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Perceptual Knowledge and the Primacy of Judgment



Rather than asking how what we are aware of in perceptual experience can give us knowledge of the independent world, this paper asks what conditions we as knowers must fulfill, what capacities we must have, and what the ‘objects of perception’ must be in the competent exercise those capacities, if we are to have any such knowledge. It is argued that we must be capable of perceiving that such-and-such is so and thereby knowing by perception alone what is so in the world as it is independently of us.



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Stroud, Barry. (2011) ‘Seeing What is So’. In Roessler, J., Lerman, H., and Eilan, N. (eds.), Perception, Causation, and Objectivity (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 92102.
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Journal of the American Philosophical Association
  • ISSN: 2053-4477
  • EISSN: 2053-4485
  • URL: /core/journals/journal-of-the-american-philosophical-association
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