Earlier versions of this essay were given at the Columbia University Seminar on Modern Japan and the New England Seminar on Japan at Harvard. I should like to thank the members of both for many helpful criticisms and suggestions. Leon Sigal, Charles Sheldon, and Lawrence Olson each read the manuscript carefully and I am grateful for their comments.

¹ Chō, Kunai, Kunai Chō Yōran (1965), P. 33.Google Scholar

² The Japanese had every reason to fear for the continuation of the imperial institution. Just prior to Potsdam, ‘I [Dean Acheson] was soon engaged in a sharp difference of opinion with Joe Grew regarding the future of the Emperor of Japan. Grew argued for his retention as the main stabilizing factor in Japan; I argued that he should be removed because he was a weak leader who had yielded to the military demand for war and who could not be relied upon. Grew's view fortunately prevailed. I very shortly came to see that I was quite wrong.’ Acheson, Dean, Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department (New York: W. W. Norton, 1969), pp. 112–13.Google Scholar Robert Butow's analysis of Japan's surrender also shows how precarious was the position of the emperor, and the imperial institution, as far as U.S. leaders were concerned. Butow, Robert J. C., Japan's Decision to Surrender (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1954), pp. 189–92.Google Scholar

³ For an early, and excellent academic exploitation of the new public opinion market, see Hirotatsu, Fujiwara, Gendai Nihon no Seiji Ishiki (Tokyo: Sōbun Sha, 1958).Google Scholar

⁴ ‘Emperor System’ (Tennō Sei) was a term used by the Japan Communist Party in their ‘Theses’ of 1927 and 1932 to designate the entire ruling structure of the Meiji political system that had to be overthrown; this included abolition of the imperial institution. Ironically, however, it became a term of common parlance in the immediate postwar period, used by conservative supporters of the imperial institution as well as those advocating abolition. For conservatives, the effort to ‘protect the national polity’ soon became called the movement to ‘protect the Emperor System.’Google Scholar See Takeshi, Ishida, ‘Sengo no Tennō Sei.’ in his Sengo Nihon no Seji Taisei (Mirai Sha, 1957)Google Scholar as reproduced in Kuno, Osamu and Kamijima, Jirō (eds), ‘Tennō Sei’ Ronshū (Tokyo: San'ichi Shobō, 1974), pp. 216–30.Google Scholar In its original Marxist meaning, ‘Emperor System’ signified the oppressive bureaucratic behemoth established under the Meiji Constitution—that is, the political embodiment of ‘absolutism’ (zettai shugi) which was a transitional stage between feudalism and capitalism (bourgeois democracy). But today the original Marxist meaning is only one of many encompassed under ‘Emperor System.’ The literature on the ‘Emperor System’—by Marxists, reactionaries, conservatives, liberals, etc., from all walks of life and academic disciplines—is immense. For a Marxist analysis, see Kiyoshi, Inoue, Tennō Sei (Tokyo: Tokyo Daigaku Shuppan Kai, 1953).Google Scholar For a conservative usage, see Tanshō, Yamazaki, Tennō Sei no Kenkyū (Tokyo: Teikoku Chihō Gyōsei Gakkai, 1959). The original meaning of the term has been further muddled by applying it to the postwar political system in such terms as ‘symbol emperor system’ (shōchō tennō sei) and ‘popular emperor system’ (taishū tennō sei).Google Scholar

⁵ Tatsukichi, Minobe, ‘Kempō Kaisei Mondai,’ Asahi Shimbun (20 and 21 October 1945).Google Scholar

⁶ Tatsukichi, Minobe, ‘Minshu Shugi to Waga Gikai Seido,’ Sekai (January 1946), p. 21.Google Scholar

⁷ For a discussion of Minobe's views in the immediate postwar period, see also Miller, Frank O., Minobe Tatsukichi: Interpreter of Constitutionalism in Japan (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1965), Ch. VIII.Google Scholar

