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In Defense of Comparative Statics: Specifying Empirical Tests of Models of Strategic Interaction

  • Clifford J. Carrubba (a1), Amy Yuen (a2) and Christopher Zorn (a3)

Abstract

Beginning in 1999, Curtis Signorino challenged the use of traditional logits and probits analysis for testing discrete-choice, strategic models. Signorino argues that the complex parametric relationships generated by even the simplest strategic models can lead to wildly inaccurate inferences if one applies these traditional approaches. In their stead, Signorino proposes generating stochastic formal models, from which one can directly derive a maximum likelihood estimator. We propose a simpler, alternative methodology for theoretically and empirically accounting for strategic behavior. In particular, we propose carefully and correctly deriving one's comparative statics from one's formal model, whether it is stochastic or deterministic does not particularly matter, and using standard logit or probit estimation techniques to test the predictions. We demonstrate that this approach performs almost identically to Signorino's more complex suggestion.

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In Defense of Comparative Statics: Specifying Empirical Tests of Models of Strategic Interaction

  • Clifford J. Carrubba (a1), Amy Yuen (a2) and Christopher Zorn (a3)

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