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Aspects stratégiques d'une politique environnementale incitative

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  17 August 2016

Yolande Hiriart
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Résumé

Nous analysons une politique environnementale menée de façon unilatérale par un Pays Développé, destinée à lutter contre une pollution globale. Dans un cadre de concurrence internationale, nous étudions les conséquences d'une telle politique sur la répartition géographique des activités de production, sur les émissions globales, et sur la recherche de technologie propre de la part des firmes. Nous montrons principalement que des considérations stratégiques amènent les gouvernements à des politiques laxistes. Ce résultat de dumping écologique est robuste au type de concurrence puisque nous l'obtenons aussi bien pour une concurrence en prix que pour une concurrence en quantités.

Summary

Summary

We analyze an environmental policy initiated unilaterally by an industrial country which objective is to reduce a global pollution. In an international trade framework, we study the effects of such a policy on the geographical distribution of production, on the global level of emissions, and on the clean technology research by the firms. We mainly show that strategical considerations lead governments to laxist policies. This ecological dumping result is robust to the kind of competition since it can be obtained in a price competition as well as in a quantity competition.

Keywords

régulation environnementaleconcurrence imparfaiterisque moraldumping écologiqueF12F18H21Q28Multinationaltransfer pricinginternational tax policyprofit shiftingF12F18H21Q28
Type
Research Article
Information
Recherches Économiques de Louvain/ Louvain Economic Review , Volume 70 , Issue 1 , 2004 , pp. 53 - 77
Copyright
Copyright © Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de recherches économiques et sociales 2004 

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Footnotes

*

Je remercie les participants aux 3ièmes Journées du GREEN-CIRANO (Québec), au Séminaire de Microéconomie (Université de Montréal), au Séminaire du CATT (Université de Pau), ainsi que les rapporteurs anonymes de cet article pour leurs commentaires. Je reste responsable pour toute erreur ou omission.

**

Université de Toulouse (LEERNA-IDEI), Manufacture des Tabacs, bât. F, 21 allée de Brienne, 31042 Toulouse Cedex, France. Tél.: 05 61 12 86 32. Fax: 05 61 12 86 37. Courriel: yhiriart@cict.fr.

References

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