The reasons for a new account of the genesis and formulation of the main economic provisions of the joint declaration are three-fold. First, the context of economic discussions in which the conference took place has never been adequately described; consequently the reasoning behind certain decisions, as well as some of the nuances of the talks, have been misunderstood. Secondly, the injudicious character of Welles' proposals for point four and the nature of America's diplomatic defeat at the hands of the British have never been properly explained. Finally, it has not previously been detected that Churchill evaded full consultation with his Cabinet and ignored some of their advice which, ironically, resulted in a less serious set-back for American economic goals than would otherwise have been the case.

Type
Research Article
Information
Review of International Studies , Volume 10 , Issue 2 , April 1984 , pp. 143 - 163
Copyright
Copyright © British International Studies Association 1984

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References

1. Wilson, T. A., The First Summit, Roosevelt and Churchill at Placentia Bay 1941 (Boston, 1969)Google Scholar. There is also Morton, H. V., Atlantic Meeting (London, 1943)Google Scholar, which is a journalist's eyewitness account, but the author was not privy to any of the discussions which were held.

2. See Offner, A. A., The Origins of the Second World War (New York, 1975)Google Scholar and Hinton, H. B., Cordell Hull: A Biography (New York, 1941), pp. 153–161.Google Scholar

3. Cohen, W. I., The American Revisionists—The Lessons of Intervention in World War I (Chicago, 1967).Google Scholar

4. Anglo-American Trade Agreement 1938, HMSO Cmd. 5882.

5. Hull, memo. ‘Representations to the British Government on Effects of Import Controls on American Business and Agriculture’, 22 Jan. 1940, State Department records 641.116/2578, National Archives, Washington.

6. Loewenheim, F. L., et al., (ed.), Roosevelt and Churchill, Their Secret Wartime Correspondence (London, 1975) p. 125.Google Scholar

7. Sherwood, R. E., Roosevelt and Hopkins, An Intimate History (New York, 1948), pp. 223–224.Google Scholar

8. See W. F. Kimball, ‘Beggar My Neighbour: America and the British Interim Finance Crisis 1940–41’, Journal of Economic History, Dec. 1969, vol. 29.

9. Sayers, R. S., History of The Second World War, U.K. Civil Series, Financial Policy (HMSO., 1956), p. 384.Google Scholar

10. Kimball ‘Beggar My Neighbour’ op. cit. source Morgenthau Diary vol. 341, pp. 190–4, Memo. Cochran to Young. F.D.R. Lib.

11. Sayers' ‘Financial Policy’, op. cit., p. 384.

12. Taylor, A. J. P., Beaverbrook (London, 1972), pp. 439–440.Google Scholar

13. Board of Trade to Stirling, 9 May 1941, A3435/2354/45, P.R.O., (London). (Apart from Cabinet records all P.R.O. refs. are FO 371.)

14. Roosevelt to Hull, 16 May 1941, State Dept. records 841.24/603Vi, Nat. Archives, Washington.

15. See Wilson, The First Summit, op. cit., p. 185; Langer, W. L. and Gleason, S. E., The Undeclared War (New York, 1968)Google Scholar; Gardner, R. N., Sterling Dollar Diplomacy (New York, 1980), p. 42Google Scholar; Notter, H., Postwar Foreign Policy Preparations, 1939–45 (Washington DC, 1949)Google Scholar, Appendix 8, p. 463.

16. 22 May, State Department draft F.W. 84/24/603–1/5, Nat. Archives, Washington.

17. Morgenthau Diary, vol. 404, pp. 235–49, F.D.R. Lib.

18. There is disagreement between British and American records on the exact date of this meeting. In a memo by Acheson dated 7 July 1941, State Dept. 841.24/635 Vi Nat. Archives, Washington, he refers to Keynes and Halifax informing him of the substance of the talks they had with FDR whereas British records indicate the meeting did not occur until the following day. In telegram Washington to FO, 8 July 1941, W8340/37/49, P.R.O. London, it is clearly stated ‘J.M.K. and Halifax saw President today’. Also the 8th was a Tuesday and in Chancellor of Exchequer to Washington, 29 June 1941, W7905/37/49, P.R.O., London, it is mentioned that Halifax and Keynes are to meet with F.D.R. on the following Tuesday.

19. Chancellor of the Exchequer to Washington, 29 June 1941, W7905/37/49, P.R.O., London.

20. Halifax to FO, 8 July 1941, W8340/37/49, P.R.O., London.

21. Prime Minister and Chancellor of the Exchequer to Washington, 14 July 1941, W8377/37/49, P.R.O., London.

22. Chancellor of the Exchequer to Keynes, 14 July 1941, W8377/37/49, P.R.O., London.

23. Keynes to the Chancellor of the Exchequer, 15 July 1941, W9079/37/49, P.R.O., London.

24. See attached to Kingsley Wood to Eden, 8 August 1941, W9748/37/49, P.R.O., London.

25. Acheson, D., Present At the Creation (London, 1967), p. 30.Google Scholar

26. Halifax to FO, 4 August 1941, W9552/37/49, P.R.O., London.

27. Kingsley Wood to Eden, 8 August 1941, W9748/37/49, P.R.O., London.

28. See Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, op. cit.

29. Merli, F. J., and Wilson, T. A. (ed.). The Makers of American Diplomacy (New York, 1974)Google Scholar, ‘Franklin D. Roosevelt and the Conduct of American Foreign Policy’, T. A. Wilson and R.D.McKinzie, p. 483.

