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Jeux stratégiques de marché dans le modèle à générations imbriquées, le modèle “achat ou vente”

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  17 August 2016

Francis de Morogues
Francis de Morogues*
Affiliation:
Università degli Studi di Brescia†
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Résumé

Cet article étend l’analyse des jeux stratégiques de marché au modèle à générations imbriquées. Nous considérons une économie avec un bien et de la monnaie de crédit où les stratégies des agents sont du type “achat ou vente ”. Nous montrons que l’existence d’un équilibre stationnaire non autarcique dépend du degré de concurrence sur les marchés.

Summary

Summary

We develop a dynamic imperfect competition equilibrium model by embendding the Shapley-Shubik market games into an overlapping generations framework. We consider a model where the strategies are “buy or sell ” in an economy with one good and credit money. We show that the existence of an non autarchic stationnary equilibrium depend on the size of market power.

Keywords

General Equilibrium,Imperfect Competition,Overlapping Generations.D50,D91,C72.Equilibre général,concurrence imparfaite,générations imbriquées.D50,D91,C72.
Type
Research Article
Information
Recherches Économiques de Louvain/ Louvain Economic Review , Volume 65 , Issue 3 , 1999 , pp. 301 - 322
Copyright
Copyright © Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de recherches économiques et sociales 1999 

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Footnotes

*

Je remercie Philippe Michel, Thierry Paul et les membres du groupe de travail “générations imbriquées” du GREQAM pour leurs commentaires. Ce travail bénéficie du support financier de l’Union Européenne : TMR-Marie Curie (contrat N°ERB4001GT975243).

†

Dipertimento di Scienze Economiche, Via S. Faustino, 74b – 25122 Brescia – Italia, dmorogue@ehess.cnrsmrs.fr

References

Références

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