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On Identifying Background-Structure in Classical Field Theories

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2022

Ryan Samaroo
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Abstract

This article concerns the concept of background-structure in a classical field theory. I propose and evaluate three ways of fixing the extension of the concept, giving particular attention to the bearing of the Anderson-Friedman definition of an absolute object on that task. I attempt to show that, though that task cannot end with the Anderson-Friedman definition, that definition sharpens—–and does not blur—–the particular feature of general relativity that is the basis of nearly all attempts to fix the extension of the concept.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 78 , Issue 5 , December 2011 , pp. 1070 - 1081
Copyright
Copyright © The Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

‡

Anyone familiar with the work of Gordon Belot and Domenico Giulini will recognize my debt to them. I am grateful for discussions with audience members in Montreal and Bristol and for comments from Chris Smeenk, David Wallace, Steve Weinstein, and especially Bill Demopoulos, Robert DiSalle, and Wayne Myrvold. All errors are mine. This work was supported by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada.

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