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Repressed productive potential and revolt: insights from an insurgency in Burundi

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  10 June 2019

Cyrus Samii  and
Emily A. West
Cyrus Samii
Affiliation:
Department of Politics, New York University, 19 West 4th Street, New York, NY10012, United States
Emily A. West*
Affiliation:
Department of Political Science, University of Pittsburgh, 4600 Wesley W. Posvar Hall, Pittsburgh, PA15260, Pennsylvania, United States
*
*Corresponding author. Email: eawest@pitt.edu
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Abstract

The relationship between participation in revolt and individuals' economic conditions is among the most debated in political science. While conventional economic theory suggests that those who face the poorest economic prospects are most inclined to fight, extant evidence is decidedly mixed. We address this puzzling variation by analyzing the interplay between macro-structural conditions and individuals' micro-level circumstances. Under conditions of severe group repression, we show how a “glass-ceiling” logic may operate: among the repressed group, those with relatively high productive potential may be most motivated to revolt. We test this with in-depth analysis of participation in the 1993–2003 Burundian insurgency. The data are consistent with numerous implications of the glass-ceiling logic and inconsistent with extant alternative explanations.

Keywords

Inequalityrebellionethnic conflicthuman capitalopportunity costs
Type
Original Article
Information
Political Science Research and Methods , Volume 9 , Issue 1 , January 2021 , pp. 106 - 121
Copyright
Copyright © The European Political Science Association 2019

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