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Access charge and imperfect competition

  • François Boldron (a1) and Cyril Hariton (a2)

Résumé

Un gouvernement bienveillant qui fait face à un coût exogène des fonds publics (à cause d'un système fiscal imparfait) souhaite financer un monopole (un opérateur de téléphone local, par exemple) qui produit un bien nécessaire pour des firmes en compétition à la Cournot (l'accès à ce réseau local pour des opérateurs longues distances). Nous montrons qu'une charge d'accès ad valorem est un instrument de régulation plus efficace qu'une charge d'accès unitaire si ces deux dernières doivent être positivies (si elles sont négatives, pour une subvention, le meilleur instrument est la charge d'accès unitaire). Ce résultat est établi avec un nombre fixe d'entreprises ou avec entrée libre dans le secteur aval. Enfin, nous étudions l'impact sur les prix finaux de la concurrence imparfaite.

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Keywords

Access charge and imperfect competition

  • François Boldron (a1) and Cyril Hariton (a2)

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