Hostname: page-component-8448b6f56d-mp689 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-04-19T20:06:17.980Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

Replication as Regulation

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  02 September 2013

Linda L. Fowler*
Affiliation:
Dartmouth College

Extract

over replication is comparable in many respects to controversy among policy analysts about the ends and means of regulation. Proponents of replication seek to provide the collective good of free-flowing information and to sanction the negative externality of sloppy scholarship. Similarly, opponents of replication claim property rights in the data and variables they have created through hard work and ingenuity. As with disputes over regulatory policy, the fundamental sticking point is whether the benefits of mandatory replication to the community of political scientists outweigh the costs of compliance to individuals.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © The American Political Science Association 1995

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Fenno, Richard F. Jr., 1962. “The House Appropriations Committee as a Political System.” American Political Science Review 56:310324.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Fenno, Richard F. Jr., 1966. The Power of the Purse: Appropriations Politics in Congress. Boston: Little, Brown.Google Scholar
Verba, Sidney,Schlozman, Kay Lehman, Brady, Henry, Nie, Norman H. 1993. “Citizen Activity: Who Participates? What Do They Say?American Political Science Review 87:303318.CrossRefGoogle Scholar