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Is There a Compelling Argument for Ontic Structural Realism?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2022

Matteo Morganti
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Abstract

Structural realism first emerged as an epistemological thesis aimed to avoid the so-called pessimistic metainduction on the history of science. Some authors, however, have suggested that the preservation of structure across theory change is best explained by endorsing the metaphysical thesis that structure is all there is. Although the possibility of this latter, ‘ontic’ form of structural realism has been extensively debated, not much has been said concerning its justification. In this article, I distinguish between two arguments in favor of ontic structural realism that can be reconstructed from the literature and find both of them wanting.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 78 , Issue 5 , December 2011 , pp. 1165 - 1176
Copyright
Copyright © The Philosophy of Science Association

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