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NASH EQUILIBRIUM STRATEGIES REVISITED IN SOFTWARE RELEASE GAMES
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 23 June 2020
Abstract
A software release game was formulated by Zeephongsekul and Chiera [Zeephongsekul, P. & Chiera, C. (1995). Optimal software release policy based on a two-person game of timing. Journal of Applied Probability 32: 470–481] and was reconsidered by Dohi et al. [Dohi, T., Teraoka, Y., & Osaki, S. (2000). Software release games. Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications 105(2): 325–346] in a framework of two-person nonzero-sum games. In this paper, we further point out the faults in the above literature and revisit the Nash equilibrium strategies in the software release games from the viewpoints of both silent and noisy type of games. It is shown that the Nash equilibrium strategies in the silent and noisy of software release games exist under some parametric conditions.
Keywords
- Type
- Research Article
- Information
- Probability in the Engineering and Informational Sciences , Volume 36 , Issue 1 , January 2022 , pp. 105 - 125
- Copyright
- Copyright © The Author(s), 2020. Published by Cambridge University Press