Hostname: page-component-7bb8b95d7b-s9k8s Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-09-25T23:38:52.092Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

British India versus the British Empire: The Indian Army and an impasse in imperial defence, circa 1919–39

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  03 July 2013

ELISABETH MARIKO LEAKE
ELISABETH MARIKO LEAKE*
Affiliation:
Corpus Christi College, University of Cambridge, UK Email: elisabeth.leake@aya.yale.edu
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

From the end of the Great War to the onset of the Second World War, Great Britain and British India clashed over the Indian Army's role in imperial defence. Britain increasingly sought an imperial fighting force that it could deploy across the globe, but the government of India, limited by the growing independence movements, financial constraints, and—particularly—renewed tribal unrest on its North-West Frontier, refused to meet these demands. Attempts to reconcile Britain's and India's conflicting strategies made little headway until the late 1930s when compromise ultimately emerged with the establishment of the Expert Committee on the Defence of India 1938–39. While the Committee refuted India's traditional focus on the subcontinent's own security, importantly it recognized the necessity of British financial support for the Indian Army and the maintenance of a large local fighting force to prevent North-West Frontier unrest from disrupting imperial military planning at a time of global war.

Type
Research Article
Information
Modern Asian Studies , Volume 48 , Issue 1 , January 2014 , pp. 301 - 329
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2013 

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

1 See Barnett, C. (1974). Britain and her army, 1509–1970, Penguin, LondonGoogle Scholar; Bond, B. (1980). Military policy between the two world wars, Clarendon Press, OxfordGoogle Scholar; Howard, M. (1972). The continental commitment: The dilemma of British defence policy in the era of the two world wars, Maurice Temple Smith Ltd., LondonGoogle Scholar; and Peden, G.C. (1984). ‘The burden of imperial defence and the continental commitment reconsidered’, The Historical Journal, 27:2, pp. 405–23CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

2 See Heathcote, T.A. (1995). The military in British India, Manchester University Press, ManchesterGoogle Scholar, and Tomlinson, B.R. (1979). The political economy of the Raj 1914–1947, Macmillan, LondonCrossRefGoogle Scholar.

3 Heathcote, The military in British India, p. 24.

4 Tomlinson, The political economy of the Raj, pp. 108–10. A ‘crore’ equals 10 million rupees.

5 Jeffery, K. (1984). The British Army and the crisis of empire 1918–1922, Manchester University Press, Manchester, p. 57Google Scholar.

6 Tomlinson, The political economy of the Raj, pp. 114–15.

7 ‘Report of the Committee appointed by the Secretary of State for India to enquire into the administration and organisation of the Army in India’, 22 June 1920, Public Records Office, Kew (PRO), CAB 24/112.

8 Ibid.

9 Bose, S. and Jalal, A. (1998). Modern South Asia: History, culture, political economy, Routledge, New York, p. 127Google Scholar.

10 Tomlinson, The political economy of the Raj, p. 116.

11 Mason, P. (1974). A matter of honour: An account of the Indian Army, its officers and men, Jonathan Cape, London, p. 456Google Scholar.

12 See Krämer, G. (2008). A history of Palestine: From the Ottoman conquest to the founding of the state of Israel, Princeton University Press, PrincetonGoogle Scholar; Tripp, C. (2000). A history of Iraq, Cambridge University Press, CambridgeGoogle Scholar; Fieldhouse, D.K. (2006). Western imperialism in the Middle East 1914–1958, Oxford University Press, OxfordGoogle Scholar; Beasley, W.G. (1987). Japanese imperialism 1894–1945, Oxford University Press, OxfordGoogle Scholar.

13 Kolinsky, M. (1999). Britain's war in the Middle East: Strategy and diplomacy, 1936–42, Macmillan, Basingstoke, pp. 30–31CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

14 Bond, British military policy between the two world wars, pp. 75–80.

15 War Cabinet conclusions, 15 August 1919, PRO, CAB 23/15.

16 Heathcote, The military in British India, p. 243.

17 Press communiqué, 20 December 1933, India Office Records, London (IOR), L/Mil/7/5508.

18 Ibid.; Bond, British military policy between the two world wars, pp. 111–12.

19 Letter from Sir Findlater Steward to A.P. Waterfield, 14 July 1931, IOR, L/Mil/5/885. For more on Indianization, see Gupta, P.S. (2002). ‘The debate on Indianization 1918–39’, in Gupta, P.S., and Deshpande, A.The British Raj and its Indian armed forces 1857–1939, Oxford University Press, New Delhi, pp. 228–69Google Scholar.