30. Memo, for Prime Minister by Bridges, 31 July 1941, A6942/18/45, P.R.O., London.

31. For example see Rauch, B., Rooseveltfrom Munich to Pearl Harbor (New York, 1950), p. 363Google Scholar and Lindley, E. K. and Davis, F.How War Came to America (London, 1943), p. 221.Google Scholar

32. Wheeler-Bennett rejects the proposition the British had a pre-prepared draft as well and the suggestion the joint declaration was first raised by the British, but he does not document this fully: J. W. Wheeler-Bennett and A. Nicholls, The Semblance of Peace (London, 1972), p. 37. For documentation see: D. Dilks (ed.), The Diaries of Sir Alexander Cadogan 1938–45 (New York, 1972), p. 398, editorial comment; W. S. Churchill, The GrandAlliance (London, 1950), p. 386; Memo by W.S.C. for War Cabinet, 20 August 1941, WP(41)202, P.R.O., London.

33. Wilson, First Summit, op. cit., p. 187, source ‘Pearl Harbor Attack Part 2’ p. 536 ff. On Investigation of Pearl Harbor Attack, 79th Cong. 1st and 2nd sessions, Washington, 1946, Welles' testimony.

34. To date no copy of such a draft has come to light in official records, nevertheless a number of historians have claimed that such a copy existed. See Roosevelt, E., As He Saw It (New York, 1946), p. 39Google Scholar; Wilson, The First Summit, op. cit.; Langer and Gleason, Undeclared War op. cit. The resolution of this question as to whether a pre-conference draft was drawn up has been hindered by the inaccessibility of Welles' papers. However, on 16 June 1982, William M.Franklin, who has been given access to the papers, kindly sent the author a letter which included the following: ‘In response to your letter of June 7,1 can say that I did not find in the papers of Sumner Welles any draft of joint principles which he might have prepared and taken t o the Atlantic Conference of 1941.’ Letter from W. M. Franklin to the author 16 June 1982 with permission to cite.

35. F.R.U.S., 1941, Vol. I. Memo of conversation between Welles and Cadogan, 9 August 1941, pp.345–54.

36. See: Gardner, Sterling Dollar Diplomacy, op. cit., pp. 42–3; Langer and GleasonUndeclared War, op. cit., pp. 681–2; Wilson, First Summit, op. cit., p. 98. However, later on p. 185 Wilson seems to be in two minds on this because he then describes the Welles/Cadogan conversation simply as a ‘source’ of joint declaration rather than a ‘complete agreement on a joint declaration of war and peace’.

37. F.R.U.S., 1941, Vol. I. Memo of conversation between Welles and Cadogan, 9 August 1941, pp.352–3.

38. Ibid.

39. Dilks, Cadogan Diaries, op. cit., pp. 430–1.

40. Ibid., p. 397, editorial note.

41. See: Memo by W.S.C. for War Cabinet, 20 August 1941, WP(41)202, P.R.O., London and S. Welles, Where Are We Heading? (New York, 1946), p. 6. Welles writes, ‘The initiative was taken by Mr. Churchill after his arrival at Argentia on the evening of August 9 (re. the joint declaration). ’ Wheeler-Bennett, Semblance of Peace, op. cit., p. 38, construes this to mean Welles was claiming W.S.C. first proposed the joint declaration. In fact Welles is simply ambiguous and Wheeler-Bennett's is not the only construction that can be placed on this phrase i.e. see the present narrative.

42. Dilks, Cadogan Diaries, op. cit., Diary entry Sunday, 10 August 1941, p. 398.

43. W. S. Churchill, Grand Alliance, op. cit., p. 386.

44. Welles, Where Are We Heading?, p. cit., p. 9.

45. Ibid., pp. 10–11.

46. E. Roosevelt, As he Saw It, op. cit., pp. 35–7: Wilson, First Summit, op. cit., p. 190. However, at another point in the narrative Wilson alleges such a heated exchange over British imperialism did not take place: Ibid., pp. 189–90. Clearly Wilson contradicts himself here largely because of a fanciful thesis that Welles doubted FDR's anti-imperialist sentiment and so tried to commit the President to State Dept. policy in his first draft of point four. Such a thesis would not be very plausible if the heated exchange Elliott Roosevelt describes did take place.

47. When Churchill accepted the emasculated point 4 of the joint declaration which was then only a pale reflection of article VII of the draft Lend-Lease Consideration Agreement, Welles records that even this was better than Roosevelt had thought W.S.C. would accept: See F.R.U.S., 1941, Vol. I. Memo by Welles, pp. 364–5.