⁸ Toshiyoshi, Miyazawa, in the Mainichi Shimbun (19 October 1945),Google Scholar as quoted in Isao, Satō, Kempō Kaisei no Kekka (2nd Edn, Tokyo: Nihon Hyōron Sha, 1948), p. 5.Google Scholar

⁹ Toshiyoshi, Miyazawa, ‘The August Revolution and the Principle of Sovereignty in the People,’ Sekai Bunka (May 1946),Google Scholar as cited in Genji, Okubo, Problems of the Emperor System in Postwar Japan (Tokyo: The Japan Institute of Pacific Studies, 1948), pp. 68–9.Google Scholar

¹⁰ Tomoo, Odaka, Kokumin Shuken to Tennō Sei (Tokyo: Kokuritsu Shoin, 1947), pp. 26–34. The original Diet record of the proceedings in the House of Peers was not available to me to verify Odaka's summary of Miyazawa's views. But in the ensuing debate between the two Miyazawa did not deny Odaka's summary and it is fair to assume that it is an accurate statement of Miyazawa's opinions expressed in the House of Peers.Google Scholar

¹¹ Tomoo, Odaka, ‘Kokumin Shuken to Tennō Sei,’ Kokka Gakkai Zasshi, LX, No. 10 (10 1946), pp. 18–43.Google Scholar

¹² ibid., pp. 18–19.

¹³ ibid., p. 20.

¹⁴ ibid., pp. 30–4.

¹⁵ ibid., pp. 36–7.

¹⁶ ibid., pp. 24, 38.

¹⁷ ibid., pp. 40–1.

¹⁸ ibid., pp. 41–2.

¹⁹ Toshiyoshi, Miyazawa, ‘Kokumin Shuken to Tennō Sei to ni tsuite no Oboegaki: Odaka Kyōju no Riron o Megutte,’ Kokka Gakkai Zasshi, LXII, No. 6 (06 1948), pp. 1–34.Google Scholar

²⁰ ibid., pp. 5–6.

²¹ ibid., pp. 21–5.

²² Tomoo, Odaka, ‘Jijitsu to shite no Shuken to Tōi to shite no Shuken,’ Kokka Gakkai Zasshi, LXIV, No. 4 (04 1950), pp. 4–6.Google Scholar

²³ ibid., p. 26.

²⁴ Kyōkai, Hōgaku, Chūkai Nihon Koku Kempō (10th edn, Tokyo: Yūhikaku, 1952), I, p. 45.Google Scholar

²⁵ Kyōkai, Hōgaku, Chūkai Nihon Koku Kempō (1st edn Rev., Tokyo: Yūhikaku, 1953), I, p. 63.Google Scholar

²⁶ Toshiyoshi, Miyazawa, Kempō (4th edn Rev., Tokyo: Yūhikaku, 1953), p. 163.Google Scholar

²⁷ ibid., pp. 162–3.

²⁸ Tetsurō, Watsuji, ‘Kokutai Henkō Ron ni tsuite Sasaki Hakushi no Oshie o Kou,’ in Watsuji Tetsurō Zenshū (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1962), XIV, pp. 355–68.Google Scholar

²⁹ ibid., pp. 355–7.

³⁰ ibid., pp. 358–9.

³¹ ibid., pp. 359–60.

³² ibid., pp. 360–3.

³³ ibid., pp. 363–4.

³⁴ ibid., pp. 364–8.

³⁵ Tetsurō, Watsuji, ‘Hōken Shisō to Shintō no Kyōgi,’ in Watsuji Tetsurō Zenshū, XIV, pp. 320–1.Google Scholar

³⁶ ibid., pp. 322–3.

