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Putting Rights in Their Place

  • Hillel Steiner (a1)


This essay explores Sen’s claim that rights-realization can be consequentially evaluated. Supporting this claim, it attempts to show that the value pluralism thereby presupposed is sufficient to render superfluous the idea — advanced by Sen and others — of ‘agent-relativity’ as a structural feature of ethical judgment.



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Sen, A.K. (1982), Rights and Agency, Philosophy and Public Affairs, n° 11 .
Sen, A.K. (1983), Evaluator Relativity and Consequential Evaluation, Philosophy and Public Affairs, n° 12 .
Sen, A.K. (1985a), Well-being, Agency and Freedom, Dewey Lectures 1984, Journal of Philosophy, n° 82 .
Sen, A.K. (1985b), Rights as Goals, Austin Lecture 1984, in: Guest, S. and Milne, A., (eds.), Equality and Discrimination : Essays in Freedom and Justice, Stuttgart, Franz Steiner.
Sen, A.K. (1987), On Ethics and Economics, Oxford, Basil Blackwell.
Smart, J.J.C. and Williams, B.A.O. (1973), Utilitarism : For and Against, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.



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