48. Welles, Where Are We Heading?, op. cit., p. 18.

49. W.S.C. Memo to War Cabinet, 20 August 1941, WP(41)202, P.R.O., London.

50. Churchill, Grand Alliance, op. cit., p. 387.

51. Ibid., p. 388.

52. Welles, Where Are We Heading?, op. cit., p. 13.

53. W.S.C to Lord Privy Seal Attlee, Tudor 15, 11 August 1941, at WP(41)203, P.R.O., London. NB Telegrams from Prince of Wales to London were code-named ‘Tudor’ and those from London to Prince of Wales, ‘Abbey’.

54. F.R.U.S., 1941, Vol. I, Memo by Welles, p. 362.

55. Gardner, Sterling Dollar Diplomacy, op. cit., p. 46.

56. Welles, Where Are We Heading?, op. cit., p. 15.

57. Ibid., p. 16.

58. Ibid., p. 15.

59. See above in narrative.

60. F.R.U.S., 1941, Vol. I, Memo by Welles, p. 369.

61. W.S.C. to Attlee, 11 August 1941, Tudor 15 and 16, WP(41)203, P.R.O., London.

62. Churchill, Grand Alliance, op. cit., p. 392.

63. Attlee to W.S.C, 11 August 1941, Abbey 31, WP(41)203, P.R.O., London.

64. Ibid.

65. Ibid.

66. Churchill, Grand Alliance, op. cit., p. 392.

67. F.R.U.S., 1941, Vol. I, Memo by Welles, p. 364–5.

68. See Wilson, First Summit, op. cit., pp. 202–5, quoting from F.R.U.S., 1941, Vol. I, p. 364 and Hopkin's draft article, Box 303, Hopkins Papers, F.D.R. Lib.

69. This is taken from Wilson First Summit, op. cit. and is based on the unpublished diary of Sir Ian Jacob who gave Wilson access to his records.

70. W.S.C. to Attlee, 12 August 1941, Tudor 20, WP(41)203.

71. Welles, Where A re We Heading?, op. cit., p. 15.

72. War Cabinet, 12 August 1941, WM81/41, P.R.O., London.

73. Ibid.

74. Ibid.

75. Attlee to W.S.C, 12 August 1941, Abbey 35, WP(41)203, P.R.O., London.

76. Morton, Atlantic Meeting, op. cit., p. 121.

77. See: Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, op. cit., p. 359; Wilson, First Summit, op. cit., pp. 443–4; Taylor, Beaverbrook, op. cit., pp. 480–1.

78. W.S.C memo for War Cabinet, 20 August 1941, WP(41)202, P.R.O., London. This memo also makes clear that contra A. J. P. Taylor in Beaverbrook, op. cit., pp. 480–1, the joint declaration was not finalized on Monday, 11 August and thus Beaverbrook could have urged W.S.C to take a stronger line with the President on Tuesday morning. Such recommendations by Beaverbrook may have been inaccurately recollected subsequently so that when he collaborated with Sherwood on the latter's history of the FDR/Hopkins relationship he told Sherwood that he had been the main defender of imperial preference on the Monday whereas, in fact, if he did make a case for their defence it was not then but on the Tuesday.

79. Churchill, Grand Alliance, op. cit., pp. 443–4. The accounts of Wilson, The First Summit, op. cit., p. 215 and J. P. Lasch, Roosevelt and Churchill 1939–41 (London, 1977), p. 400 give an erroneous impression that it was the text of point 4 in Abbey 35 that was presented to FDR, thoug h not pressed upon him, in the final meeting.

80. W.S.C to Attlee, 12 August 1941, Tudor 23, WP(41)203, P.R.O., London.

81. W.S.C. to Attlee, 12 August 1941, Tudor 24 WP(41)203, P.R.O., London.

82. See PREM 3, P.R.O., London.

83. See ADM 53.

84. W.S.C memo to War Cabinet, 20 August 1941, WP(41)202, p. 3, P.R.O., London.

85. See British draft of Consideration Agreement at H. W. Smith to N. Butler, 26 September 1941, Wl 1797/37/49, P.R.O., London.

86. One of the other main reasons for a British hardline on the consideration draft was the American position in the ‘wheat talks’ 1941–2, e.g. see E. F. Penrose, Economic Planning for the Peace (New York, 1953), p. 66.

87. Hull to Winant, 25 August 1941, State Dept. records 740.0011 European War 1939/14454 Nat. Archives, Washington, and Winant's reply 1 September 1941, at similar location/14570 in which he reported W.S.C had offered the phrasing ‘by means of the reduction of trade barriers and the reduction and elimination of harmful restrictions as part of a general scheme’ to clarify point four of the Atlantic Charter. Needless to say this did not satisfy Hull.

88. Breckinridge Long Papers Box 5, Desk Diary entry 19 August 1941, Library of Congress, Washington.