Skip to main content Accessibility help
×
Home

Strategic Interactions and Atoms’ Power in Public Goods Economies*

  • Hovav Perets and Benyamin Shitovitz

Summary

In this paper we study the Nash equilibrium in a smooth public goods economy, described as a non-cooperative game, where the set of players is a mixed measure space of consumers. We assume a finite number of private goods. We show that under certain conditions there exists a unique Nash equilibrium in the economy, where the public goods are produced with a linear technology. Moreover, we discuss the difference in market power between an atomless sector and an atom with the same utility function, and an atom with its split atomless sector, both in a pure exchange economy and a public goods economy.

Copyright

Corresponding author

** Corresponding author. The Faculty of Industrial Engineering and Management, Technion, Israel Institute of Technology, ISRAEL. E-mail: Perets@ie.technion.ac.il
*** Department of Economics, University of Haifa, Haifa 31905, ISRAEL. E-mail: binya@econ.haifa.ac.il

Footnotes

Hide All
*

Part of this work is based on Perets’ Ph.D. thesis (2010) supervised by Prof. Shitovitz, University of Haifa, Israel. An earlier versions on the subject had been presented by both authors in workshops (2011 and 2012) on “Strategic Interactions and General Equilibrium: Theories and Applications II and III”, Universities Nanterre and Bourgogne, France.

We are grateful to Associate Editor and two anonymous referees for their helpful comments and suggestions. Of course, all remaining errors are ours.

Footnotes

References

Hide All
Artstein, Z., 1979. A Note on Fatou's Lemma in Several Dimensions. Journal of Mathematical Economics 6, 277282.
Aumann, R.J., 1964. Markets with a Continuum of Traders. Econometrica 32, 3950.
Bergstrom, T., Blume, C. and Varian, H., 1986. On the Private Provision of Public Good. Journal of Public Economics 29, 2549.
Bernheim, B.D., 1986. On the Voluntary and Involuntary Provision of Public Goods. American Economic Review 76, 789793.
Debreu, G., 1972. Smooth Preferences. Econometrica 40, 603615.
Gabszewicz, J. and Mertens, J.F. 1971. An Equivalence Theorem for the Core of an Economy Whose Atoms are not ‘Too’ Big. Econometrica 39, 713722.
Gabszewicz, J. J. and Shitovitz, B., 1992. The Core in Imperfectly Competitive Economies, in: Aumann, R.J. & Hart, S. (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, Vol. I, Chapter 15, pages 459483 Elsevier.
Perets, H., 2011. On Nash Equilibria in a Public Goods Economy with a Mixed Measure Space of Consumers, Ph.D. Dissertation (in Hebrew), University of Haifa, Israel.
Perets, H., Shitovitz, B. and Spiegel, M., 2012. Trading Equilibrium in a Public Good Economy with Smooth Preferences and a Mixed Measure Space of Consumers. Journal of Mathematical Economics 48, 163169.
Schmeidler, D., 1970. Fatou's Lemma in Several Dimensions. Proceedings of the American Mathematical Society 24, 300306.
Shitovitz, B., 1973, Oligopoly in Markets with a Continuum of Traders. Econometrica 41, 467501.
Shitovitz, B., Spiegel, M., 1998. Cournot-Nash and Lindahl Equilibria in Pure Public Good Economies. Journal of Economic Theory 83, 118.
Shitovitz, B. and Spiegel, M., 2001. Stable Provision Vs. Cournot-Nash Equilibria in Pure Public Good Economies. Journal of Public Economic Theory 3, 219224.
Warr, Peter G., 1983. The Private Provision of a Public Good is Independent of the Distribution of Income, Economics Letters, 13 (2-3): 207211.

Keywords

Related content

Powered by UNSILO

Strategic Interactions and Atoms’ Power in Public Goods Economies*

  • Hovav Perets and Benyamin Shitovitz

Metrics

Full text views

Total number of HTML views: 0
Total number of PDF views: 0 *
Loading metrics...

Abstract views

Total abstract views: 0 *
Loading metrics...

* Views captured on Cambridge Core between <date>. This data will be updated every 24 hours.

Usage data cannot currently be displayed.