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Simulating Terrorism: Credible Commitment, Costly Signaling, and Strategic Behavior

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  25 September 2009

David A. Siegel  and
Joseph K. Young
David A. Siegel
Affiliation:
Florida State University
Joseph K. Young
Affiliation:
Southern Illinois University
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Abstract

We present two simulations designed to convey the strategic nature of terrorism and counterterrorism. The first is a simulated hostage crisis, designed primarily to illustrate the concepts of credible commitment and costly signaling. The second explores high-level decision making of both a terrorist group and the state, and is designed to highlight scarce-resource allocation and organizational dynamics. The simulations should be useful both in a traditional classroom setting as well as to the larger public. We provide a primer on the subject matter, and all the material necessary to run the simulations.

Type
The Teacher
Information
PS: Political Science & Politics , Volume 42 , Issue 4 , October 2009 , pp. 765 - 771
Copyright
Copyright © The American Political Science Association 2009

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