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No Refuge for Realism: Selective Confirmation and the History of Science
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 January 2022
Abstract
Realists have responded to challenges from the historical record of successful but ultimately rejected theories with what I call the selective confirmation strategy: arguing that only idle parts of past theories have been rejected, while truly success-generating features have been confirmed by further inquiry. I argue first, that this strategy is unconvincing without some prospectively applicable criterion of idleness for theoretical posits, and second, that existing efforts to provide one either convict all theoretical posits of idleness (Kitcher) or stand refuted by detailed consideration of the very examples (optical/electromagnetic ether, caloric fluid) to which they appeal (Psillos). I also argue that available avenues for improving on these proposals are unpromising.
- Type
- Realism
- Information
- Philosophy of Science , Volume 70 , Issue 5: Proceedings of the 2002 Biennial Meeting of The Philosophy of Science Association. Part I: Contributed Papers , December 2003 , pp. 913 - 925
- Copyright
- Copyright © The Philosophy of Science Association
Footnotes
My thanks to Anjan Chakravartty, Philip Kitcher, Stathis Psillos, Larry Laudan, David Lemoine, Jarrett Leplin, Andre Kukla, Jeff Barrett, Pen Maddy, David Malament, Peter Godfrey-Smith, Alan Nelson, James Ladyman, Alexander Rosenberg, Arthur Fine, Hasok Chang, P. D. Magnus, Patrick Forber, and Tim Lyons, as well as audiences at Stanford University, the CSHPS, the BSPS, the PSA, and the members of my “Historical Turn” seminar for helpful discussions and comments.
This material is based upon work supported by the National Science Foundation under Grant No. SES-0094001. Any opinions, findings, and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this material are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Science Foundation (NSF).
References
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