³⁷ Tetsurō, Watsuji, ‘Sasaki Hakushi no Kyōji ni tsuite,’ in Watsuji Tetsurō Zenshū, XIV, pp. 368–89.Google Scholar

³⁸ For an enlightening, and critically sympathetic analysis of Watsuji's thought, including his approval of the 1947 Constitution,Google Scholar see Bellah, Robert N., ‘Japan's Cultural Identity: Some Reflections on the Work of Watsuji Tetsurō,’ Journal of Asian Studies, XXIV, No. 4 (08 1965), pp. 573–94.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

³⁹ Sōichi, Sasaki, ‘Tennō no Kokka-teki Shōchō Sei,’ in Tennō Sei Ron Shū (Tokyo: San'ichi Shobō, 1976), II, pp. 407–8.Google Scholar

⁴⁰ ibid., p. 409.

⁴¹ ibid., pp. 409–10. Sasaki later discovered that Baron Shidehara Kijūrō had found a foreign precedent for the use of ‘symbol’ in law: the Statute of Westminster (1926, 1931) had referred in its preamble to the British Crown as symbol of the free association of nations in the British Commonwealth. Shidehara had called the attention of the House of Peers to this precedent in September 1946, but Sasaki had not heard him right and read about it later in the proceedings of the House. ibid., pp. 410–11.

⁴² Miyazawa, , Kempō, pp. 178–9.Google Scholar

⁴³ Isao, Satō, Nihon Koku Kempō Jūni Kō (1st edn Rev., Tokyo: Gakuyō Shoten, 1956), pp. 240–1, 247, 249.Google Scholar

⁴⁴ Naoki, Kobayashi, Nihon ni okeru Kempō Dōtai no Bunseki (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1963).Google Scholar This was followed by an even more extensive public opinion analysis of constitutional issues by Kobayashi, , his Nihon Koku Kempō no Mondai Jōkyō (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1964).Google Scholar

⁴⁵ For an analysis of both polls see Titus, D. A., ‘Emperor and Public Consciousness in Postwar Japan,’ The Japan Interpreter, 2:6 (Summer 1970).Google Scholar A detailed analysis of the Kōfu poll, in Japanese, is given in Yoshida Yoshiaki, Titus, D. A. and others, ‘The “Symbol” Emperor in Public Consciousness—A Public Opinion Analysis in Kōfu City, Yamanashi Prefecture,’ Kiyo (Meiji University), No. 9 (1965).Google Scholar

⁴⁶ Titus, , ‘Emperor and Public Consciousness,’ p. 194.Google Scholar

⁴⁷ 32 per cent of the Meiji and 26 per cent of the Kōfu respondents replied that the existence of the imperial institution contradicted democracy. ibid., p. 190.

⁴⁸ See Tomitarō, Karasawa, Kyōkasho no Rekishi (Tokyo: Sōbun Sha, 1956), pp. 607–41,Google Scholarfor a discussion of educational reforms under the Occupation. Karasawa describes both the pathos and humor of the Japanese school teacher suddenly ordered to teach precisely the opposite of what he had previously been impelled to teach. He also reproduces a fascinating memorandum from Ienaga Saburō regarding Ienaga's role in, and what Ienaga heard about, the preparation of the first postwar textbook in Japanese history for use in the elementary schools, Kuni no Ayumi, published in late 1946. Ienaga notes in the memorandum that SCAP's basic policies with regard to demythologizing the emperor and imperial institution ‘were at one with the position of us historians for the most part.’Google Scholaribid., p. 623. Kuni no Ayumi, according to Karasawa, was of great significance in setting the course for the teaching of history in postwar Japanese schools. ibid., p. 628.

