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Honesty and deception in populations of selfish, adaptive individuals

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  11 February 2016

David Catteeuw  and
Bernard Manderick
David Catteeuw
Affiliation:
Artificial Intelligence Lab, Vrije Universiteit Brussel, Pleinlaan 2, 1050 Brussels, Belgium e-mail: dcatteeu@vub.ac.be, bmanderi@vub.ac.be
Bernard Manderick
Affiliation:
Artificial Intelligence Lab, Vrije Universiteit Brussel, Pleinlaan 2, 1050 Brussels, Belgium e-mail: dcatteeu@vub.ac.be, bmanderi@vub.ac.be
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Abstract

Biologists have mostly studied under what circumstances honest signaling is stable. Stability, however, is not sufficient to explain the emergence of honest signaling. We study the evolution of honest signaling between selfish, adaptive individuals and observe that honest signaling can emerge through learning. More importantly, honest signaling may emerge in cases where it is not evolutionary stable. In such cases, honesty and dishonesty co-exist. Furthermore, honest signaling does not necessarily emerge in cases where it is evolutionary stable. We show that the latter is due to the existence of other, more important equilibria and that the importance of equilibria is related to Pareto-optimality.

Type
Articles
Information
The Knowledge Engineering Review , Volume 31 , Issue 1: Adaptive Learning Agents , January 2016 , pp. 19 - 30
Copyright
© Cambridge University Press, 2016 

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