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Recherches Économiques de Louvain/ Louvain Economic Review Recherches Économiques de Louvain/ Louvain Economic Review

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A Welfarist Proof of Arrow’s Theorem

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  17 August 2016

Charles Blackorby ,
David Donaldson  and
John A. Weymark
Charles Blackorby
Affiliation:
University of British Columbia, Vancouver
David Donaldson
Affiliation:
University of British Columbia, Vancouver
John A. Weymark
Affiliation:
University of British Columbia, Vancouver
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Abstract

This article presents a proof of Arrow’s Theorem which highlights the theorem’s relationship to welfarism and which emphasizes its underlying geometric structure. In addition, this method of proof is adapted to provide a proof of a single-preference-profile version of Arrow’s Theorem. The relationship between Arrovian social choice theory and Bergson-Samuelson welfare economics is also considered.

Keywords

024 025 024 025
Type
Research Article
Information
Recherches Économiques de Louvain/ Louvain Economic Review , Volume 56 , Special Issue 3-4: A Special Issue in Honor of Professor A. Sen : Alternatives to Welfarism , 1990 , pp. 259 - 286
Copyright
Copyright © Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de recherches économiques et sociales 1990

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