⁴⁹ These eleven are a small sample of the textbooks approved for use in the schools. For example, the Ministry of Education in 1968 listed 8 approved titles in history and 8 in civics, or social studies, for use in middle schools; for high schools, 27 titles in Japanese history, 18 in politics/economics, and 24 in ethics/society.Google ScholarShō, Mombu, Mombu Shō Tōkei Yōran (Tokyo: Okura Shō Insatsu Kyoku, 1968), pp. 82–3.Google Scholar In September 1978 I wrote to the Ministry of Education for a list of approved titles, and the numbers of each title in use, in these fields for 1965, but my letter went unanswered. I relied, therefore, on the textbook collection donated to the Faculty of Oriental Studies Library, Cambridge University, by the Japan Foundation, and my discussion is not as systematic or complete as I had hoped it would be. The 11 textbooks examined here are: Yasuo, Kazama and others, Shintei NIHON SHI (Tokyo: Tokyo Shoseki Kabushiki Kaisha, 1973). First approved by the Ministry of Education in 1964, revision approved in 1970, for use in high schools.Google ScholarTarō, Sakamoto, Shinhen Kōtō Gakkō NIHON SHI (Tokyo: Gakkō Tosho Kabushiki Kaisha, 1973). Approved for high schools in 1967.Google ScholarNobushige, Ukai and others, ATARASHII SHAKAI: Rekishi-teki Bunya (Tokyo: Tokyo Shoseki Kabushiki Kaisha, 1973). Approved for middle schools in 1971.Google ScholarKazuo, Kasahara and others, Chū Gakkō: SHAKAI: Rekishi-teki Bunya (Tokyo: Gakkō Tosho Kabushiki Kaisha, 1973). Approved for middle schools in 1971.Google ScholarMasamichi, Inoki and others, Kōtō Gakkō: SEIJI-KEIZAI: Kaiteiban (Tokyo: Gakkō Tosho Kabushiki Kaisha, 1973). First approved in 1967, revision approved in 1970, for use in high schools.Google ScholarMasamichi, Rōyama and others, Shinhen: SEIJI-KEIZAI: (Tokyo: Tokyo Shoseki Kabushiki Kaisha, 1973). First approved in 1967, revision approved in 1970, for use in high schools.Google ScholarNobushige, Ukai and others, ATARASHII SHAKAI: Kōmin-teki Bunya (Tokyo: Tokyo Shoseki Kabushiki Kaisha, 1973). Approved in 1971 for use in middle schools.Google ScholarTadaichi, Sagara and others, Chū Gakkō: SHAKAI: Kōmin-teki Bunya (Tokyo: Gakkō Tosho Kabushiki Kaisha, 1973). Approved in 1971 for middle schools.Google ScholarSaburō, Ōshima and others, Shō Gakkō: SHAKAI: 6-nen Ka (Tokyo: Gakkō Tosho Kabushiki Kaisha, 1973). Approved for elementary schools in 1970.Google ScholarHajime, Nakamura and others, RINRI-SHAKAI (Tokyo: Tokyo Shoseki Kabushiki Kaisha, 1973). Approved for high schools in 1972.Google ScholarYasumasa, Ōshima and others, Kōtō Gakkō: RINRI-SHAKAI (Tokyo: Gakkō Tosho Kabushiki Kaisha, 1973). Approved for high schools in 1972.Google Scholar

