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Is Competition or Collusion in the Product Market Relevant for Labour Markets?*

  • Fabian Bergès (a1) and Stéphane Caprice

Résumé

Dans des modèles où les syndicats ne sont pas présents, le lien entre la collusion sur le marché des biens et son impact sur le marché du travail est ambigu. Considérer un marché dual du travail où se côtoient des ouvriers qualifiés et non qualifiés, en tenant compte de l'accroissement d'efficacité due à la présence d'ouvriers qualifiés dans la firme, permet d'éclairer ce lien et de tirer quelques conclusions. Le cadre d'analyse est composé de deux firmes qui sont en concurrence sur le marché du travail pour le recrutement d'employés, et qui sont en concurrence (ou en collusion) sur le marché des biens pour vendre leur production. Les employés qualifiés sont hétérogènes dans leur spécialisation. Les biens vendus sur le marché final sont imparfaitement substituables. Un premier résultat est que la collusion sur le marché des biens aboutit à un salaire d'équilibre symétrique plus élevé sur le marché du travail (en l'absence de syndicats). Deuxièmement, la collusion favorise le recrutement d'employés qualifiés : les firmes sont incitées à recruter des ouvriers qualifiés pour accroître leur productivité et bénéficier d'économies sur les coûts. Enfin, la collusion sur le marché des biens se fait aux dépens des travailleurs non qualifiés et de l'emploi total ; elle peut cependant augmenter la masse salariale.

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Corresponding author

*** Toulouse School of Economics (GREMAQ, INRA); UMR 1291, 21 Allée de Brienne, F-31000 Toulouse; caprice@toulouse.inra.fr.

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We are grateful for remarks from EARIE (2003), Labour Seminar at the University of Warwick, Applied Economics Seminar at Inra-Toulouse (2003) and EALE (2004) participants. This article was finalized while Stephane Caprice was a visiting fellow at the Warwick University during the year 2004-2005.

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References

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Is Competition or Collusion in the Product Market Relevant for Labour Markets?*

  • Fabian Bergès (a1) and Stéphane Caprice

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