20 Gupta, ‘The debate on Indianization’, p. 238.

21 Unsigned document, ‘Indianization’, undated, IOR, L/Mil/7/5465.

22 Press communiqué, 20 December 1933, IOR, L/Mil/7/5508.

23 Tomlinson, The political economy of the Raj, p. 118.

24 Jalal, A. (1985). The sole spokesman: Jinnah, the Muslim League and the demand for Pakistan, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp. 7–13CrossRefGoogle Scholar. For more on growing tensions between India's Hindu and Muslim communities, see also Page, D. (1982). Prelude to partition: The Indian Muslims and the imperial system of control 1920–1932, Oxford University Press, New DelhiGoogle Scholar.

25 See Brobst, P.J. (2005). The future of the Great Game: Sir Olaf Caroe, India's independence, and the defense of Asia, University of Akron Press, Akron, Ohio, particularly pp. 101–03Google Scholar.

26 Prasad, B. (1963). Defence of India: Policy and plans, Official history of the Indian Armed Forces in the Second World War 1939–45, Combined Inter-Services Historical Section, Calcutta, pp. 28–31Google Scholar.

27 Caroe, O. (1962). The Pathans 550 B.C.–A.D. 1957, Macmillan, London, p. 397Google Scholar; Elliott, J.G. (1969). The frontier, 1839–1947, Cassell & Co., London, p. 178Google Scholar.

28 Warren, A. (2000). Waziristan, the Faqir of Ipi, and the Indian Army: The North-West Frontier revolt of 1936–37, Oxford University Press, Karachi, p. 279Google Scholar; Supplement no. 2 to monthly intelligence summary no. 7 on events in Waziristan, 20 July 1937, IOR, L/Mil/5/1065.

29 Moreman, T.R. (1998). The Army in India and the development of frontier warfare, 1849–1947, Macmillan, Basingstoke, pp. 163–67CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

30 Kolinsky, Britain's war in the Middle East, p. 67.

31 ‘Frontier operations cost about rs. one lakh a day’, The (Lahore) Tribune, LVII (25 August 1937), p. 16. A ‘lakh’ equals 100,000 rupees.

32 ‘N.-W. frontier fighting. British casualties. Total cost of campaign’, The (London) Times, no. 47847 (20 November 1937), p. 11.

33 In the North-West Frontier Province, the Congress established a ministry with the aid of their allies, the Khudai Khidmatgars, a Pathan nationalist organization based in the settled districts. While the Khudai Khidmatgars, or ‘Red Shirts’ as they were popularly known, based their movement on Pathan tribal law and traditions, they only minimally influenced the Pathans of the tribal zone. The British limited the Red Shirts’ access to the tribal zone, leaving the organization to develop almost entirely in the settled districts. See Banerjee, M. (2000). The Pathan unarmed: Opposition & memory in the North West Frontier, James Currey, OxfordGoogle Scholar.

34 Sir James Grigg to Sir Aubrey Metcalfe, 29 October 1938, Churchill College Archives Centre, Cambridge (CCAC), Grigg Papers, PJGG 4/4/1.

35 See ‘Appreciation of the political situation by the Government of India’, 21 January 1938, PRO, CAB 24/274; Ibid., 23 February 1938, PRO, CAB 24/275; Ibid., 20 March 1938, PRO, CAB 24/276; Ibid., 21 April 1938, PRO, CAB 24/276; Ibid., 21 May 1938, PRO, CAB 24/276; Ibid., 20 June 1938, PRO, CAB 24/277.

36 ‘Appreciation of the political situation by the Government of India’, 24 October 1938, PRO, CAB 24/279; Ibid., 18 January 1939, PRO, CAB 24/283; Ibid., 1 March 1939, PRO, CAB 24/284.

37 Fortnightly report from North-West Frontier Province Governor to Viceroy, 23 July 1938, IOR, Linlithgow Papers, Mss Eur F125.

38 ‘Appreciation of the political situation by the Government of India’, 22 July 1938, PRO, CAB 24/278.

