On the evening of Friday 17 July 1998, the United Nations Diplomatic Conference of plenipotentiaries voted to adopt the Statute of an International Criminal Court which will have jurisdiction over persons who have committed the most serious crimes of international concern. The Secretary-General of the United Nations characterised this historical event as ‘a gift of hope to future generations, and a giant step forward in the march towards universal human rights and the rule of law.’ This marathon Conference achieved what several generations of lawyers and diplomats have tried to create: the foundations of a workable permanent International Criminal Court which satisfies the criteria of independence and aims at effectiveness and universality. According to the Preamble of the Statute, the international community affirms that it is determined:

‘That the most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole must not go unpunished and that their effective prosecution must be ensured by taking measures at the national level and by enhancing international co-operation, to put an end to impunity for the perpetrators of these crimes and thus to contribute to the prevention of such crimes, to these ends and for the sake of present and future generations, to establish an independent permanent International Criminal Court…’

The 1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict has, until recently, sat on the sidelines of humanitarian law. One reason for this, which has been overlooked to date, is a seemingly widespread though rarely confessed confusion over the nature and extent of the ‘cultural property’ to which it applies. Article 1 defines cultural property within the meaning of the Convention as: ‘movable or immovable property of great importance to the cultural heritage of every people …’

A Royal Decree of 25 April 1947 entrusted the internationally well known Professor E.M. Meijers with the task of drafting a new civil code.2 Meijers started by submitting some 50 questions to the Dutch Parliament, 18 of which went right to the heart of the issue of how to deal with unjust enrichment:

‘Should a general provision be incorporated to the effect that a person who without sufficient legal ground is enriched at the expense of another must compensate the other for his loss to the maximum of his enrichment, or should the code be limited to the enumeration of a number of specific instances in which this action can be brought?’

A Dutch couple was married in the Netherlands in 1957 under the regime of community of property. In 1980, they entered into a marriage contract, which altered their matrimonial regime into one of separation of goods. In 1982, they moved to London. In 1990 the marriage was dissolved by the English High Court. The Court also dealt with an application of the wife for full ancillary relief under sections 23 and 24 of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973. The High Court awarded her a capital sum so that periodic payments of maintenance would be unnecessary. It also held that the Netherlands separation of goods agreement was of no relevance for the purposes of its decision in the case. In its decision the High Court set the total amount which the wife should be awarded in order to provide for herself at £ 875 000. Part of that amount, £ 535 000, was covered by her own funds, by the sale of moveable property, by the transfer of a painting and finally, by the transfer of immovable property. For the rest, the Court ordered the husband to pay to his former wife a lump sum of £ 340 000, to which the sum of £ 15 000 was added to meet the costs of earlier proceedings.