On April 1999, the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (hereinafter: the Vienna Convention, CISG or the Convention)2 celebrated its 19th anniversary. The Convention has been praised throughout the world as a skillful and effective tool for governing international sales transactions. Hence, after more than fifty years of arduous work, the efforts undertaken to unify the law for international sales at a global scale seem, at last, to have reached success. As frequet referrals to former efforts undertaken will be made, it seems appropriate to set forth, at least summarily, the history of the Vienna Convention.

The rules of the People's Republic of China (hereinafter: China) governing the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments are found in the Civil Procedural Law. Two articles lay down the conditions for recognition and the defenses for non-recognition, while 30 other articles relate to the execution of foreign judgments. Since the provisions of this Law are too general and cannot meet practical needs, the Supreme People's Court of China (hereinafter: the Supreme Court) has made some interpretations in this regard. Two documents are pertinent to the present study. The first is the ‘Opinions of the Supreme People's Court Regarding Several Questions on the Implementation of the Civil Procedural Law’.(hereinafter: 1992 Opinions). The second is the ‘Regulation of the Supreme People's Court Regarding Certain Questions on the Execution of Judgments by the People's Courts (for Trial Implementation)’ (hereinafter: 1998 Regulation).

On the evening of Friday 17 July 1998, the United Nations Diplomatic Conference of plenipotentiaries voted to adopt the Statute of an International Criminal Court which will have jurisdiction over persons who have committed the most serious crimes of international concern. The Secretary-General of the United Nations characterised this historical event as ‘a gift of hope to future generations, and a giant step forward in the march towards universal human rights and the rule of law.’ This marathon Conference achieved what several generations of lawyers and diplomats have tried to create: the foundations of a workable permanent International Criminal Court which satisfies the criteria of independence and aims at effectiveness and universality. According to the Preamble of the Statute, the international community affirms that it is determined:

‘That the most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole must not go unpunished and that their effective prosecution must be ensured by taking measures at the national level and by enhancing international co-operation, to put an end to impunity for the perpetrators of these crimes and thus to contribute to the prevention of such crimes, to these ends and for the sake of present and future generations, to establish an independent permanent International Criminal Court…’

The purpose of this article is to add a few glosses to some of the provisions of the Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC; Court), dealing with the relationship between it and the United Nations (UN) Security Council (UNSC).

Multinational Enterprises (MNEs) are very powerful entities in the current world order. Indeed, it is trite to note that the power of some MNEs outstrips the power of certain nation-states. In view of their vast economic power and ubiquitous presence, and consequent intrusion into many aspects of people's lives, it is not surprising that MNE activity can and does occasionally impact detrimentally on the enjoyment of internationally recognised human rights.

The People's Republic of China (hereinafter: China) does not have a special statute on private international law. The relevant rules can be found mainly in China's Civil Procedural Law and the General Principles of the Civil Law. The rules of international jurisdiction are included in the former. In Part IV of the Civil Procedural Law entitled ‘Special Provisions for Civil Procedures Involving Foreign Parties’, there is a special chapter that is dedicated to the rules of international jurisdiction. This chapter has altogether four articles, all of which concern international jurisdiction over contract disputes.

In July 1998, a United Nations Diplomatic Conference in Rome voted to adopt the Statute of the International Criminal Court. Rules of Procedure and Evidence are now required to effectuate proceedings and trials in the Court itself.

The 1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict has, until recently, sat on the sidelines of humanitarian law. One reason for this, which has been overlooked to date, is a seemingly widespread though rarely confessed confusion over the nature and extent of the ‘cultural property’ to which it applies. Article 1 defines cultural property within the meaning of the Convention as: ‘movable or immovable property of great importance to the cultural heritage of every people …’

A state's rules of criminal jurisdiction determine the (spatial) scope of its criminal law. Such rules become increasingly important as criminal offences gain an international dimension. Every state has its own rules of criminal jurisdiction. As they form the outcome of considerations involving both legal and political aspects, it is hardly surprising that there are substantial differences between states. Irrespective of their differences, however, these rules are commonly classified according to the so-called ‘principles of jurisdiction’. This classification is based on the connection between the particular offence in question and the state claiming jurisdiction regarding this offence. With regard to the territoriality principle this connecting point forms the locus delicti: the jurisdictional requirement is that the offence is committed within the territory of the state (hereafter: intraterritorial locus delicti) claiming jurisdiction. The other principles are principles of extraterritorial jurisdiction because they apply when the offence is supposed to have been committed outside the country's territory (extraterritorial). The active personality principle is based on the nationality of the offender; a state claims jurisdiction over crimes committed by its own nationals. According to the passive personality principle, the nationality of the victim of the offence provides the basis for the establishment of jurisdiction. The protective principle applies if the extraterritorial offence injures or endangers a certain legal interest to which the state ascribes a particular national importance. With the universality principle there is also a particular legal interest involved, yet, different from the one applying with the protection principle, the interest here is of a universal nature. The differences between jurisdictional systems of states are found in the different elaborations of these principles. The active personality principle, for example, might be applied to all offences, but also to a limited group of offences. Sometimes, the applicability of this principle is subjected to the requirement that the offence in question is punishable according to the law of the state in which the offence is committed (lex loci delicti). In addition, the territoriality principle, which today is considered a jurisdictional starting-point for any state, is interpreted in different ways as each state interprets the locus delicti concept related to this principle in its own way.

A Royal Decree of 25 April 1947 entrusted the internationally well known Professor E.M. Meijers with the task of drafting a new civil code.2 Meijers started by submitting some 50 questions to the Dutch Parliament, 18 of which went right to the heart of the issue of how to deal with unjust enrichment:

‘Should a general provision be incorporated to the effect that a person who without sufficient legal ground is enriched at the expense of another must compensate the other for his loss to the maximum of his enrichment, or should the code be limited to the enumeration of a number of specific instances in which this action can be brought?’

In September 1958 the Venezuelan Ministry of Justice created a Commission, comprising Professors Roberto Goldschmidt, Gonzalo Parra-Aranguren and Joaquín Sánchez-Covisa, assigning it the task of preparing a Draft on Private International Law. A preliminary document was drawn up after ten months of intensive work, but the Commission decided to reflect on the Draft and it was only in April 1963 when it was completed, with an ‘Explanatory Report’ annexed.

A Dutch couple was married in the Netherlands in 1957 under the regime of community of property. In 1980, they entered into a marriage contract, which altered their matrimonial regime into one of separation of goods. In 1982, they moved to London. In 1990 the marriage was dissolved by the English High Court. The Court also dealt with an application of the wife for full ancillary relief under sections 23 and 24 of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973. The High Court awarded her a capital sum so that periodic payments of maintenance would be unnecessary. It also held that the Netherlands separation of goods agreement was of no relevance for the purposes of its decision in the case. In its decision the High Court set the total amount which the wife should be awarded in order to provide for herself at £ 875 000. Part of that amount, £ 535 000, was covered by her own funds, by the sale of moveable property, by the transfer of a painting and finally, by the transfer of immovable property. For the rest, the Court ordered the husband to pay to his former wife a lump sum of £ 340 000, to which the sum of £ 15 000 was added to meet the costs of earlier proceedings.