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Does Approval Voting Elect the Lowest Common Denominator?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  02 September 2013

Steven J. Brams  and
Peter C. Fishburn
Steven J. Brams
Affiliation:
Department of Politics, New York University
Peter C. Fishburn
Affiliation:
AT&T Bell Laboratories
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Extract

Approval voting (AV) is a voting system in which voters can vote for as many candidates as they wish in a multicandidate election—one with more than two candidates (Brams and Fishburn, 1983). Like plurality voting (PV), in which voters are restricted to casting just one vote, the candidate (or candidates) with the most votes wins, with each candidate approved of receiving one full vote.

The salient difference between AV and PV in multicandidate elections is that voters, by indicating that they approve of more than one candidate under AV, can help more than one to get elected. This feature of AV tends to prevent a relatively extreme candidate, who may be the favorite of a plurality of the electorate but is anathema to the majority, from winning. Whereas under PV an extremist can win if two or more moderate candidates split the centrist vote, under AV centrist voters can prevent the extremist's election by voting for more than one moderate. Insofar as the moderate candidates share the votes of their centrist supporters, then one will be elected—and the proverbial will of the majority will be expressed.

Type
Research Article
Information
PS: Political Science & Politics , Volume 21 , Issue 2 , Spring 1988 , pp. 277 - 284
Copyright
Copyright © The American Political Science Association 1988

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References

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