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The Beliefs and Intentions of Buridan's Ass

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  12 December 2017

FINNUR DELLSÉN  and
NATHANIEL SHARADIN Open the ORCID record for NATHANIEL SHARADIN [Opens in a new window]
FINNUR DELLSÉN
Affiliation:
INLAND NORWAY UNIVERSITY OF APPLIED SCIENCEfinnurd@gmail.com
NATHANIEL SHARADIN
Affiliation:
SYRACUSE UNIVERSITYnatesharadin@gmail.com
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Abstract:

The moral of Buridan's ass is that it can sometimes be rational to perform one action rather than another even though one lacks stronger reason to do so. Yet, it is also commonly believed that it cannot ever be rational to believe one proposition rather than another if one lacks stronger reason to do so. This asymmetry has been taken to indicate a deep difference between epistemic and practical rationality. According to the view articulated here, the asymmetry should instead be explained by the difference between rational intentions and rational actions. Thus, it turns out, cases such as Buridan's ass do not indicate an asymmetry between epistemic and practical rationality as such.

Keywords

Buridan's assbeliefintentiondegree of beliefdegree of intentionrationality
Type
Articles
Information
Journal of the American Philosophical Association , Volume 3 , Issue 2 , Summer 2017 , pp. 209 - 226
Copyright
Copyright © American Philosophical Association 2017 

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