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Unified Theories and Unified Science

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 February 2022

Robert L. Causey
Robert L. Causey*
Affiliation:
The University of Texas at Austin
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Extract

Discussions of unified science frequently suppose that the various scientific theories should be combined into one unified theory, and it is usually supposed that this should be done by successive reductions of the various theories to some fundamental theory. Yet, there has been little systematic study of the characteristics of unified theories, and little foundational support for the use of reductions as a unifying procedure.

In this paper I: (a) briefly review some of my previous work on microreductions, (b) state some conditions which are necessary in order for a theory to be unified, (c) argue that when certain identities exist between the elements in the domains of two theories, then the only satisfactory way to combine these two theories into one unified theory is by a microreduction, and (d) indicate briefly some further applications and consequences of this work.

Type
Symposium: The Unity of Science
Information
PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association , Volume 1974 , 1974 , pp. 2 - 13
Copyright
Copyright © 1976 by D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht-Holland

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Footnotes

*

An earlier version of this paper was presented at the symposium on the Unity of Science at the Fourth Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association at Notre Dame University, November 1-3, 1974. This is a revised draft prepared for publication in this volume.

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