In the winter of 1934–35, when John Maynard Keynes was beginning to circulate proofs of The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money, he indulged in a playful exchange of letters with George Bernard Shaw devoted mainly to the merits of Karl Marx as an economist. At the end of his letter of January 1, 1935, Keynes's observations took a more serious turn, documenting fundamental changes in his theoretical ambitions following the publication of his Treatise on Money in 1930: “To understand my state of mind, however, you have to know that I believe myself to be writing a book on economic theory which will largely revolutionize—not, I suppose, at once but in the course of the next ten years—the way the world thinks about economic problems” (Keynes 1973a, p. 492).

When François Quesnay began to publish on economics there were unmistakable indications that fundamental change was required in France. The finances of the State were in perpetual difficulty, and it had to borrow at higher interest rates than the private sector. Paris was the intellectual capital of Europe, and France was unquestionably one of Europe's great powers, but she had difficulty in simultaneously financing the Army and the Navy, which her international ambitions required. In the repeated wars with Great Britain in what has been described as the Second Hundred Years War (dating from 1688 until 1815) military weaknesses under the Bourbons associated with inadequacies of finance hampered France's efforts to match Britain in the colonization and exploitation of the wealth of North America and India. In the absence of representative institutions such as the British Parliament, the wealthy in France would not consent to the taxation required to establish the French State on a financial foundation commensurate with its political aspirations.

Loïc Charles and Philippe Steiner (2000) rightly draw our attention to Quesnay's neglected political views, namely the project of making France strong enough to confront England in economic and in military affairs. Schematically, Quesnay insists more upon wealth than upon population, which makes for a difference with most of the economists of his time, and more upon the navy than upon the army. Walter Eltis (1999) carefully relates the “explanations” of the Tableau économique contained in l'Ami des Hommes and the Philosophie rurale to the policy recommendations of Quesnay. He emphasizes the practical character of these different Tableaux in contrast with the abstract character of the first versions and of the Formule. He also gives a detailed account of the efects of diferent policies, namely the extension of grande culture, free trade of corn (which amounts to a higher price of corn), and tax reform. Gianni Vaggi (2001) insists on the modernization of agriculture as a decisive element of the power of a nation. Such preoccupations seem well in accordance with Quesnay's more general concern—that is, refounding the French monarchy on a natural order in which politics and economics can hardly be distinguished.

“PAUVRES PAYSANS, PAUVRE ROYAUME” (Quesnay's emphasis), this is the synthesis of the evil and damages of France in Extrait des économies royales de M. De Sully (Kuzcynski and Meek 1972, p. 10). This text is made up of twenty-four short maxims that accompany the third edition of the Tableau économique, in the first months of the 1759; the words quoted refer to a note and to maxim fourteen. A similar text, with the emphasis, is in the Maximes générales du gouvernemente économique d'un royaume agricole published in the 1767 in the Physiocratie by Pierre Samuel Du Pont de Nemours, a disciple of Francois Quesnay (INED 1958, vol. II, p. 973). This is no secondary item in the work of the master of Physiocracy; in this brief sentence and in that emphasis there is the synthesis and analysis of the main problem of France in the eighteenth century.

The Physiocrats “New Science” of Political Economy is often represented as unrelated to the pursuit of national power. A recent study (Fourquet 1989), which rests on the approaches of Fernand Braudel (1979) and Immanuel Wallerstein (1980), has radicalized the thesis already propounded by Edmond Silberner (1939) who claimed that Quesnay was profoundly ignorant of military matters and failed to understand the power struggles being played out on the seas and in the colonies. Did not Quesnay propose turning back to an agricultural economy, banishing industry, trade, and the navy—in short, all the active forces thanks to which Great Britain had snatched domination of the world economy from Holland and thanks to which she would prevent France from obtaining it?

Yet this thesis is weak. It must be remembered that Quesnay's first economic writings date from 1756–57, that is to say a period when confrontation between France and England was at a peak, with the start of the Seven Years' War. How could an author who claims to de ne the economic government ofan agricultural nation ignore the military problems which were so crucial in this period? Even if he wanted to, how could he succeed in doing so once he came to deal with taxes and the highly sensitive question of finance? How could he make himself understood by his contemporaries with a political theory that set aside all the burning issues of the day? How could he find an audience among those developing the science of commerce who always accorded great importance to the pursuit of power?

Under scrutiny the traditional thesis appears inaccurate. After recalling the writings of some of his contemporaries, whom Quesnay knew and read (section 1), I shall show that articles drafted between 1756 and 1757, like published or unpublished works which Mirabeau and Quesnay elaborated between 1757 and 1760, give significant room to the nation's military power, particularly when the economic government is in question (section 2). From the years 1763–64 the idea of a natural order does not lead Quesnay to neglect the pursuit of power (section 3). These links between power and wealth in the work of the founder of Physiocracy will lead finally to some remarks on political economy as a form of rationalization of politics.