39 Hauner, M. (1981). ‘One man against the empire: The Faqir of Ipi and the British in Central Asia on the eve of and during the Second World War’, Journal of Contemporary History, 16:1, p. 185CrossRefGoogle Scholar, pp. 192–99. See also Hauner, M. (1981). India in Axis strategy: Germany, Japan and Indian nationalists in the Second World War, Klett-Cotta, StuttgartGoogle Scholar.

40 Memorandum prepared by the Air Staff and given to Sir Thomas Inskip by Sir Kingsley Wood, ‘Policy and control of the North West Frontier of India’, 22 November 1938, IOR, L/Mil/7/5465.

41 Ibid.

42 G. Cunningham, ‘Note on His Excellency the Viceroy's memorandum on frontier policy dated 29th June, 1939’, 5 July 1939, IOR, L/PO/5/32.

43 Further notes on Viceroy's memorandum from R.A. Cassels to the Marquess of Linlithgow, 10 July 1939, IOR, L/PO/5/32.

44 Memorandum by His Excellency the Viceroy on frontier policy, 29 June 1939, IOR, L/PO/5/32.

45 Ibid.

46 Memorandum responding to memorandum by His Excellency the Viceroy on frontier policy from O. Caroe, 8 July 1939, IOR, L/PO/5/32.

47 Griffith, R. (1938). ‘The frontier policy of the Government of India’, Journal of the Royal United Services Institute, 83:531Google Scholar, p. 577.

48 ‘Pacification of N.-W. Frontier. Mistakes in method’, The Times, no. 48307 (17 May 1939), p. 20.

49 Ibid.; see also Chetwode, P. (1936). ‘Proceedings of the East India Association. Some aspects of the defence of India. Now and when the reforms materialize’, The Asiatic Review, 32:109, pp. 463–78Google Scholar.

50 For examples see ‘Tribesmen kidnap three women and one man. Village party gives them fight. Two persons rescued’, The Tribune, LIX (24 June 1939), p. 3; ‘Cavalry lines in Bannu fired on’, The Tribune, LIX (30 June 1939), p. 3; ‘Tribal raids in Bannu, D.I. Khan’, The Tribune, LIX (8 July 1939), p. 3; ‘Bombs explode on Razmak road. One man injured’, The Tribune, LIX (22 July 1939), p. 16; ‘Razmak camp sniped. No casualties. Bridges damaged; lorries detained’, The Tribune, LIX (10 August 1939), p. 7.

51 Chiefs of Staff Sub-Committee, ‘Imperial defence policy’, 23 February 1932, PRO, CAB 53/22.

52 ‘Report by the Defence Requirements Sub-Committee’, 28 February 1934, PRO, CAB 24/247.

53 Postan, M.M. (1952). British war production, History of the Second World War, United Kingdom civil series, Her Majesty's Stationery Office, London, p. 12Google Scholar.

54 Memorandum by the Secretary of State for War, ‘The organization of the army for its role in war’, 10 February 1938, PRO, CAB 24/274.

55 Barnett, C. (1972), The collapse of British power, Eyre Methuen Ltd., London, pp. 502–03Google Scholar; Postan, British war production, p. 33.

56 Cabinet conclusions, 16 February 1938, PRO, CAB 23/92; see also Kennedy, P.M. (1981). The realities behind diplomacy: Background influences on British external policy 1865–1980, Allen & Unwin, LondonGoogle Scholar, especially pp. 234–35.

57 Barnett, Britain and her army, p. 420; Cabinet conclusions, 5 April 1939, PRO, CAB 23/98.

58 Jackson, A. (2006). The British Empire and the Second World War, Hambledon Continuum, London, pp. 64Google Scholar, 241, 477; (1966). ‘Defence—Armed Services: Army, New Zealand’, in McLintock, A.H. An encyclopaedia of New Zealand, p. 5, Te Ara: The Encyclopaedia of New Zealand: <http://www.teara.govt.nz/en/1966/defence-armed-services-army-new-zealand>, [accessed 21 May 2013].

59 Tomlinson, The political economy of the Raj, p. 138.

60 Letter from Secretary, Government of India, to Secretary, India Office, Military Department, 9 February 1938, PRO, CAB 24/278.

