Skip to main content Accessibility help

Interpreting Common Ownership

  • Hervé Moulin (a1)


The paper surveys, without proofs, recent axiomatic results on the utilization of common property resources, by this author and some others. Problems discussed include the division of unproduced commodities (the traditional fair division problem), and the cooperative production of a private or public good.

Axioms contrast No Envy with two monotonicity properties, respectively when the population owning the resources in common increases, and when these resources themselves grow.



Hide All
Baumol, W., Panzar, J. and Willig, R. (1982), Contestable Markets and the Theory of Industry Structure, New York, Harcourt-Brace-Jovanovich.
Chichilnisky, G. and Thomson, W. (1987), The Walrasian Mechanism from Equal Division is not Monotonic with Respect to Variations in the Number of Consumers, Journal of Public Economics, 32, pp. 119124.
Cohen, G. A. (1986), Self-Ownership, World Ownership and Equality, Social Philosophy and Policy, 3, Spring, pp. 7796.
Crawford, V. (1979), A Procedure for Generating Pareto Efficient Egalitarian Solution, Econometrica, vol. 47(1 ), pp. 4960.
Dworkin, R. (1981), What is Equality? Part 2: Equality of Resources, Philosophy and Public Affairs, vol. 10(4 ), pp. 283345.
Elster, J. (1989), Incentives and Local Justice, mimeo, University of Chicago.
Foley, D. (1967), Resource Allocation and the Public Sector, Yale Economic Essays, vol 7(1 ), pp. 4598.
Graham, L.D. and Marshall, R. (1987), Collusive Bidder Behavior at Single, Object Second-Price and English Auctions, Journal of Political Economy vol. 95(6 ), pp. 12171239.
Ichiishi, T. and Quinzii, M. (1983), Decentralization for the Core of a Production Economy With Increasing Returns, International Economic Review, vol. 24, pp. 397412.
Kaneko, M. (1977), The Ratio Equilibrium and a Voting Game in a Public Good Economy, Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 16(2 ), pp. 123136.
Moulin, H. (1987a), Egalitarian Equivalent Cost Sharing of a Public Good, Econometrica, vol. 55(4 ), pp. 965977.
Moulin, H. (1987b), A Core Selection for Pricing a Single Output Monopoly, Rand Journal of Economics, vol. 18(3 ), pp. 397407.
Moulin, H. (1989a), Welfare Bounds and Fair Allocation of Private Goods, mimeo, Virginia Polytechnic Institute.
Moulin, H. (1989b), Uniform Externalities : Two Axioms for Fair Allocation, Journal of Public Economics, forthcoming.
Moulin, H. (1989c), All Sorry to Disagree: a General Principle for the Provision of Non-rival Goods, mimeo, Duke University.
Moulin, H. (1989d), Cores and Large Cores when Population Varies, International Journal of Game Theory, forthcoming.
Moulin, H. and Thomson, W. (1988), Can Everyone Benefit from Growth? Two difficulties, Journal of Mathematical Economics, 17, pp. 339345.
Moulin, H. and Roemer, J., (1989), Public Ownership of the External World and Private Ownership of Self, Journal of Political Economy, vol. 97(2 ), pp. 347367.
Moulin, H. (1990), Joint Ownership of a Convex Technology, Review of Economic Studies, (57), pp. 439452.
Musgrave, R. and Peacock, A. (1958), Classics in the Theory of Public Finance, Macmillan, London.
Olson, M. and Zeckhauser, R. (1966), An Economic Theory of Alliances, Review of Economics and Statistics, vol. 48, pp. 226279.
Otsuki, M. (1989), On Distributive Fairness in Lindahl Systems and Other Concepts of Equity, mimeo, Tohoku University.
Quinzii, M. (1982), An Existence Theorem for the Core of a Productive Economy with Increasing Returns, Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 28, pp. 3250.
Roemer, J. (1986), The Mismarriage of Bargaining Theory and Distributive Justice, Ethics, 97, pp. 88110.
Roemer, J. and Silvestre, J. (1988), Public Ownership: Three Proposals for Resource Allocation, mimeo, University of California, Davis.
Sebenius, J. (1984), Negotiating the Law of the Sea, Cambridge, Harvard University Press.
Sharkey, W. (1982), The Theory of Natural Monopoly, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
Steinhaus, H. (1948), The Problem of Fair Division, Econometrica, vol. 16, pp. 101104.
Thomson, W. (1983), The Fair Division of a Fixed Supply Among a Growing Population, Maths Operations Research, vol. 8, pp. 319326.
Thomson, W. (1988), A Study of Choice Correspondences in Economies with a Variable Number of Agents, Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 46, pp. 237254.
Thomson, W. and Varian, H. (1985), Theories of Justice Based on Symmetry, in: Hurwicz, L. et al (eds.), Social Goals and Social Organization, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
Varian, H. (1974), Equity, Envy and Efficiency, Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 29(2 ), pp. 217244.
Weber, S. and Wiesmeth, H. (1989), Economic Models of NATO, mimeo, York University, Toronto.
Weizman, M. (1974), Free Access Versus Private Ownership as Alternative Systems for Managing Common Property, Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 8, pp. 225234.
Young, H. P. (1989), Fair Division, mimeo, University of Maryland.



Full text views

Total number of HTML views: 0
Total number of PDF views: 0 *
Loading metrics...

Abstract views

Total abstract views: 0 *
Loading metrics...

* Views captured on Cambridge Core between <date>. This data will be updated every 24 hours.

Usage data cannot currently be displayed