¹ See, for instance, statement by the representative of Congo, A/SPC/SR. 419 on 4 December 1963; Columbia-A/SPC/SR. 420 on 6 December 1963; Peru-A/SPC/SR. 422 on 10 December 1963; Cameroon-A/SPC/SR. 429 on 16 December 1963; Yugoslavia-A/SPG/SR. 428; New Zealand-A/SPC/SR. 425 on 13 December 1963; Netherlands-A/SPC/SR. 420 on 6 December 1963.

² This was the East European contention.

³ See draft resolution A/SPG/L. 104/Rev. 1, G.A.O.R., 18th Session, Special Political Committee, 422 meeting.

⁴ See draft resolution A/SPC/L. 109, G.A.O.R., 18th Session, Special Political Committee, 427 meeting.

⁵ See draft resolution A/SPC/SR. 429, G.A.O.R., 18th Session, Special Political Committee, 429 meeting.

⁶ For a definition of various categories of questions, see note under Table II.

⁷ A recent exception is the Irish complaint concerning Northern Ireland on which the Council met briefly and adjourned without adopting the agenda. In opposing the inscription of the item, Britain invoked the domestic jurisdiction clause of Article 2 of the Charter. The Council took no action on Ireland's request for a United Nations peace-keeping force. For details, see Security Council Offidol Records, 1503 meeting (S/PV. 1503).

⁸ The Committee was set under General Assembly resolution of 18th February 1965. A similar practice has been followed in the establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee to study the Resources of the Sea Bed and Ocean Floor beyond national limits.

⁹ In the absence of any authoritative and universally agreed definition, the phrase “peace-keeping operations” may be understood to mean the decisions relating to dispatch of observers and armed forces in situations falling outside Chapter VII and with the objective of localising conflicts. These operations are based on the consent of the parties. They are to be distinguished from pacific settlement of disputes under Chapter VI and from the enforcement action under Chapter VII.

¹⁰ For a discussion of this concept see “Introduction to the Annual Report of the Secretary-General, 1960–61,” G.A.O.R., 16th Session, Supplement No. iA (A/4800/Add.1).

¹¹ Memorandum of Soviet Government, Document A/AC-121/2, March 26, 1965.

¹² An excellent summary of these positions during 1965 is to be found in the Yearbook of the United Nations 1965 (New York: Office of Public Information), pp. 1–24Google Scholar. Also see Report of the Secretary-General and President of the General Assembly in document A/AC. 121/4, March 31, 1965. For more detailed discussion see G.A.O.R., 21st Session, Special Political Committee Summary Records of Meetings, A/SPC/495–548.

¹³ See Repertoire of the Practice of the United Nations, vol. II, 1955, p. 66Google Scholar, which listed as of 31 August 1954, 303 decisions of the Council taken without vote and 707 affirmative or negative decisions.

¹⁴ For instance during the Council's discussion on the Middle East crisis in 1967, resort to voting on procedural matters was taken only once. Similarly, 7 out of 10 draft resolutions submitted on matters other than cease-fire, were not put to vote. These were the following drafts: S/7916 of 30 May 1967-(USA); S/7919 of 31 May 1967-(UAR); S/7941 of 7 June 1967-(Canada); S/7952/Rev. 3 of 14 June 1967-(USA); S/8227 of 7 November 1967-(India, Mali and Nigeria); S/8229 of 7 November 1967-(USA); and S/8253 of 20 November 1967-(USSR).

¹⁵ In February 1962 the Council rejected a Cuban request for a Council meeting. Earlier in the same year, a Soviet request for a Council meeting on the Congo was rejected via upholding a Presidential ruling on motion of simple adjournment under Rule 33 of the Provisional Rules of Procedure. (Report of the Security Council, G.A.O.R., 17th Session, Supplement 2 (A/52O2) pp. 71–73.)Google Scholar

¹⁶ See the statements by theRepresentatives of France and India on the preliminary discussion on the Pueblo incident in S/PV. 1388. However, even those members who favour admission of a complaint as a matter of principle, do not always follow this practice. For instance, in the Cuban complaint cited above, the Representative of United Kingdom argued that “(However) each case ought to be examined on its own merits, for it would not be right to adopt the agenda automatically…”. (Report of the Security Council, G.A.O.R., 17th Session, Supplement 2 (A/52O2) p. 72).Google Scholar

¹⁷ Annual Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization, G.A.O.R., 21st Session, Supplement 1, (A6301), p. 42.Google Scholar

¹⁸ During the 1372 meeting of the Council, the US representative, without formally challenging the President/s announcement on the order of speakers moved that parties to the dispute—in this case UAR and Israel—be invited to speak prior to the Members of the Council. After some discussion and more than two hours of private consultations, the question was put to a vote at the instance of the original mover. The motion failed to be adopted, as it received 8 votes in favour, none against and 7 abstentions. (S/PV. 1373), p. 41.

¹⁹ Such motions when formally moved, have been adopted unanimously.

²⁰ A noteworthy exception is the assurances offered by the nuclear-weapon states to the non-nuclear-weapon states signatories to the Treaty on Non-Proliferation. This resolution was adopted by the Security Council on igth June 1968 by io votes to none, with 5 abstentions (Algeria, Brazil, France, India and Pakistan). For further details see verbatim record of 1433 meeting of the Security Council (S/PV. 1433).