The United States has sometimes been called a reluctant Arctic actor, but during its chairmanship of the Arctic Council (2015–2017) the US engaged as an active proponent of Arctic cooperation, using the region as a showcase for strong global climate policy. This paper places US Arctic policy development during the Obama presidency within a longer time perspective, with a focus on how US interests towards the region have been formulated in policies and policy statements. The paper uses frame analysis to identify overarching discourses and discusses the extent to which certain themes and political logics recur or shift over time. It highlights economic development and national competitiveness as a prominent recurring frame, but also that the policy discourse has moved from nation-building and military security towards a broader security perspective, with attention to energy supply for the US, and more recently also to the implications of climate change. Over time, there is a clear shift from reluctance towards Arctic regional cooperation to embracing it. Moreover, it highlights how different stands in relation to climate change have affected Arctic cooperation in the past and may do so again in the future.

Overarching digitalisation is producing significant socio-cultural, economic and policy changes in the European High North. These changes create new opportunities, but also challenges and concerns for people and communities living in the region. Digital development is guided by supranational, national and regional digital policies and is secured through national cybersecurity agendas. These frameworks concentrate on advancing overall economic growth and safeguarding critical information infrastructure and information security, but pay inadequate attention to the interests, needs and fears of people and communities experiencing digitalisation in everyday life. In order to generate a more comprehensive cybersecurity agenda, which focuses on human security and empowering people to influence the digital development, a research framework highlighting the actual ways people use, wish to use, or are unable to use information and communication technologies is needed. The focus of this article is therefore on regionally contextualised digital opportunities and threats as they may be experienced by local people and communities. It utilises insights of securitisation theory to grant people a say in the direction of digital development in their region. The aim is to introduce issues of human security to cybersecurity agendas, for a more comprehensive understanding of the societal changes that digitalisation generates.

Current understanding of climate change impacts, adaptation and vulnerability among Inuit in the Arctic is relatively static, rooted in the community and time that case studies were conducted. This paper captures the dynamism of Inuit–climate relationships by applying a longitudinal approach to assessing vulnerability to climate change among Inuit in Ulukhaktok, Northwest Territories, Canada. Data were collected in 2005 and 2016 following a consistent methodology and analytical framework. Findings from the studies are analysed comparatively together with longitudinal datasets. The data reveal that many of the climatic changes recorded in 2005 that adversely affected hunting activities have been observed to be persisting or progressing, such as decreasing sea ice thickness and extent, and stronger and more consistent summer winds. Inuit are responding by altering travel routes and equipment, taking greater pre-trip precautions, and concentrating their efforts on more efficient and accessible hunts. Increasing living and subsistence costs and time-constraints, changes in the generation and transmission of environmental knowledge and land skills, and the concentration of country food sharing networks were identified as key constraints to adaptation. The findings indicate that the connections between subsistence activities and the wage economy are central to understanding how Inuit experience and respond to climate change.

The lipid composition of blue mussels Mytilus edulis L. living under different environmental conditions (in the intertidal zone and in aquaculture) was studied to detect origin-related differences in seasonal modifications of lipids, and their fatty acid composition in gills and digestive glands. In early May, the gills and digestive glands of intertidal mussels contained higher amounts of total lipids, chiefly phospholipids and sterols, which appear to perform a protective function as maintenance of membrane integrity. Seasonal modifications in lipid composition of both intertidal and aquaculture mussels were related to environmental factors (mainly low temperature), reproductive processes and food availability. We show that seasonal changes in membrane lipid composition of both intertidal and aquaculture mussels reflect the process of membrane lipid remodelling (namely changes in phosphatidylethanolamine proportion and in the fatty acid composition of phospholipids) required for homeoviscous adaptation in low-temperature conditions. In particular, the unsaturation index and chain fluidity index of phospholipids increased in gills and digestive glands of mussels collected in early May and in November. Similar seasonal changes in the triacylglycerol levels and its fatty acid composition were observed in gills and digestive glands of both intertidal and aquaculture mussels collected in late May and August.

In 1921, when Sir Ernest Shackleton was planning his circum-Antarctic expedition on the R.Y.S. Quest, he was eager to appoint a suitably qualified young person as a cabin boy or deck hand. He expressed great admiration for the Boy Scout Movement and its founder, Sir Robert Baden-Powell. Discussions between them led to Shackleton advertising for a Boy Scout to accompany him on the expedition, believing that the experience would greatly benefit the youngster's character, as well as providing much positive publicity for the expedition. He selected two young Scouts but, while much has been written about James Marr, no account has been written about the younger boy, Norman Mooney. This is because he was unable to cope with continuous seasickness and had to return home after only four weeks at sea. This account provides some little-known detail about Mooney and why he was selected, and about Shackleton's sensitive recruiting procedure.