61 Tomlinson, The political economy of the Raj, p. 138.

62 Thomas, P.J. (1939). The growth of federal finance in India: Being a survey of India's public finances from 1833 to 1939, Oxford University Press, Madras, p. 424Google Scholar.

63 Telegram from the Viceroy, 24 August 1938, IOR, L/WS/1/150.

64 Cabinet conclusions, 20 July 1938, PRO, CAB 23/94.

65 Letter to S.H. Phillips from S.K. Brown, 2 June 1938, IOR, L/WS/1/150.

66 Note by the Minister for Co-ordination of Defence, ‘India. Defence questions’, 29 July 1938, PRO, CAB 24/278.

67 Telegram from Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, 3 August 1938, IOR, L/WS/1/150.

68 ‘A report of a sub-committee on the defence problems of India and the composition and organization of the army and Royal Air Force in India’, 12 May 1938, PRO, CAB 24/278.

69 Ibid.

70 Ibid.

71 Ibid.

72 Ibid.

73 Ibid.

74 Ibid.

75 Ibid.

76 See Warner, P. (1981). Auchinleck: The lonely soldier, Buchan & Enright, LondonGoogle Scholar.

77 ‘Report of the Expert Committee on the Defence of India 1938–39’, 30 January 1939, PRO, CAB 24/287.

78 Decypher of telegram from Government of India, Defence Department, to Secretary of State for India, 2 December 1938, IOR, L/WS/1/154.

79 Ibid. The Report did not make distinctions between Indian political parties such as the Congress or the Muslim League, instead making generalizations about public opinion based on religious divisions.

80 Ibid.

81 ‘Report of the Expert Committee on the Defence of India 1938–39’, 30 January 1939, PRO, CAB 24/287.

82 Ibid.

83 Ibid.

84 Ibid.

85 Ibid.

86 Ibid. Neither officials in London nor Delhi mentioned a possible threat from Japan, probably partly because of their focus on the strategic importance of the Middle East and possibly also because of an awareness that the Pathans perceived Japanese Shinto and Buddhist practices as a greater threat to Islam than British rule. This became particularly evident after Japan declared war on the Allies. (See ‘Extract from most secret General Headquarters India weekly intelligence summary of the North West Frontier and Afghanistan, no. 6’, 13 February 1942, IOR, L/PS/12/3249.)

87 Final copy of evidence given by Lieutenant-General Thomas Corbett to the Expert Committee on the Defence of India 1938–39, 22 December 1938, CCAC, Corbett papers, CORB 1/15.

88 ‘Report of the Expert Committee on the Defence of India 1938–39’, 30 January 1939, PRO, CAB 24/287.

89 Ibid.

90 Ibid.

91 Prasad, Defence of India, p. 63.

92 Memorandum by the Chiefs of Staff Committee, ‘Preparation of more troops in India for service overseas’, 25 July 1940, PRO, CAB 66/10/22.

93 Prasad, N. (1956). Expansion of the armed forces and defence organisation 1939–45, Official history of the Indian Armed Forces in the Second World War 1939–45, Combined Inter-Services Historical Section, Calcutta, pp. 400–03Google Scholar.

94 Decypher of telegram from Government of India, Defence Department, to Secretary of State for India, 29 October 1940, IOR, L/WS/1/116.

95 See report by the Chiefs of Staff Committee, ‘Review of military policy in the Middle East’, 5 December 1939, PRO, CAB 66/3/48.

96 Letter by H.V. Lewis, 24 November 1939, Imperial War Museum, London, Lewis papers, IWM 74/48/1.

97 Letter from Linlithgow to Cunningham, 22 April 1941, IOR, Linlithgow papers, Mss Eur F125.

98 A. Hartley, ‘Report by His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief in India on operations carried out in Waziristan between the 1st October 1941 and 31st December 1942’, 2 August 1943, IOR, L/WS/1/1526; ‘Report for the month of August 1942 for the Dominions, India, Burma and the colonies and mandated territories, (undated) September 1942, PRO, CAB 68/9/43.

99 Fieldhouse, Western imperialism in the Middle East, p. 102; Clayton, A. (1999). ‘“Deceptive might”: Imperial defence and security, 1900–1968’, in Brown, J.M. and Louis, W.R.The Oxford History of the British Empire, New York, Oxford University Press, Vol. 4, p. 284Google Scholar; Kolinsky, Britain's war in the Middle East, pp. 40–41.