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Ceteris Paribus Conditions as Prior Knowledge: A View from Economics

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 February 2022

Neil de Marchi  and
Jinbang Kim
Neil de Marchi
Affiliation:
Duke University
Jinbang Kim
Affiliation:
Duke University
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Extract

We take it that what is intended by “laws” in the title of this session—“Confirming Ceteris Paribus Laws in the Social Sciences”—is reliable rather than fortuitous relations, that is, Millian “tendencies,” with “forcing” properties. These refer to causes which do their work whether or not interfered with, or even counteracted by, other causes. Early econometricians had this in mind when they referred to “autonomous” relations (or behavioral relations). We entirely beg the question of how we know when we are dealing with genuine causes and with the related question how we come by autonomous relations. Instead, we concentrate upon some implications of our supposing that we can identify the experimental conditions necessary to confirm the operation of whatever tendency is in question.

Another expression for these experimental conditions is the steps necessary in order to transform a theoretical model into an estimable one.

Type
Part X. Laws in the Social Sciences
Information
PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association , Volume 1988 , Issue 2: Volume Two: Symposia and Invited Papers 1988 , 1988 , pp. 317 - 325
Copyright
Copyright © 1989 by the Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

1

We wish to thank participants in the PSA session at which a draft of this paper was presented for stimulating comments; and Dan Hausman and Nancy Cartwright who, perhaps unwittingly, drew us in this direction through comments they have made at widely separated times and places on things ranging from the absence of concern by the logical falsificationist Popper for what constitutes supporting evidence to the role of ceteris paribus and prior knowledge in the causal thinking of early econometricians. They bear no responsibility for the use to which we have put their ideas.

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