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Antitrust policy and price collusion : public agencies vs delegation

  • Gianmaria Martini (a1) and Cinzia Rovesti (a2)

Résumé

Cet article étudie l'efficacité d'une politique antitrust combattant la collusion horizontale sous différents régimes de mise en oeuvre. Nous considérons deux régimes : un régime avec agence publique, où une authorité antitrust se charge de la politique de concurrence, et un régime de « délégation », où la politique est choisie par les consommateurs. Sous les deux régimes, la politique est mise en oeuvre à discrétion. L'analyse montre que la délégation domine l'agence publique, dans le cas d'une information complète comme imparfaite sur les coûts de production, parce que les consommateurs mettent en place une activité d'investigation d'un plus haut niveau. Ce résultat implique que l'agence publique va combattre des cas « importants » d'activités anti-concurrencielle, alors que les consommateurs vont aussi agir face à des cas plus « mineurs ». La combinaison des deux régimes mène à un meilleurs bien-être que si une agence publique seule est en charge de la politique concurrentielle, parce que les consommateurs peuvent partiellement relacher la contrainte des ressources limitées de l'agence.

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Antitrust policy and price collusion : public agencies vs delegation

  • Gianmaria Martini (a1) and Cinzia Rovesti (a2)

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