⁵⁰ Ukai, , ATARASHII SHAKAI: Kōmin-teki Bunya, pp. 179–80.Google Scholar

⁵¹ Sagara, , Chū Gakkō: SHAKAI: Kōmin-teki Bunya, p. 174.Google Scholar

⁵² Saburō, Ōshima, Shō Gakkō: SHAKAI: 6-nen Ka, p. 32.Google Scholar

⁵³ As indicated by public opinion polls, controversy does remain in postwar Japanese society concerning the emperor and imperial institution. And controversy still exists among academics. In 1975, for example, Kiyoshi, Inoue published his Tennō no Sensō Sekinin (Tokyo: Gendai Hyōron Sha, 1975),Google Scholar which condemned the emperor for his part in the Pacific War. Charles Sheldon has thoroughly criticized Inoue's arguments in his article, ‘Scapegoat or Instigator of Japanese Aggression? Inoue Kiyoshi's Case against the Emperor,’ Modern Asian Studies 12: 1 (1978), pp. 1–35.CrossRefGoogle Scholar The emperor's prewar role as ‘plotter’ was given international notoriety by fantasy, David Bergamini's, Japan's Imperial Conspiracy (New York & London: 1971).Google ScholarUniversally condemned by specialists on Japan, Bergamini's book is a detriment to a true understanding of the emperor and imperial institution in prewar Japan. For a critique of Bergamini and an accurate assessment of the emperor's position on issues of war, peace, and diplomacy during the 1930s,Google Scholar see Sheldon, Charles, ‘Japanese Aggression and the Emperor, 1931–1941, from Contemporary Diaries,’ Modern Asian Studies, 10:1 (1976), pp. 1–40. The emperor's ‘war responsibility’ is but one issue involving the emperor and imperial institution that lingers on in postwar Japan, despite the new constitutional orthodoxy, the textbooks, and, as we shall see, the efforts of the mass media and the palace bureaucracy.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁵⁴ ‘Gendaikko no Mita Tennō-zō,’ Shūkan Sankei (10 May 1965), p. 18.Google Scholar

⁵⁵ During my two years in Japan from 1963 to 1965 I collected over 70 articles and features about the imperial house from 25 editions of 11 different popular weeklies: Josei Myōjō, Josei Sebun, Sandė Mainichi, Shūkan Asahi, Shūkan Gendai, Shūkan Heibon, Shūkan Myōjō, Shūkan Sankei, Shūkan Taishū, Shūkan Yomiuri, and Yanguredei. Financial support during this period was generously provided by the Foreign Area Fellowship program.Google Scholar

⁵⁶ Shūkan Asahi (8 November 1963), Shūkan Gendai (14 November 1963), Shūkan Sankei (11 November 1963), Shūkan Taishū (21 November 1963).Google Scholar

⁵⁷ Both the engagement and marriage were front page news in all the leading newspapers as well as subjects for special features and even editions by the popular weeklies.Google Scholar

⁵⁸ Much has been done on prewar Japanese fascism, but much yet needs to be done on the cult of ‘emperor worship’ or ‘emperorism’—how and why it was created and the extent to which it was genuinely believed. As early as 1920 Dr William McGovern, Lecturer on Japanese at the School of Oriental Studies in the University of London, wrote: ‘… the earlier conception of the Emperor as a divine and mysterious figure, the Son of Heaven and the absolute fount of authority, has been maintained, and in recent years even augmented … Why is it, the Westerner may ask, that the Japanese give this wholehearted devotion to their rulers past or present? Why is it that if the vast majority of Japanese boys were asked what was their highest ambition in life they would answer, and answer sincerely and unhesitatingly, “To lay down our lives for the Emperor”?’Google ScholarMcGovern, William M., Modern Japan: Its Political, Military, and Industrial Organization (London: T. Fisher Unwin, 1920), pp. 124, 130.Google ScholarMany contemporary observers leave no doubt as to the cult's pervasiveness and intensity, especially from the 1920s. In his ‘human declaration’ (ningen sengen) of 1 January 1946 the emperor denied that he was divine. I have not discussed his declaration in the text because it was either not mentioned or mentioned only in passing by the school textbooks and the popular weeklies of the mid 1960s. The emperor's renunciation of divinity was, of course, important because, as the Myōjō Zōkan of May 1964 noted (p. 105), it began a ‘new age for the country of Japan, and for the imperial family.’ But the renunciation would not have been all that important had it not been followed by extensive efforts to humanize the emperor and imperial family, and it is these efforts that are of concern to us here.Google Scholar On the renunciation and its implications, see Kawai, Kazuo, Japan's American Interlude (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1960), Ch. V, especially pp. 84–5. In my estimation Kawai's chapter on the emperor in the early postwar period remains the best general essay on that subject to appear in English, and is indeed better than most essays in Japanese that I have read on this period.Google Scholar

⁵⁹ Shūkan Myōjō, No. 33 (11 August 1963), pp. 30–6.Google Scholar

⁶⁰ ibid., pp. 34–5. The accuracy of Sakomizu's account is not our concern here. For example, the war was by no means over ‘at that instant’ on August 9–10. Our concern is how the emperor is presented to the public by the mass media, and Sakomizu's account is revealing for that purpose.

