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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 17 August 2016
This paper suggests, on the basis of the New Keynesian model, a measure of the degree of conservatism of the European Central Banker. At first, we notice that the appointment of the President of the European Central Bank was made after substantive disagreements about the degree of conservatism (institutional and personal) of the candidates. Secondly, we apply this measure to the change of presidency (from Duisenberg to Trichet) in order to explore the possibility of a step change in the conduct of the ECB's monetary policy. Finally, our results show that once appointed, the two Central Bankers adapted to the institutional framework in which they made decisions.
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