Considering that phytoplankton assemblages are good bioindicators of environmental conditions, the sensitivity of the Western Antarctic Peninsula (WAP) to climate change, and the importance of some areas of its islands as Antarctic Specially Managed Areas, this work assembles published datasets on phytoplankton biodiversity and ecology in confined coastal areas (embayments) of King George Island, WAP. Over 33 years (1980–2013), 415 species from 122 genera have been identified to species level, being mostly diatoms (371 species), with 10 new species described with local material (6 diatoms, 4 cyanobacteria). The importance of diatoms was indicated by the frequent occurrence of Corethron pennatum, Pseudogomphonema kamtshaticum, and abundant benthic genera in the plankton (e.g. Navicula, Cocconeis). The increased contribution of dinoflagellates after 2010 suggests marked changes in the water column. Early-summer blooms differ between the bays' eastern and western shores, with terrestrial melting and wind-driven upwelling inducing the dominance of benthic species at eastern shores, whereas planktonic diatoms (Thalassiosira, Pseudo-nizschia, and Chaetoceros) are most abundant along western shores and central areas. The importance of an accurate identification of organisms that are becoming key ecological components of the region is discussed, as recent changes in the microflora may affect the entire marine food web.

I am writing in response to Professor Chris Turney's recent research article Why didn't they ask Evans?, published in Polar Record on 28 September 2017. The article took as its focus Scott's second-in-command, Lieutenant E.R.G.R ‘Teddy’ Evans, and alleged that Evans failed to deliver Captain Scott's ‘updated orders’ to base in February 1912. This is an error that needs to be corrected.

In ’Why didn't they ask Evans?’ (Turney, 2017), I draw together previously unpublished sources and new analyses of published material to cast further light on the circumstances that led to the fatal events surrounding the return of Captain Robert Falcon Scott's Polar Party on the British Antarctic Expedition (BAE, 1911–1913). Of particular importance are the notes on the meeting between the Royal Geographical Society's President Lord Curzon and the widows Kathleen Scott and Oriana Wilson in April 1913, which explicitly identify Lieutenant Edward ‘Teddy’ Evans as having removed food that exceeded his allocation as a member of the Last Supporting Party (Curzon, 1913), the establishment and almost immediate closure of a ‘Committee of Enquiry’ chaired by Lord Curzon (Beaumont, 1913a, b, c; Cherry-Garrard, 1913a; Darwin, 1913; Goldie, 1913), the recognition of missing food at key depots by the returning Polar Party on the 7, 24 and 27 February 1912 (Scott, 1913a; Wilson, 1912), Evans’ anger at not being selected as a member of the Polar Party and his early departure home (Evans, 1912), the revised timeline of when Evans fell down with scurvy on the Ross Ice Shelf to apparently align with when and where the food was removed (The Advertiser, 3 April 1912, Adelaide: 10) (Cherry-Garrard, 1922; Ellis, 1969; Evans, 1912, 1913a, 1943; Lashly, 1912; Scott, 1913a, 1913b), Evans’ failure to ensure Scott's orders regarding the return of the dog sledging teams had been acted on (Cherry-Garrard, 1922; Gran, 1961; Hattersley-Smith & McGhie, 1984) and the misunderstanding amongst senior Royal Geographical Society members during Evans’ recuperation in the UK that Apsley Cherry-Garrard ‘was to meet the South Pole party, with two teams of dogs, at the foot of the [Beardmore] glacier’ (Markham, 1913). I would like to thank May (2018) for her comment and acknowledge that Edward Wilson's sketchbooks of the expedition's logistics, scientific priorities, sketches and notes on the BAE comprise entries from 1911–1912 and not solely from 1912, which Turney (2017) used to denote the year of the last entry.

The article Could Captain Scott have been saved? Cecil Meares and the second journey that failed, by Karen May and Sarah Airriess, first published in Polar Record in 2014 (May & Airriess, 2015), builds a case against Cecil Meares for a failure to restock One Ton Depot in accordance with Scott's instructions. The authors claim that Meares was guilty of disobedience, neglect of duty and ‘obfuscation’. However, their case is diminished – in my view – by three significant mistakes that undermine their charges against Meares. In the three sections below, I identify those mistakes and consider whether the strong claims May and Airriess make about Meares are justified.

Alp makes some factual corrections regarding the ‘second obfuscation’ and ‘third obfuscation’ identified in the article. Regarding the ‘second obfuscation’, Alp is correct that the man-haulers (of the 3 X.S. supplies) had not yet returned from base on 17 January 1912, and would not return until 23 January. However, Alp's objection does not exonerate Meares. On 31 January 1912, expedition member Apsley Cherry-Garrard recorded that Meares supposedly had considered departing on the ‘second journey’, but had been assured by the man-haulers that there was already ‘plenty for all parties’ with ‘what they had left at 1 Ton’. The key date was 17 January 1912, when Meares still had time to either leave (for the ‘second journey’, a projected two-week depot run) or remain at base. Meares’ inaction on that date therefore cannot be excused by reassurance from the man-haulers on what they ‘had left’ at One Ton, as on 17 January the man-haulers had not yet returned to base to deliver such reassurance.