⁶¹ ‘Enyūkai de no Hosuto-buri,’ Shūkan Sankei (10 May 1965), p. 16.Google Scholar

⁶² ‘Tennō no Isshūkan,’ ibid., p. 21.

⁶³ ‘Tennō no Ishokujū,’ ibid., p. 23.

⁶⁴ ‘Kaigai de Moteru Misutaa Hirohito,’ ‘Tennō-sama wa Oshiruko ga Suki,’ ibid. pp. 25, 51.

⁶⁵ ibid., p. 50.

⁶⁶ Ibid.

⁶⁷ ‘Tennō no Ningen-teki Rireki Nijū Nen,’ ibid., pp. 32–6; 'Tennō Ke no Ayumi, Myōjō Zōkan (May 1964), pp. 104–17.

⁶⁸ Shūkan Sankei, p. 35.Google Scholar

⁶⁹ ibid., p. 32; photo, p. 34.

⁷⁰ ibid., p. 32; Myōjō Zōkan (May 1964), pp. 105–6.

⁷¹ ‘Tennō no Isshūkan,’ Shūkan Sankei, p. 22.Google Scholar

⁷² ‘Tennō no Ningen-teki Rireki Nijū Nen,’ ibid., p. 34. As part of the humanization campaign the emperor had toured every area of Japan by the end of 1954. While these tours certainly brought the emperor closer to the people, they also caused various problems. One of the problems was that the emperor, ‘obviously ill at ease, hardly ever seemed able to respond with anything but a vacuous “Ah, so!” The observing crowds tittered and nicknamed him “Ah-so San,” meaning “Mr. Ah-so.”’ Kawai, Japan's American Interlude, p. 85.Google Scholar On the tours, see ibid., pp. 84–7.

⁷³ ‘Gendaikko no Mita Tennō-zō,’ Shūkan Sankei, p. 19.Google Scholar

⁷⁴ ‘Michiko-sama no Purezento, Omedeta Ojiichama Tennō ni mata Ureshii Hanashi,’ ibid., p. 27. This article also notes the unfortunate security restraints that restrict the activities of the emperor and members of the imperial family.

⁷⁵ For example, the article on the personal history of the emperor over the past 20 years in the Shūkan Sankei of 10 May 1965 was written by five successive palace reporters attached to the Sankei Shimbun.Google Scholar

⁷⁶ Murata, Kiyoaki, ‘Imperial Household Officials Planning Reform of Old Customs,’ Japan Times (4 January 1966).Google Scholar

⁷⁷ Chō, Kunai, pp. 34, 43. The ‘state property’ regulation was not without its humorous consequences. Were the emperor's glasses state property? His laboratory equipment? Finally, his clothes, glasses, and scientific equipment were classified as his personal private property, but his desk and ceremonial robes became state properly and were duly so marked. Shūkan Sankei, p. 33. The members of the imperial house, which includes the imperial family as well as branch houses, as of the end of 1965 were: the emperor (Hirohito, b. 29 April 1901); the empress (Nagako, b. 6 March 1903); the crown prince (Akihito, b. 23 Decembre 1933); the crown princess (Michiko, b. 20 October 1934); the two children of the crown prince and princess (Naruhito, or Prince Hiro, b. 23 April 1960, and Fumihito, or Prince Aya, b. 30 November 1965); the emperor's second son, Prince Hitachi (b. 28 November 1935) and his wife Hanako (b. 19 July 1940); Princess Chichibu (b. 9 September 1909), widow of the emperor's first brother; the emperor's second brother, Prince Takamatsu (b. 3 January 1905) and his wife Kikuko (b. 26 Decembre 1911); and the emperor's third brother, Prince Mikasa (b. 2 Decembre 1915), his wife Yuriko (b. 4 June 1923), and their four children (3 boys and 1 girl).Google ScholarDai Nihon Shinshi Roku (Tokyo: Tokyo Tantei Sha, 1972).Google Scholar

⁷⁸ Chō, Kunai, pp. 42, 13, 30–1.Google Scholar

⁷⁹ ibid., pp. 30–1.

