On average, UK productivity performance in the decades leading up to the financial crisis was quite disappointing. Joining the EU was not to blame. Indeed, EU membership, which was an integral part of the Thatcher reform programme, had a significant positive impact. Over the long run, UK supply-side policies have been badly designed in various different ways. These design faults have not been the result of constraints imposed by EU membership but rather the consequence of domestic government failure. There is no reason to think that EU exit will lead, either directly or indirectly, to improvements in UK productivity outcomes.

OECD projections for European countries imply that the crisis will have no long-term effect on trend growth. An historical perspective says this is too optimistic. Not only is the legacy of public debt and its requirement for fiscal consolidation unfavourable but the experience of the 1930s suggests that much needed supply-side reforms are now less probable – indeed policy may well become less growth friendly. Whereas the 1940s saw the Bretton Woods agreement and the Marshall Plan pave the way for the ‘Golden Age’, it is unlikely that anything similar will rescue Europe this time around.

This paper reviews UK supply-side policies since 2010 in terms of their impact on growth and considers medium-term growth prospects in the context of the puzzle of disappointing post-crisis TFP performance. It is argued that there is no reason to believe that growth prospects have deteriorated significantly compared with the pre-crisis period. Changes in policy under the Coalition government are unlikely to have made a big difference to growth potential. On the one hand, this means opportunities for radical reform have been ignored; on the other hand, there has been no repeat of the 1930s’ debacle.

We estimate trend UK labour productivity growth using a Hodrick-Prescott filter method. We use the results to compare downturns where the economy fell below its pre-existing trend. We find that the current productivity slowdown has resulted in productivity being 19.7 per cent below the pre-2008 trend path in 2018. This is nearly double the previous worst productivity shortfall ten years after the start of a downturn. On this criterion the slowdown is unprecedented in the past 250 years. We conjecture that this reflects a combination of adverse circumstances, namely, a financial crisis, a weakening impact of ICT and impending Brexit.

We analyse TFP growth in the US business sector using a basic unobserved component model where trend growth follows a random walk and the noise is a first order autoregression. This is fitted using a Kalman-filter methodology. We find that trend TFP growth has declined steadily from 1.5 to 1.0 per cent per year over the past 50 years. Nevertheless, recent trends are not a good guide to actual medium-term TFP growth. This exhibits substantial variations and is quite unpredictable. Techno-optimists should not give best to productivity pessimists simply because recent TFP growth has been weak.

This paper evaluates claims that European productivity growth has been undermined by weak competition and excessive regulation and taxation. The argument has some validity in the context of the information and communications technology (ICT) revolution which has placed a greater premium on flexibility. The UK has been well-placed to benefit from ICT but experiences a productivity gap reflecting historically-low investment combined with high employment of low-productivity workers. Rapid Irish growth has benefited greatly from low corporate taxation but the massive contribution of ICT production to productivity growth suggests it is a special case not a role model.

It has been claimed using the concept of the Index of Sustainable Economic Welfare (ISEW) that there has been an absolute decline in sustainable living standards in the UK since the mid-1970s. Revisions to ISEW are proposed to make it more nearly a measure of utility-based real national income. In particular, ISEW should be revised to take account of much-improved life expectancy. Implementing any of the suggested revisions reverses the finding of absolute decline while implementing all of them results in a growth rate higher than that of real GDP per head in the national accounts.