⁸⁰ ibid., pp. 13–14, 27–8. Some 46,886 lanka were submitted for the 1964 Imperial New Year Poetry Party, of which 12 were selected to be recited in the presence of the emperor and empress. The number submitted was ‘an all-time record.’ Japan Times (11 January 1964).

⁸¹ Hisata, Kuroda, Tennō Ke no Zaisan (Tokyo: San'ichi Shobō, 1966), p. 109.Google Scholar

⁸² Chō, Kunai, pp. 44–5.Google Scholar

⁸³ ibid., p. 39.

⁸⁴ Titus, D. A., Palace and Politics in Prewar Japan (New York and London: Columbia University Press, 1974), p. 87.Google Scholar

⁸⁵ Kumao, Harada, Saionji-kō to Seikyoku, 9 vols (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1950–1956), II, p. 397.Google Scholar

⁸⁶ Chō, Kunai, p. 41.Google Scholar

⁸⁷ Titus, , Palace and Politics, p. 68. Dollar figures are based on the exchange rate for the year in question, here and elsewhere.Google Scholar

⁸⁸ Chō, Kunai, p. 42.Google Scholar

⁸⁹ Shūkan Sankei, (10 May 1965). p. 22.Google Scholar

⁹⁰ ibid., pp. 33–4.

⁹¹ Chō, Kunai, p. 10.Google Scholar

⁹² ibid., pp. 10–15.

⁹³ ibid., p. 25. The actions of the emperor in foreign relations, such as receiving the credentials of ambassadors posted to Japan, make the emperor Head of State in the eyes of many as far as diplomatic relations are concerned. But this is hardly ever mentioned publicly. If a government official were to say that the emperor was even ceremonial Head of State in this respect he would certainly be censured by the mass media and ‘public opinion.’ Hosokawa Ryūgen thinks this Japanese hypersensitivity to the Head of State issue is nonsense: it is taken for granted by foreigners that the emperor is Head of State in terms of formal diplomatic relations. Shūkan Sankei (10 May 1965), p. 50.

⁹⁴ Keiichi, Matsushita, ‘Taishū Tennō Sei Ron,’ Chūō Kōron, 74:5 (04 1959), p. 31.Google Scholar

⁹⁵ Koizumi Shinzō, the late tutor to the crown prince, denied any maneuvering by himself or by his palace colleagues regarding the crown prince's marriage. (Koizumi, interview, 1963). Whether the marriage was a spontaneous master stroke on the tennis court, or a master stroke on the part of the palace leadership, it was a master stroke nonetheless. Some consider the marriage as at best a risky experiment, however—one that possibly vulgarized the imperial institution by making it too ‘popular.’ The dignified distance of the emperor is essential to the imperial institution even in a democracy. (Comments by Japanese guests at the Columbia University Seminar on Modern Japan, 21 March 1975).Google Scholar

⁹⁶ When I asked Irie Sukemasa in 1964 about what the emperor thought of the present constitutional and political system, and his role therein, Irie responded with a positive elliptical: ‘Don't you think he doesn't think isn't a good system?.’Google Scholar

⁹⁷ However pathological a reconciliation of ‘art’ and ‘reality’, Mishima Yukio's spectacular suicide in November 1970 is still significant for the form it took, and for its rationalization: Mishima saw his suicide as a heroic act of patriotism, laying his life down for the emperor. This is the very essence of right-wing extremism, however psychotic, and very far from the current mainstream of thought and behavior in today's Japan. But it is still there.Google Scholar

⁹⁸ Murata, Kiyoaki, Japan Times (4 January 1966).Google Scholar